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A seemingly unassailable consensus in political economy states that secure and
private property rights are the institutional guarantor of economic growth. Gov-
ernments that protect investors’ rights to their returns, guarantee contracts as a
third-party, and abstain from expropriating or over-regulating property rights accel-
erate long-term economic growth. Dani Rodrik and his co-authors state the consen-
sus plainly: “Institutions rule.” (Rodrik et al 2004) . Moreover, this institutional
consensus has moved beyond the academy, influencing approaches to foreign aid,
regulatory reform, and public policy. Nevertheless, the hegemony of this approach
to economic institutions masks both conceptual and empirical weaknesses. Criti-
cally, it assumes that the protection of private property is a public good. The public
good assumption presumes that governments cannot discriminate the protection of
private property, favoring certain groups’ rights and not others. Within a country,
the security of private property is uniform across citizens and can be measured as
such.
In this dissertation, I dispute this conventional institutional account and propose
a new understanding of property rights institutions, their effect on economic activ-
ity, and their political origins. The linchpin of my approach is simple. I assume
1
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that economic agents demand — and politicians can provide — property rights dis-
crimination, protecting certain groups’ rights while willfully ignoring or even delib-
erately violating other groups’ rights. Property rights discrimination creates parallel
economies within the same country — one consisting of protected rights and dy-
namism and the other consisting of unprotected rights and stagnation. The shape of
property rights discrimination in turn shapes economic inequality and threatens per
capita economic growth.
I therefore predicts that an as yet hidden important institutional phenomenon
exists, varies meaningfully across countries, has critical implications for economic
performance, and is the outcome of a discoverable process. In short, I ask: Why
do politicians discriminate the protection of private property rights more in certain
countries than others? I argue that the shape of property rights discrimination —
the size of the “out” group and the severity of discrimination against it — depends on
how political institutions structure bargaining between political leaders and citizens.
The remainder of this chapter discusses the extant literature on property rights,
summarizes a conceptual and empirical puzzle that challenges the current consensus,
and summarizes my approach to property rights discrimination.
1.1 Institutions Rule
Over the last fifteen years, economists’ research agenda on long-term economic
growth has increasingly turned to “institutions” — the rules that govern economic
activity — as the critical determinant of cross-national differences in levels of wealth
and economic growth. In particular, they have focused on rules that protect private
property rights. Rodrik (2004: 10) states that “There is now widespread agreement
among economists studying economic growth that institutional quality holds the key
3
to prevailing patterns of prosperity around the world.”1
This confidence in the power of property rights institutions originates in simple
yet powerful microeconomic theory. A risk-averse economic agent contemplating
investment will refrain from doing so when she fears her future returns will be expro-
priated (Kydland and Prescott 1977: 486) . Ronald Coase (1960) extends this logic
to argue that when transaction costs are negligible, the creation and enforcement
of private property rights is sufficient for economic efficiency, regardless of who is
allocated those rights initially. Institutional economics has transformed this logic
into a narrative on long-term macroeconomic performance. Alchian and Demsetz
(1973) emphasize the conflictual nature of economic competition and the need for a
mechanism that can regulate and pacify that competition by defining and enforcing
private property rights. Douglass North (1981 , 1990 ) towers over this literature.
North cites several channels through which the protection of private property rights
underlies subsequent economic performance. He argues that advances in technol-
ogy depend on the gap between private and social returns to innovation, which in
turn depends on the design of economic institutions that govern returns to inven-
tions (1981: 16) . Since the rate of technological change in large part determines
the rate of economic growth, economic institutions are integral to economic change.
Apart from their effect on the rate of technological change, economic institutions
(i.e., the rules that structure property rights) affect economic performance through
their influence on the level of transaction costs in an economy (1990). They provide
the “structure for exchange that determines the cost of transacting and the cost of
transformation” (1990, 34). Transactions among economic actors, he explains, have
become increasingly complex over time. Rather than restricting their transactions to
1Not all economists subscribe to such strong statements of the institutionalist literature. For example, see Sachs
(2003) and Rodrik’s own even-handed review of the empirical literature on property rights and macroeconomic
performance (2004) .
4
people with whom they already have close bonds, economic actors increasingly have
relied on more complex transactions with strangers, which they enforce with third-
parties (1990, 35). When institutions produce high transaction costs and insecure
property rights, the results are dire: the use of obsolete technologies, low investment
in fixed capital, the avoidance of long-term agreements, overly small firms, and an
overall inefficient organization of production (North, 1990, 65). At worst, economic
actors eschew economic exchange altogether or perhaps move their transactions into
the informal market (North, 1990, 67).
Subsequent institutionalists working in development economics echo North’s claims.
Acemoglu and his co-authors (2004:9) define economic institutions as those that “pro-
vide security of property rights and relatively equal access to economic resources to
a broad cross-section of society.” They follow North in forcefully arguing that eco-
nomic institutions are the fundamental causes of economic performance (Acemoglu,
et al, 2004, 2-3). In their version of the Northian story, without good property rights
institutions, technological advances will slow and investment in human and physical
capital will collapse (1-2). Echoing Coase (1960) and Alchian and Demsetz (1973),
they argue that economic institutions, when properly designed, allocate property
rights to the most efficient users guaranteeing that a society makes the best use of
its resources.
Empirically, political economists have set out to rigorously test the proposition
that private property rights underlie long-term economic performance. In dozens
of studies, they have found support for this narrative, inspiring Rodrik and his co-
authors’ statement that “Institutions rule.” Steven Knack and Philip Keefer (1995)
show that indexes of property rights are highly correlated with subsequent long-
term economic growth. Separately, Knack (1996) finds that convergence of poor
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countries to richer countries’ standards of living is conditional on the quality of
economic institutions. Keefer and Knack (1997) corroborate this finding, showing
that countries with poor economic institutions tend to fall further behind richer
countries. Olson, Jr. and his co-authors (2000) find that economic institutions
are a significant predictor of productivity growth. Christopher Clague and his co-
authors (1999) find that their measure of property rights also correlates strongly with
economic growth and investment. Similarly, Timothy Besley (1995) finds evidence in
Ghana that secure land rights matter greatly for investments in land. Svensson (1998)
finds that the effect of political instability on investment rates depends entirely on
its negative effect on the security of private property rights. Acemoglu and Robinson
(2001) and Hall and Jones (1999) find that economic institutions are important for
subsequent economic growth, even when they use two-stage least squares regression
and instrument for economic institutions to account for possible endogeneity between
institutions and economic growth.
Moreover, empirical studies consistently have supported the idea that economic
institutions are better guarantors of economic performance than democratic political
institutions. Using sophisticated empirical methods, Robert Barro finds a statisti-
cally and substantively significant positive effect of the rule of law on economic
growth. Meanwhile, democracy has a weak and curvilinear effect on growth (Barro,
1997, 2000). Leblang (1996) also directly compares the effects of democracy and
sound economic institutions on economic growth and finds that economic institu-
tions support economic growth, whereas democratic political institutions have little
effect. In head-to-head tests, Yi Feng (2003) finds that policy uncertainty outweighs
political freedom as a risk factor fro economic growth. Aron (2000) finds that mea-
sures of democracy mean very little for economic growth, whereas measures of the
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quality of economic institutions matter a great deal, though she cautions that results
remain unstable (125). David Leblang seems to summarize several studies when he
states, “To put it bluntly, in attempting to isolate political prerequisites for economic
growth we have focused on the wrong institutions [i.e., political democracy]” (1996;
6).
Political economists’ focus on property rights coincides with a long-standing dis-
cussion in comparative politics of state formation and state capacity. In the first
sentence of Political Order in Changing Societies, Samuel Huntington famously pro-
nounced that, “The most important political distinction among countries concerns
not their form of government but their degree of government” (Huntington 1968:
1). Charles Tilly (1975) contends that bargaining between owners of capital and
owners of coercion resulted in the state capacity to tax the populace and provide
services (e.g., law and order). Herbst (2000) echoes these approaches in his work
on state-building in Africa. Though these studies do not explicitly study macroeco-
nomic growth, they echo economists’ focus on property rights in their prioritization
of the state’s capacity to promote law and order through judicial institutions, and
the enforcement of rules.
The current consensus on the power of private property rights is no mere aca-
demic debate. Economists have translated research into policy, beginning with their
discourse on development. Hernando de Soto’s research on property rights (2000)
and policy work at the Institute for Liberty and Democracy ILD in Peru has en-
gendered wide interest in both academia and public policy. In a book designed to
foster public debate, Paul Collier, former head of development research at the World
Bank, identified “bad governance” as one of four traps in which poor countries be-
come enmeshed (2007). Furthermore, new measurement efforts designed to assess the
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quality of the environment for development have focused on concepts closely related
to property rights security. Two indexes of “economic freedom” assess the degree to
which economic actors in country freely transact, with sub-measures dedicated to the
security of their property rights from other citizens and the state itself.2 The World
Bank’s Doing Business dataset changes the focus of more academic debates on prop-
erty rights to their implications for business regulations, measuring, for example, the
difficulty of obtaining government enforcement of contracts and registration of new
businesses. Robert Barro, whose research is cited above, encapsulated this public
discourse in a 1997 article in the Hoover Digest, the public policy journal of Stan-
ford’s Hoover Institute. In it, he dismissed both the possibility and the desirability of
democratization in post-Mobuto Democratic Republic of Congo. He proposed that
Laurent Kabila eschew instituting free elections and the sharing of political power
and instead “concentrate on property rights and free markets . . . With respect to a
quick move to Western-style democracy, perhaps the best advice would be for Kabila
to consult more with Singapore’s Lee and less with America’s Clinton.”
Apart from public discourse, reform of institutions that protect private property
has assumed a high priority for government agencies and multilateral institutions
charged with aiding developing countries. The Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC), an arm of the United States government dedicated to development policy,
has created selection criteria for potential aid recipients, including a subset of the
Doing Business ’ indicators. Another broad set of criteria is “ruling justly,” which
includes measures of the rule of law that economists often have used to code the
security of private property rights. In essence, the MCC makes reform of institutions
that protect private property a precursor for aid programs. Similarly, the World Bank
2There are two major data projects in this regard: the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom and
the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World.
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has placed governance — a concept that includes the core concerns of the property
rights consensus — at the center of its reform agenda, leveraging research projects
such as the Doing Business indicators and the Worldwide Governance Indicators
(which measure the quality of institutions that promote the rule of law and regulate
economic activity). Within the Bank, the Public Sector and Governance Group has
focused the Bank’s attention on reforming the state itself, rather than implementing
specific policies. As part of that effort, the Governance and Anti-Corruption (GAC)
group aims to “help develop capable and accountable states and institutions that can
devise and implement sound policies, provide public services, set the rules governing
markets, and combat corruption, thereby helping to reduce poverty” (World Bank
2007). Improving the institutions that protect private property, those institutions
that “set the rules governing markets,” has thus taken precedence in promoting
economic development in poor countries.
1.2 Cracks in the Foundation
The hegemonic view from institutional economics, therefore, states that countries
that more vigorously protect private property rights accelerate economic growth.
That consensus increasingly has shaped public policy in the field of international
development, including within powerful government agencies and multilateral or-
ganizations. Indeed, most public discourse on development at least references the
consensus on protecting private property, at least as a component in a wider strategy
on improving governance.
Nevertheless, a small, but growing group of scholars has begun to criticize the
current consensus regarding private property rights. Take together, these critiques
question the conceptual underpinnings of the consensus on property rights. Most
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begin by questioning the conceptual clarity of the agenda. Rodrik (2004:12) ad-
mits that the economic institutional quality “remains a nebulous concept.” Though
investor confidence clearly underpins investment and growth, he reasons, the liter-
ature has failed to identify the specific organs of the state that underlie that con-
fidence. Multiple paths — including paths generally considered heterodox within
economics — might lead to investor confidence, including state ownership of firms.
Until economists identify such roads and their effects on economic performance, the
consensus on property rights will not yield more useful policy advice. Kurtz and
Schrank (2007a, 2007b) echo Rodrik’s (2004) critique, arguing that concept forma-
tion remains surprisingly weak in the literature on governance. In particular, extant
measures confuse policy and structure; concepts scholars have tended to regard as
institutions (e.g., expropriation) in reality are policies determined by the interaction
of various structures, such as bureaucracies. Policies depend on the transitory wishes
of political leaders, with more ephemeral effects on economic activity. In contrast,
institutions effect more enduring change on economic activity.
Kurtz and Schrank (2007a, 2007b) then proceed to raise the issue of the distri-
butional issues at stake in protecting private property, a point that reverberates in
other theoretical inquiries into property rights. One function of property rights in-
stitutions remains resolving conflicts over rights, a function emphasized by Alchian
and Demsetz (1973). In such cases, they reason, economists tend to overstate the
“transparency and intelligibility” of adversaries’ claims (2007b: 564). In the absence
of a plainly justified winner of the dispute, it remains unclear how “good” institutions
will resolve the dispute, since the main question at stake likely concerns distribution
rather than efficiency. Kurtz and Schrank (2007b) thus raise a point analyzed inten-
sively by Knight (1992), who treats the creation of social institutions more generally
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and rules that protect private property more specifically. Whereas the distributional
implications of property rights institutions merit only passing reference in previous
accounts, Knight (1992) places them at the center of his theory. Social outcomes
— macroeconomic efficiency in the case of property rights institutions — are the
by-product of battles among self-interested agents to control each others’ actions, all
in the quest of maximizing individual payouts. He emphasizes that any attempt to
explain the creation and evolution of social institutions must originate in an analysis
of competing interests.
Haber, Razo, and Maurer (2003) deepen Knight’s (1992) logic and point the
way to a different understanding of property rights institutions. Haber, Razo, and
Maurer (2003) seek to explain how economic growth often continues during periods
of extreme political instability and even civil war. Politicians buffeted by threats to
their rule, they reason, immediately should expropriate rights. They cannot commit
credibly to the protection of private property. How, then, does growth continue? The
answer, they claim, depends on politicians’ ability to differentiate across citizens the
protection of private property rights:
Governments have strong incentives to specify property rights as private
goods . . . When it comes to the enforcement of property rights, however,
the strategy of the government is less clear. Governments can enforce
property rights as a public good by protecting the rights of asset holders
indiscriminately, without consideration of the identity of the particular
asset holder. They can also choose to enforce property rights selectively,
enforcing the rights of only some special group of asset holders. In this
case, property rights is a private, not a public good. (Haber, Razo, and
Maurer 2003: 21-22, emphasis in original)
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Rights should be private, but political institutional economists implicitly assume the
protection of those private rights to be public in nature. Yet a rational economic
agent does not require that other agents’ rights be protected in order for her to max-
imize her returns (22). In fact, they may demand selective enforcement, particularly
during periods of political instability.
Acemoglu and his co-authors (2004), whose research has contributed greatly to
the empirical consensus discussed in Section 5.1, advance a similar narrative. Though
institutional economics has quantified the importance of property rights institutions,
they argue, the field continues to lack an adequate explanation of their origins and
divergence across countries. Their answer to this question mirrors Knight’s (1992)
approach to social institutions and Haber, Razo and Maurer’s (2003) approach to
growth through instability. They argue that economic institutions are chosen for
their distributional consequences, particularly because the distribution of economic
resources can be transformed into political power (59). Politicians can bargain with
elites to create economic institutions that discriminate against the interests of non-
elites. This adds a new dimension to the definition of “good” property rights insti-
tutions, which they define as follows:
. . . those that provide security of property rights and relatively equal ac-
cess to economic resources to a broad cross-section of society. Although
this definition is far from requiring equality of opportunity in society, it
implies that societies where only a very small fraction of the population
have well-enforced property rights do not have good economic institutions
(Acemoglu, et al, 2004, 9).
Importantly, Acemoglu and his co-authors (2004) supplement their account of the po-
tential differentiation of property rights security by recognizing that bargaining over
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those institutions occurs in the shadow of political institutions. Libecap’s (1989)
bargaining model of property rights institutions evokes this language, characterizing
property rights allocation as a bargaining between economic agents focused on distri-
butional gains and political agents. Sened (1997) explicitly recognizes this point by
describing private property as fundamentally a political institution. And in no way is
the distributional critique absent from foundational accounts of property rights insti-
tutions. North (1981: 22) recognizes that political actors may expropriate the rights
of certain classes of citizens in order to re-distribute those rights to other classes.
We may crystallize two broad critiques of the hegemonic approach from this short
review. First, property rights institutions likely affect the distribution of economic
payoffs and thus prompt self-interested economic agents to pursue advantageous in-
stitutions. The strong version of this critique states that the collective benefits of
private property rights so closely studied by economists are entirely incidental. In
concentrating on these collective benefits, institutional economists have committed
a kind of ecological inference, aggregating a micro-institutional story (i.e., in which
institutions affect private gains to economic activity) into a macro-institutional anal-
ysis. Second, self-interested politicians are intimately involved in the design of such
institutions, usually in collaboration with economic agents. Spurred by demands for
institutional changes that institutionalize agents’ private benefits, they can supply
property rights discrimination, strategically differentiating the protection of private
property so that certain groups’ rights are protected and others’ are not.
1.3 An Empirical Puzzle
Empirically speaking, the foregoing critique envisions an empirical regularity un-
foreseen by the dominant research program in institutional economics. In that pro-
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gram, scholars assume implicitly that institutions that protect private property do
so uniformly. Regardless of institutional quality, property rights confidence does not
vary meaningfully within countries. In contrast, seriously considering the distribu-
tional implications of private property suggests that economic agents demand —
and politicians can provide — property rights discrimination. If so, we should ob-
serve that individuals’ confidence in the security of their property rights varies both
within and across countries. Unsurprisingly, extant research affords little opportu-
nity to quantify property rights discrimination, since scholars have not admitted that
the phenomenon existss.
Fortunately, new data from the World Bank enable exactly this kind of evaluation.
The Bank’s Enterprise Surveys (ES ) project has conducted 135 random surveys of
firm managers in 98 countries since 2000. Within countries, firms are chosen for in-
clusion using a simple random sampling methodology, sampling from the population
of registered businesses with over five employees. At the country-level, the ES tend
to concentrate on larger economies within regions, with a slight regional bias towards
Eastern Europe. The ES ask firm managers a wide range of questions, including a
battery of questions regarding the firm manager’s confidence in the country’s insti-
tutional environment. Question 46 asks the firm manager the following question:
“‘I am confident that the judicial system will enforce my contractual and property
rights in business disputes.’ To what degree do you agree with this statement?”
Firm managers respond on a six-point scale ranging from 1 (“fully disagree”) to 6
(“fully agree”), with higher values corresponding to greater confidence in their prop-
erty rights. In Chapter 3, I will attend more carefully to a more broad coding of firm
managers’ property rights confidence, utilizing coding rules and statistical methods
to sharpen the comparison of firm managers’ responses across countries. However, a
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simple comparison of responses to this key question equips us to gauge the extent of
property rights discrimination within and across countries.
I begin this simple analysis by surveying the range of responses for a country we
may safely assume strongly protects private property rights for all citizens, largely
refraining from property rights discrimination — Germany. Figure 1.1 depicts the
set of responses of German firm managers to Question 46, with the mean response
marked with an asterisk.
Figure 1.1: Property rights discrimination in Germany
Figure 1.1 depicts a left-skewed distribution; the majority of respondents reply that
they feel great confidence in the judicial system’s protection of private property
rights. The mean response of approximately 4.7 places the mean response between
the “tend to agree” and “mostly agree” categories. The distribution of responses
clusters tightly at the high end of the scale. The standard deviation is approximately
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one category. Nearly 90% of respondents respond within one standard deviation of
the modal response of “mostly agree.” Though the remaining 10% of respondents
evince a lack of confidence in their private property rights, we can conclude without
doing undue injury to the data that firm managers in Germany are generally confident
in the protection of their private property rights.
Germany’s firm managers evince precisely the kind of pattern the dominant view
of property rights might expect — high mean confidence with very little variation
about the mean. Figure 1.1 portrays a country with little property rights discrimi-
nation. Do other countries evince a similar pattern? Figure 1.2 graphs the standard
deviation against the mean for each country surveyed in the ES, along with the bi-
variate regression line linking mean to standard deviation. The horizontal axis of
the graph demonstrates that countries vary in mean property rights confidence, as
institutional economists might expect. Conversely, the hegemonic view of property
rights as a macro-institution cannot account for variation along the vertical axis,
which describes the pattern of inter-country variation in intra-country variation in
property rights confidence. Germany, located in the bottom right-hand corner of
the graph exemplifies countries with high mean protection and low variation about
the mean — these might be described as having “good” institutions. Countries
tending towards the bottom left-hand corner of the graph (e.g., Bangladesh 2002,
Moldova 2002, Cambodia 2003) also have relatively low variation, but a far lower
mean. These countries tend to reflect economists’ implicit assumption of “bad” in-
stitutions — firms are pessimistic regarding the legal protection of their property
rights, but they are uniformly pessimistic.
In contrast, two areas of the graph indicate a more intense degree of property
rights discrimination. Countries tending towards the upper right-hand corner (e.g.,
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Figure 1.2: Comparing the distribution of property rights confidence in a variety of countries
Malawi 2005, Kosovo 2003, Chile 2004) are characterized by distributions with both a
high mean and high variance, indicating that some set of firm managers deviates from
the mean assessment. Finally, countries in the upper left-hand corner of the graph
(e.g., Ecuador, Nicaragua, Pakistan) indicate a different pattern of property rights
discrimination. Though property rights confidence is generally low, high variation
in the distribution suggests that, while the protection of private property rights is
on average poor, a relatively large minority enjoys relatively secure private property
rights.3
Figure 1.2 summarizes how countries diverge in the distribution of their private
3Note in Figure 1.2 that Latin American countries tend to be located above the regression line that shows the
bivariate relationship between the mean and standard deviation. In short, Latin American countries tend to have
higher variation in property rights discrimination than their mean confidence would predict (e.g., Chile, Ecuador,
Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador). Also note that OECD countries tend to be located
below the regression line, demonstrating that they tend to have lower variation in property rights protection than
their (high) mean would predict (e.g., Germany, Spain, Greece).
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Figure 1.3: Comparing the distribution of property rights confidence in four countries
property rights. However, it does so only superficially; the impact of a particular
standard deviation on the distribution of property rights confidence remains unclear.
Figure 1.3 clarifies the empirical picture by reproducing Figure 1.1 for four countries
depicted in Figure 1.2, chosen so as to compare their mean confidence level. Malawi
and Vietnam each exhibit high and nearly identical mean property rights confidence,
whereas Nicaragua and Moldovoa exhibit low and nearly identical mean property
rights confidence. However, the countries exhibit very different distributions. Firm
managers in Nicaragua and Malawi report high variance in their property rights con-
fidence, in contrast to Moldova’s and Vietnam’s low variance. Figure 1.3 provides
evidence in favor of the notion that the distribution of property rights confidence
varies meaningfully across countries. Malawi and Vietnam, which share a similar
mean, have very different patterns of property rights discrimination. Vietnam’s dis-
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tribution of property rights confidence resembles Germany’s to some degree, with
a distribution tightly clustered around the modal response and only 5-6% of re-
spondents reporting very low confidence in their property rights. In contrast, fully
20% of firms in Malawi report very low confidence in the judiciary’s protection of
their private property; similarly, a much larger percentage of firms report very high
confidence than in Vietnam (approximately 55% in Malawi versus about 35% in
Vietnam). In turn, Moldova’s distribution seems the mirror image of Vietnam’s,
with a relatively tight distribution around a lower mean. Meanwhile, Nicaraguan
firm managers report a far wider distribution of property rights confidence, with a
far higher percentage of firms at both the bottom and the top of the scale.
This analysis suggests that property rights confidence varies within countries and
that that variation itself varies across countries. In combination with the conceptual
critique detailed in Section 1.2, it suggests that economists’ focus on the “quality”
of property rights institutions is misplaced, since it misinterprets both conceptually
and empirically the phenomenon it describes. The general quality of property rights
institutions, however measured, is a mathematic fiction, since property rights insti-
tutions can differentiate which citizens they protect and how securely they protect
them.
We may summarize the end point of this theoretical and empirical critique in
Huntingtonian terms. Whereas Huntington (1968) declares that the degree of gov-
ernment is the most important distinction among countries, I claim that it is the
distribution of government that truly distinguishes countries. At present, we lack
a theory of why property rights discrimination varies across countries, an empiri-
cal description of that variation, and an analysis of its effect on microeconomic and
macroeconomic performance.
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1.4 Property Rights Discrimination: A New Approach
This dissertation remedies these weaknesses in our understanding of the politics
of private property by answering the following question: Why do politicians discrim-
inate the protection of private property rights more in certain countries than others?
Answering this question demands a novel approach to describing the distribution
of property rights confidence; quantifying its microeconomic and macroeconomic ef-
fects; and explaining its origins. Below, I describe my approach and outline the
remainder of the dissertation.
1.4.1 A Theory of Property Rights Discrimination
Chapter 2 contains a theory of property rights discrimination, beginning by care-
fully defining two concepts that at times remain dangerously nebulous in research
in this field — property rights and property rights institutions. First, I diverge
from conventional assumptions regarding property rights institutions by theorizing
how self-interested economic agents’ payouts from economic activity depend on how
institutions allocate rights, adjudicate disputes, and enforce agents’ claims. An eco-
nomic agent undoubtedly benefits indirectly from the protection of others’ rights.
However, her economic choices respond more strongly to the protection of her own
rights. At minimum, she lobbies politicians more readily for the protection of her
own rights. More likely, she profits when other actors’ rights are neglected, partic-
ularly when this neglect allows her to violate those rights for her own gain. Rather
than united by common interests in “efficient” property rights institutions, economic
actors preferences for institutional design diverge dramatically. Under certain cir-
cumstances, politicians will respond to pressure to engage in property rights discrim-
ination, building institutions that more strongly protect certain actors’ or classes of
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actors’ rights.
Second, Chapter 2 then turns to an analysis of the economic repercussions of prop-
erty rights discrimination. In doing so, it retains the core microeconomic logic that
an economic agent will delay or cancel investment when she fears her future returns
will be expropriated (Kydland and Prescott 1977), but disaggregates it to understand
how property rights discrimination affects both microeconomic and macroeconomic
payoffs. Property rights discrimination creates two parallel economies — an “in”
group of protected rights and an “out” group of unprotected rights. This institu-
tional division has two critical economic effects. First, it depresses economic activity
within the “out” group. Second, it dampens aggregate economic activity by failing
to allow rights to accrue to the most efficient economic agents.
Recognizing the existence and repercussions of property rights discrimination of-
fers a far more complete definition of institutional failure and one that allows a more
incisive account of the origins of the failure to protect private property rights. Chap-
ter 2 offers such an explanation. I argue that sudden changes in the relative value
of economic resources create demand for the modification of existing property rights
institutions. Economic agents seek to create new rules that will privilege their par-
ticular claims. They thus bargain with self-interested politicians over the changes.
However, economic agents are not equally able to pressure politicians; the logic of
collective action dictates that certain actors will more effectively organize around
their preferred institutions. Smaller, more homogenous interests — and in particular
those dominated by rich actors — more likely will overcome the collective action
problem and lobby political actors. Thus, they more likely benefit from property
rights discrimination.
Finally, Chapter 2 expands upon this account by considering explicitly how politi-
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cians’ incentives to retain power shape their willingness to collude with certain sets of
citizens to discriminate the protection of private property. The benefit of a political
institutional approach to property rights discrimination lies in its ability not only to
predict the distribution of citizens’ confidence in their private property rights, but
also the identification of which citizens more likely fall in the “in” group. I con-
sider two political institutional theories of property rights discrimination. The first
blends disparate claims regarding the effect of democratic governance on property
rights protections. By constraining executive power, democratic political institutions
likely reduce the severity of property rights discrimination generally. However, the
expansion of the politically relevant strata of society shift the pattern of discrim-
ination. Whereas autocratic regimes likely discriminate in favor of richer actors,
democratic regimes will discriminate against them. Chapter 2 also harnesses the
selectorate theory of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and his co-authors (2003) to the
question of property rights discrimination. This rigorous approach to political in-
stitutions strongly suggests that the pattern of property rights discrimination varies
not only between democracies and non-democracies, but among different kinds of
non-democracy. A leader’s willingness to discriminate against citizens outside the
winning coalition depends on the size of the winning coalition and the selectorate
(i.e., those citizens empowered to choose the leader).
1.4.2 An Empirical Approach to Property Rights Discrimination
Chapter 2 concludes with three empirically verifiable predictions. First, property
rights discrimination exists and varies meaningfully across countries. Second, it skews
the distribution of economic activity and depresses aggregate production. Finally, an
individual’s property rights confidence is dependent on the intersection of the political
constellation and her place within that constellation. Chapters 3 and 4 are dedicated
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to testing these three predictions. Chapter 3 begins by advocating the use of firm-
level data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, described briefly above, as a
means for quantifying property rights discrimination and its consequences. Whereas
extant measures of property rights security tends to make strong and often hidden
distributional assumptions, firm-level surveys allow economic agents themselves to
describe the distribution of property rights confidence in a country. Though certainly
imperfect, the careful use of the data helps to paint an empirical portrait of prop-
erty rights discrimination. As predicted in Chapter 2 and briefly described here in
Section 1.3, the property rights confidence varies within countries and that variation
itself varies meaningfully across countries.
Chapter 3 also investigates statistically whether firm-level and/or aggregate eco-
nomic performance depends on the distribution of property rights confidence. Be-
ginning at the firm-level, I find tentative evidence that firm managers with less
confidence in their private property rights invest less, operate at lower capacity, and
hide a greater percentage of their revenues from the State, all else equal. Concen-
trating on firm informality, the results also indicate that a firm manager reacts more
strongly to the protection of her private property rights than the mean level of prop-
erty rights confidence in the economy. Finally, the distribution of property rights
confidence also affects national-level informality; in countries with severe property
rights discrimination, increases in the mean level of property rights security does not
reduce informality.
Chapter 4 turns to the most important prediction of my theoretical framework,
which concerns the political institutional bases of property rights discrimination.
Statistical analysis supports my intuition that particular kinds of firms will enjoy
better property rights protections due to their ability to overcome the collective ac-
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tion problem. Larger, state-owned, and exporting firms all enjoy more secure private
property rights. The hypothesized role of democracy described above receives quali-
fied support. Evidence tentatively suggests that democratic governance does reduce
the amount of variation in property rights confidence. However, stronger evidence
suggests that that effect partially depends on democracy’s negative correlation with
property rights managers’ property rights confidence. It would seem that democratic
countries more likely inhabit the lower left-land corner of Figure 1.2. However, it
does not appear that the pattern of property rights discrimination according to cit-
izens’ wealth materializes in the data. Democratic leaders seem no more prone to
expropriating the property rights of large firms than smaller ones. While mixed
regimes do tend to discriminate against smaller firms, there is little evidence that
this effect is shared by autocratic regimes. Further analysis uncovers a particularly
interesting pattern — autocratic regimes more likely discriminate in favor of polit-
ically influential firms than democratic or even mixed regimes. Finally, Chapter 4
estimates a series of preliminary tests of the selectorate theory. That testing reveals
intriguing differences among regimes, if not entirely as predicted by the selectorate
theory.
Chapters 3 and 4’s statistical analysis accomplishes several goals, depicting em-
pirically the existence of property rights discrimination among firms and uncovering
tentative evidence of its origins and consequences. However a number of factors
— the embryonic nature of research into property rights discrimination, relatively
weak statistical results in Chapters 3 and 4, and continuing confusion over defining
clearly the institutions that protect private property — suggest the utility of marry-
ing small-n case analysis to this research agenda. Moreover, case analysis promises to
highlight whether reform of property rights institutions resembles, even superficially,
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Chapter 2’s depiction of bargaining.
Chapter 5, therefore, shifts focus, carefully elaborating bargaining over reform of
rules governing land rights in Colombia in the late 19th and 20th centuries. Fifty
years after its independence, nearly 75% of Colombia remained untouched, the prod-
uct of the country’s arduous geography. Colonization offered little in terms of finan-
cial reward and legal rights to un-colonized land remained entire unclearly. However,
Colombia’s insertion into the world economy through exports of coffee increased the
value of fertile land and rendered inadequate the jumble of legal rules and titles gov-
erning land rights. Colombians flocked to uncultivated areas to claim land, creating
a series of conflicts over land rights. I show how large landowners and peasants
competed over land rights, with each side lobbying for rules that would privilege
its claims. That competition occurred over two stages and occurred in the shadow
of political institutions. I show how peasants’ inability to create enduring forms
of collective action, estate owners’ economic power, and the rigidly bipartisan na-
ture of Colombian politics combined to create new institutions that privileged large
landowners, with serious implications for inequality and agricultural production in
Colombia.
1.5 Contributions
This dissertation begins with a central insight from institutional economics —
namely, that long-term macroeconomic growth hinges on the vigorous protection
of private property rights. I dispute this ascendant view and leverage that criticism
into a theory of how office-seeking politicians and profit-maximizing economic agents
collude to design property rights institutions that skew the protection of private
property rights in favor of certain groups. By doing so, this research illuminates two
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related fields of study in political economy — the study of property rights and and
the relationship between political institutions and economic growth.
First, this dissertation fundamentally redefines how economic agents’ confidence
in their private property varies, with far-ranging implications for the scholars and
practitioners. Economists had long recognized that institutions of private property
(e.g., courts and legal codes, bureaucracies, regulations) affected economic actors’
confidence in their private property, but had presumed those institutions to be pub-
lic goods. Certainly, theorists have allowed that property rights confidence might
vary within countries, but have not succeeded in building a comprehensive theo-
retical account of that variation or describing it empirically. Chapter 4 furnishes
the first robust evidence of property rights discrimination’s existence and economic
consequences. Chapter 5’s sojourn into historical institutionalism in the Colom-
bian coffee industry deepens this account by illustrating how politicians may reg-
ulate private property to the advantage of particular groups. Taken together, this
dissertation conceptually and empirically re-defines the meaning of property rights
confidence, demanding that scholars attend to the distributional implications of in-
stitutions when explaining their origins and consequences. It also widens the set of
institutional arrangements for instilling confidence in economic agents. As recognized
by Haber, Razo, and Maurer (2003), politicians may create a number of institutional
arrangements to secure agents’ property rights, arrangements which may vary across
industry, locality, or ethnic group.
Second, this research clarifies how political institutions affect the aggregate size
and distribution of economic activity. Przeworski and Limongi (1993) enjoin re-
searchers to clarify the channels through which political democracy affects economic
growth. This dissertation describes one such channel through its focus on what Ace-
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moglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2004) term a “hierarchy of institutions.” In this
hierarchy, political institutions dictate the rules by which economic institutions are
created and modified. If particular constellations of political institutions make prop-
erty rights discrimination more likely, then they should correlate with patterns of
economic inequality and aggregate growth. As before, the linchpin of this clearer de-
lineation of political institutions’ effect on economic performance is thinking of the
protection of property rights as a differentiable good. Broadly speaking, marrying
theories of political and economic institutions in this manner affords us a unique
opportunity to translate the distribution of political power into the distribution of
material benefits, all through the filter of property rights institutions.
CHAPTER II
A Theory of Property Rights Discrimination
2.1 Introduction
Chapter 1 summarized an ambitious research agenda in institutional economics
that places the protection of private property rights squarely in the center of the pro-
cess of macroeconomic growth. Countries that curb citizens’ ability to violate each
other’s rights and foil politicians’ ambitions to expropriate private property will,
in the long run, grow faster. This institutional consensus has re-directed growth
economists’ focus from more proximate causes to studies of how sound institutions
accelerate technological change, investment, and firm creation. Furthermore, this
consensus has furnished the intellectual foundations of new approaches to foreign
aid that premise aid on improvements in governance, broadly conceived. Chapter
1, however, also questioned a core and often obscured premise of institutional eco-
nomics — that the protection of private property constitutes a public good. The
hegemonic approach to property rights and macroeconomic performance conceives
of institutional failure in rather vague terms. On one hand, politicians may fail to
provide the public good of property rights protection, allowing threats to private
property rights to materialize. Alternatively, political economists focus on the ten-
dency of politicians to expropriate private property rights, threatening the security of
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private property rights. In contrast, Chapter 1 emphasized that institutional failures
are distributional in nature, as politicians fail to protect certain groups’ rights while
securing others’. I termed this phenomenon property rights discrimination. When
a police force fails to protect certain businesses, or judicial institutions erect barri-
ers for citizens of a certain race, or women are prohibited from inheriting property,
property rights discrimination exists, creating parallel economies of protected and
unprotected rights.
In this chapter, I expand upon Chapter 1’s critique and build a theory of prop-
erty rights discrimination. Whereas more traditional accounts or property rights are
rooted in the assumption of large and undifferentiated benefits to private property
rights, I premise my account on how institutions of private property rights affect the
distribution of gains from economic activity, beginning in Section 2.2. Although an
economic actor benefits indirectly from the protection of others’ rights, her economic
choices are influenced more strongly by the protection of her own rights. Under cer-
tain circumstances, she profits when another actor’s rights are neglected, particularly
when this neglect allows her to violate others’ rights for her own gain. Accordingly,
economic actors’ preferences for the design of property rights institutions diverge
dramatically, in contrast to the more conventional property rights narrative in which
economic actors are united in their economic institutional preferences. Property
rights discrimination, therefore, occurs when institutions privilege the protection of
certain actors’ rights while ignoring or violating the rights of others. The resulting
economic institutional division of an economy into “in” and “out” groups has two
important economic effects. First, it depresses economic activity within the “out”
group. Second, it dampens aggregate economic activity.
Recognizing the existence and repercussions of property rights discrimination of-
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fers a far more complete definition of institutional failure, one that preserves the
spirit of North’s (1981) account of the predatory state. Most importantly, thinking
of the protection of property rights as a distributed good allows a more incisive ac-
count of the origins of the failure to protect private property right. In Sections 2.3
and 2.4, I offer such a theory. I argue that sudden changes in the relative value
of different resources create demand for the modification of extant property rights
institutions. Different groups of economic actors, united by their common economic
interests, hope to create new rules that will privilege their claims both in the present
and future, at the expense of other groups’ claims. Economic actors thus bargain
with self-interested politicians over the content of these new rules and modifications
of old ones. However, parties to the bargaining for new property rights institutions
will diverge in their ability to unite around their interests and bargain effectively, as
predicted by the collective action problem.
This logic makes clear that, in general, we should expect that particular economic
actors will more likely comprise the “in” group of protected private property rights.
In Section 2.4, I expand upon this account by considering explicitly how politicians’
incentives shape their approach to bargaining over property rights institutions. First,
I blend disparate claims regarding the relationship between democracy and property
rights institutions to build an account of how property rights discrimination shifts
under democratic rule. Next, Section 2.4 considers the predictions of the selectorate
theory of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and his co-authors (2003). I show how the
theory — which characterizes regimes by the relative size of the winning coalition
and selectorate — has specific implications not only for the general level of property
rights, but for the specific segments of the population whose rights will be violated.
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2.2 Property Rights Discrimination
Though known primarily for its contribution to the study of long-term macroe-
conomic growth, the consensus on property rights institutions is based on a microe-
conomic principle — that a self-interested economic actor more likely engages in
economically productive activities (e.g., investment in physical capital and technol-
ogy) when she is sure she will reap the benefits of those activities. Without the
protection of her property rights, the ripple effects of such activities fail to materi-
alize and the economy as a whole suffers. Thus, the protection of private property
could be thought of as the visible manifestation of Adam Smith’s invisible hand. I
do not dispute this microeconomic logic. However, I do dispute its implications for
economic actors’ incentives and the design of property rights institutions. I begin
that account here, first by defining what we mean by the terms “property rights”
and “property rights institutions” and defining property rights discrimination and
its effect on economic activity.
2.2.1 Property Rights and Institutions
Far too often, the concepts of property rights and property rights institutions are
introduced with little in the way of conceptual clarity. I thus pause to define each of
these terms carefully, emphasizing important aspects of the definitions that will guide
this theoretical account.1 I define property rights as the bundle of rights an economic
actor possesses to use various pieces of property. By defining the degree of access
economic actors have to resources, property rights enable all economic activity. I call
attention to several implications of this definition, following previous authors in this
research program. First, I conceptualize property rights as exactly that - a bundle
1I use the terms “property rights” and “economic rights” interchangeably throughout this discussion, as well as
the terms “property rights institutions” and “economic institutions.”
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of rights comparable to political rights in that they are enumerable. This conception
shifts the focus of the definition from the property itself to the rights that economic
actors possess in relation to the property. In doing so, this definition parallels Sen’s
(1999) characterization of development as a set of freedoms. In Sen’s framework,
property rights are a form of “economic facilities” in that they ease economic actors’
access to transactions with other actors (Sen 1999: 38-39, 60-61, 112-116). Put less
abstractly, examples of property rights include the rights of sale and/or transfer, use
for production, use as collateral, use as a physical address, and destruction.2 Coase
also gives voice to this conception of property when he writes that “This [property]
is usually thought of as a physical entity which the businessman acquires and uses
. . . instead of as a right to perform certain (physical) actions . . . What the
land-owner in fact possesses is the right to carry out a circumscribed list of actions”
(1960, 44).
The second critical aspect of the definition lies in the term “bundle.” Scholars
define property rights as a “bundle of sticks,” allowing that each property is asso-
ciated with a number of rights (Barzel, 1997, 4-7; Anderson and McChesney, 2003,
1). This conception allows that multiple individuals can share these rights. The
possibility of partitioning of rights to property either transforms “ownership” from a
dichotomous to a multi-dimensional concept or eliminates its conceptual usefulness
altogether. Ownership implies that an individual controls all rights to some prop-
erty, but this is rarely the case in practice. In most cases, individuals share rights to
property. Emphasizing the “bundle of sticks” metaphor also allows, at least logically,
that certain rights in relation to some piece of property can be withheld from some
individual(s). Coase (1960) explicitly refers to “circumscribed uses” of property (44).
2De Soto (2000) emphasizes the analysis of physical property, in particular its use as a physical address to facilitate
communication and as a collateral for loans.
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Put more abstractly, the set of possible economic uses of a property can be curtailed
due to legal, social, and/or political concerns. If I rent a car, I possess the rights to
drive the car and use it for whatever purposes not prohibited by the contract for the
duration of the contract. I may use it to haul boxes, sleep in, or drive to Chicago.
However, I may not sell the car, paint it, or lend it to someone else to drive. Those
rights, of course, remain with the rental car company. We can see by this example
that bundles of rights are often shared.
The “bundle of sticks” metaphor has galvanized theorists to create a taxonomy
of economic rights. Schlager and Ostrom (1992) define five sets of rights: access
(the right to enter); withdrawal (the right to appropriate returns from the asset);
management (the right to regulate the use of the asset and make changes to it);
exclusion (the right exclude other individuals from any of the other rights); and
alienation (the right to transfer all or parts of the rights to others). Libecap (1989)
emphasizes an analogous set of rights — use, appropriation of returns, and modifying
the property. The appropriation of returns is a critical feature of both typologies
— obviously, whosoever possesses that right reaps the gains and losses from the
use of the asset. Therefore, owning rights to a property also infers their inverse -
responsibilities for any economic losses incurred in the use of the property.
This conceptualization suggests a rather complex view of rights, which begs the
question of how rights areadministered. The answer lies in economic institutions.
Property rights institutions are the set of rules and procedures by which property
rights are specified, allocated, and enforced. Put differently, economic institutions
define how economic actors compete for property rights. Alchian and Demsetz (1973)
emphasize the conflictual nature of property rights competition and the need for a
property rights system to regularize and pacify that competition:
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It is more useful and nearer to the truth to view a social system as relying
on techniques, rules, or customs to resolve conflicts that arise in the use of
scarce resources rather than imagining that societies specify the particular
uses to which resources will be put . . . . Since the same resources cannot
simultaneously be used to satisfy competing demands, conflicts of interest
will be resolved one way or the other. The arrangements for doing this run
the full gamut of human experience . . . (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; 16)
For Alchian and Demsetz, conflicts over the use of resources (i.e., property rights)
must be resolved in some manner. An economic institution accomplishes that res-
olution using some set of mechanisms. Those mechanisms vary among several axes
and may be centralized or decentralized, formal or informal. Regardless of the form
the economic institution takes, it executes three functions: specification, allocation,
and enforcement. I will attend to each of those functions in turn. Specification refers
to the process by which the institution defines the rights that exist to some property.
We may also think of this tasks as defining, in a basic sense, how rights to various
resources will be defined.
Allocation is the process by which those rights are divided among economic ac-
tors. Coase’s (1960) analysis of property rights and economic efficiency explicitly
treats the assignment of property rights when multiple parties possess conflicting
claims. Copyright law, one form of an economic institution, allocates rights among
actors. The purchaser of a book may read the book, but not copy it and sell the
copies to other individuals. De Soto, in another example, discusses the set of legal
arrangements that nineteenth century California gold miners used to govern their
claims (De Soto, 2000, 140-148). Riker and Sened (1991) raise another such case in
their study of airport slotting at major US airports.
34
Finally, enforcement refers to the process by which the economic institution en-
sures that, once rights are specified and allocated, they are respected. Violations of
property rights, whether intentional or not, will inevitably occur from time to time.
And disputes over property rights are to be expected. Property rights cease to exist
without proper enforcement. Bates (1991) discusses how the Nuer people of Africa
used institutions such as feuds, compensation, and arbitration to preserve families’
property rights in cattle. Firmin-Sellers (1995), in her analysis of property rights in
colonial Ghana, also emphasizes the role of enforcement of property rights.
Economists usually define three types of economic institutions: open access, com-
munal ownership, and private property. Economic institutions vary most importantly
in how they specify economic rights (i.e., patterns of ownership). In open access, any
economic actor may extract from the resource in question, but lacks the rights of
alienation or exclusion. In open access, no centralized authority governs the specifi-
cation, allocation, and enforcement of property rights. Economic actors must bear
the full costs of these tasks themselves. Therefore, property rights are allocated and
enforced almost entirely through self-help mechanisms. These may include “racing”
(i.e., using as much of the resource as possible before other actors can do so). There
is a strong consensus that open access leads to sub-optimal outcomes. As previewed
in previous discussion, open access concentrates the benefits of extraction in an indi-
vidual economic actor, but distributes the costs of that extraction across all actors.
The result is the over-use and eventual depletion of the resource in question.
In communal ownership, a group of economic actors can exclude non-owners from
using the resource in question. However, they cannot exclude each other. Further-
more, the owners of a commons can sell or otherwise transfer the commons, but
only through some joint decision making process. Economic actors can specify, allo-
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cate, and resolve disputes concerning property rights through self-help mechanisms.
However, they may also use norms-based mechanisms to form tacit agreements. Al-
ternatively, they can create a central authority to design rules, exclude non-members,
and enforce rules. The question of the efficiency of communal ownership is less clear.
Economic actors must pay startup costs to exclude others and must bargain amongst
themselves to manage the commons and enforce the exclusion. Both the initial and
continuing costs to management and enforcement imply a collective action problem,
as detailed by Hardin (1968). Eggertsson (2003) argues that social norms and legal
statutes work to lower the internal bargaining costs. De Alessi (2003) notes that
“Communal ownership . . . provides a clear improvement over open access and over
government regulation” (109). However, that success is “situation-specific.” Ostrom
(1991) investigates the conditions under which collective action pays off.
2.2.2 Private Property Rights and the Motivations of Economic Actors
If open access generally depletes economic resources, while the benefits of com-
munal ownership are tenuous, then what form of economic institutions do actors
prefer? The answer lies in private property. Pure private property rights divide the
rights to a particular resource and divide those rights among economic actors. Pure
private property rights concentrate all rights and responsibilities in one actor. Only
that actor can use and manage that property and only she captures the gains or
losses from those decisions. Like communal ownership, however, private property
requires institutions that govern the allocation of rights, disputes over rights, and
the enforcement of allocation and dispute resolution. Those institutions may consist
of the anarchic, self-help mechanisms described above. Actors may engage in racing
and/or violence to delineate private property rights to some resource, for example.
Once rights are allocated, economic actors might also bear the costs of enforcing
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rights in the self-help system, defending their claims against other economic actors
who may wish to appropriate those rights. Though anarchic, this economic state
of nature clearly defines a set of rules, however violent, for allocation, dispute res-
olution, and enforcement. Alternatively, economic actors may rely on norms-based
mechanisms. Robert Ellickson (1991) surveys such strategies in his survey of the
cattle industry in Shasta County, California. He finds that ranchers often rely on
a well-defined and complex set of social penalties and rewards to enforce property
rights rules. As in a self-help system, the responsibility of dispute resolution and
enforcement is decentralized, with economic actors themselves responsible for the
maintenance of the system.
However, as the complexity of economic activity and the size and diversity of
the group of actors grow, a more centralized property rights authority becomes more
desirable. Disaggregating the functions of the property rights system among all actors
is likely sub-optimal, leading to foregone production. A centralized authority can
be established to record and preserve the specification of private property rights. It
arbitrates disputes over rights when two or more economic actors both claim the same
set of rights to a resource or when one actor claims another has violated a contract.3
The centralized property rights manager therefore concentrates on executing such
functions efficiently and gains special skills, lowering the overall level of transaction
costs incurred by economic actors (McChesney 2003).
Though self-help and norms-based institutions of private property continue to in-
terest institutional economists, most analysis of private property rights assumes a
centralized authority and particularly the presence of the State as that centralized
authority (Barzel 1997; North 1981, 1990; Libecap 1989). The centralized protec-
3In this sense, a contract represents an agreement among actors to share the rights to a resource, in return
for compensation or a service. The violation of contractual rights thus falls under the rubric of property rights
institutions.
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tion of private property rights by the State offers a stream of potential benefits to
economic actors (i.e., citizens of that country) and introduces two main tasks for the
State, as recognized by Madison in No. 51 of The Federalist Papers (Rossiter 1961:
322) and later under different guise by North (1981, 1990). As Madison writes:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would
be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to
control itself. (Rossiter, 1961; 322).
Though Madison primarily concentrated on the infringement of political rights in
No. 51, his logic applies equally as well to the violation of private property rights.
The first aim of institutions of private property is to “control the governed,” or to
stop economic actors from violating each others’ rights for their own gain. North
(1981: 20-27) refers to this challenge as a “contractual theory,” in that the State
serves as a third-party enforcer of all contracts in the economy, using its monopoly
on force. We may broaden this conceptualization to include the violation of an actor’s
private property rights through theft or encroachment. As the chief property rights
authority, the State is responsible for protecting citizens from violating each others’
rights.
However, as Madison recognized, granting exclusive powers of enforcement and
coercion to the State creates another set of challenges — the violation of rights by
the State itself. In effect, the government must learn to “control itself.” North (1981:
20-27) extends this discussion further in his discussion of a “predatory theory” of
the State.
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This view considers the state to be the agency of a group or class; its
function, to extract income from the rest of the constituents in the interest
of that group or class. The predatory state would specify a set of property
rights that maximized the revenue of the group in power, regardless of its
impact on the wealth of the society as a whole. (North 1981: 22)
North (1981) extends the Madisonian dilemma by considering the motivations of
agents of the State. If this centralized property rights authority associates itself
strongly with the interests of some subset of constituents, it will expropriate the
rights of actors outside that group in order to re-distribute them to the favored
group.4 Extending this logic still further, recall that, as the centralized property
rights authority, the State holds the power to circumscribe the uses of private prop-
erty for various reasons (e.g., in the case of externalities, cultural norms). Given
previous discussion that emphasizes property rights as a “bundle of sticks,” property
rights only rarely are so perfectly private. Thus, the State might use its power to
prohibit certain uses in the “out” group, cheapening their rights and facilitating their
transfer to the “in” group.
The outlines of a theory of property rights discrimination are clear in North’s
(1981) conceptualization of the two-dimensional threat to private property rights —
violation by other citizens or by the State itself (i.e., the centralized administrator of
property rights institutions). But why do citizens allow property rights discrimina-
tion? The answer depends on the value an economic actor places on the security of
others’ rights. Haber, Razo, and Maurer (2003) provide one answer to this question.
The authors admit that a rational economic actor is interested in the protection of
other actors’ claims to property rights. When other actors’ rights are protected, her
4It also seems reasonable to assume that, as the agent of the favored group, representatives of the State will keep
some portion of these rights for themselves.
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own rights are more liquid — and hence more valuable. However, they claim that the
direct benefits of having her own economic rights privileged over others’ outweigh the
liquidity advantages from an inclusive recognition and protection of property rights.
Thus, economic actors are willing to trade the efficiency-maximizing benefits of an
inclusive recognition and protection of others’ property rights for economic insti-
tutions that more directly increase their future income streams through privileging
their own property rights claims.
It seems reasonable that an economic actor benefits at least indirectly when oth-
ers’ contract and property rights are secure. The presence of the State as an unbi-
ased third-party guarantor lends credibility to contracts with other economic actors.
Without such protection, potentially profitable contracts with other economic actors
are impossible. Furthermore, the security of other actors’ rights augments the op-
portunities available to any one individual. When other actors are free to contract
and invest without fear of expropriation, they engage in new economic activities that
present opportunities to any one actor. However, the security of her own rights more
directly affects her economic opportunities. The value of the State’s contractual
guarantees to one actor declines in the probability with which she will transact with
another citizen. If, for example, an economic actor regularly transacts with some set
of actors, she will value their contract rights more highly than if she does not. If
the other set of actors is geographically distant, economically powerless, or from a
different cultural or ethnic group, the economic actor may not value the protection
of their rights. In a formal model, Weingast (1995) concludes that large divisions
among economic actors encourages acquiescence in the expropriation of property
rights.
This logic implies that citizens might create private property rights institutions
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through log-rolling. Each citizen will support another’s rights — which are mostly
indifferent to her — in exchange for support for the protection of her own rights.
However, if an economic actor benefits from the violation of another’s rights, as North
(1981) suggests, then she more likely will support the violation of others’ rights. As
previously considered, the State might expropriate some group’s private property
rights in order to transfer them to another group. Likewise, the threat of outright
expropriation and the use of restrictions on private property rights might so cheapen
some actor’s rights that she will sell them far more cheaply than otherwise. Again,
an “in” group member profits.
Thus, an economic actor does balance enlightened and narrow self-interest in
her preference for property rights institutions, but narrow self-interests will often
be weighed more heavily. A complex set of rules regarding the recording of pri-
vate property rights and their enforcement yields the State and citizens a number
of opportunities to engage in property rights discrimination, which I define as the
violation of the property rights of some one group of citizens, usually for the benefit
of some other group. Property rights discrimination creates two classes of economic
actors. The “in” group enjoys the ability to transact with the State as a third-party
guarantor and is confident that the State will not expropriate its rights. In contrast,
the “out” group’s rights are under siege both in terms of expropriation by the State
and heavier restrictions on its rights. “Out” group members also lack an unbiased
guarantor of contracts with members of the “in” group, since the State will favor
the “in” group actor’s rights in any dispute. Furthermore, “out” group members
likely find it difficult to transact among themselves, due to the absence of a third-
party guarantor. Thus, property rights discrimination damages both dimensions of
an actor’s property rights confidence. First, other actors may violate contracts, steal
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her rights, or encroach upon them. Second, the State might expropriate or severely
circumscribe her rights in order to force their transfer to a politically favored group.5
This conceptualization of the protection of private property rights challenges the
implicit assumption of nearly the entirety of previous research in institutional eco-
nomics — namely, that the protection of private property rights is a public good,
an inexhaustible and non-excludable service to economic actors provided through
economic institutions administered centrally by political actors. Instead, I assume
that economic actors’ basic incentives allow, even theoretically, the differentiation
of property rights protection, with certain actors protected and others threatened.
Such an assumption complicates the description of the security of private property
rights. A focus on protection as a public good involves merely assessing its quality,
as one might assess the quality of a road. Alternatively, assessing the quality of prop-
erty rights institutions that are allowed, if only theoretically, to be discriminatory
involves a more multi-dimensional effort. One might begin by measuring the central
tendency of property rights security, asking how confident economic actors are in
their private property rights, on average. However, the logic of property rights dis-
crimination suggests that two different economies may evince very different patterns
of property rights security but the same central tendency, as preliminary evidence
shows in Chapter 1. Thus, a more complete evaluation will focus on the distribution
of security. We might begin by measuring the variation in the protection of private
property. In countries with little property rights discrimination, we might expect lit-
tle variation about the central tendency. We might also describe the size of the “in”
and “out” groups and the difference in their confidence level. Theoretically speaking,
in countries with less property rights discrimination, we may expect a smaller “out”
5In the remainder of this discussion, I refer to these two dimensions of property rights security as contract rights
and property rights, respectively.
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group whose loss of confidence is small relative to the “in” group.
2.2.3 Property Rights Discrimination: Effects on Economic Activity
The foregoing proposes that an economic actor will acquiesce to property rights
discrimination when it benefits her self-interest. In Sections 2.3 and 2.4, I consider
the supply side of this equation, discussing when self-interested politicians will offer
property rights discrimination as recompense for political support. Here, I consider
the economic effects, both microeconomic and macroeconomic, of property rights
discrimination.
For institutional economists, The Coase Theorem (1960) remains an elegant ex-
position of the ability of private property rights institutions’ ability to guarantee
socially optimal arguments. Here, I render the Coase Theorem abstractly. Imagine
a situation in which two economic actors claim the same property right, whether
because a new resource has been discovered or due to a dispute over rights to an
extant resource. The actors gain x and y from the property right, respectively. Also
assume that x and y are denominated in dollars, and thus the payoffs to A and B
can be combined in order to evaluate the social benefit. Some set of rules assigns the
property right to either A or B; this set of rules, in combination with the designation
of private property as the primary mode of ownership, comprises the economic insti-
tution at work here. For the purposes of this discussion, I leave the content of this
assigning mechanism undefined. Table 2.1 displays the payoffs to A, B, and society,
varying the payoffs according to the relative sizes of x and y and the recipient of the
property right. If x > y, then assignment of the property right to A yields the social
optimum (i.e., x); A gains x and B gains 0. Assignment of the property right to B in
this circumstance causes A and B to bargain costlessly; A offers B y and keeps x−y,
and the social optimum again obtains. The x < y payoffs parallel this discussion.
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Table 2.1: The Coase Theorem with zero transaction costs
x > y x < y
Property right assigned to A x, 0, x x, y − x, y
Property right assigned to B x− y, y, x 0, y, y
This conventional view of the Coase Theorem states that, when transaction costs
are negligible, the resolution of property rights disputes does not matter for economic
efficiency, since economic actors will trade rights until they are in the most productive
hands. Most accounts of the effect of economic institutions on economic performance
end here. If economic actors discover a new resource, they maximize their aggregate
gains by implementing an institution of private property over the resource. Within
that institution, the initial allocation of private property rights matters little; even
if, say, the institution tends to discriminate in favor of one actor or another, the
social optimum is achieved. However, the resolution of the dispute does affect the
distribution of payoffs. Returning to Table 2.1, we can see that the assignment of
property rights affects the distribution of economic gains.6 In short, the recipient of
the property right improves his or her payoff. If x > y, then B’s share of x increases
from 0% to y
x
% if he wins the property right. A’s share decreases from 100% to 1− y
x
in that case. The winner of the property right gains more than she would if she did
not win the property right.
Therefore, this conventional view of property rights institutions states that, even
when property rights discrimination tilts the dispute mechanism (and thus payoffs
from the rights in question) in one actor’s favor, the social optimum is preserved.
However, the presence of property rights discrimination complicates the Coase Theo-
rem further since it likely raises transaction costs. As discussed previously, property
rights discrimination makes transactions between the “in” and “out” groups and
6See Polinsky, 1989, pp. 7-14 for a useful discussion that parallels this one.
44
Table 2.2: The Coase Theorem with surmountable transaction costs
x > y x < y
Property right assigned to A x, 0, x x, y − x− 2t, y − 2t
Property right assigned to B x− y − 2t, y, x− 2t 0, y, y
within the “out” group difficult, since “out” group actors cannot be certain that
their contract rights will be respected. Therefore, if a property right is assigned to
one actor, property rights discrimination raises the cost of trading rights and thus
threatens the benign conclusions of the Coase Theorem.7 In the presence of positive
transaction costs, Coase argues, “the initial delimitation of legal rights does have an
effect on the efficiency with which the economic system operates. One arrangement
of rights may bring about a greater value of production than any other” (Coase,
1960, 16). I now expand the illustration described in Table 2.1 to include positive
transaction costs. Imagine the same situation, but with transaction costs t > 0,
which the actors incur if they bargain over the property rights. In this case, t repre-
sents the difficulty of transacting due to property rights discrimination in the ruling
institutions
Table 2.2 shows the payoffs to A and B when 0 < t < |x−y|
2
, which I term sur-
mountable transaction costs. If the actor with the higher value for the property
right receives the property right, the economically efficient result obtains, as before
(top left and bottom right quadrants). However, if the actor with the lower value
for the property receives the right, the actors incur transaction costs. For example,
if B receives the property right and x > y, then A must offer y to B to gain the
property right. However, an offer of y leaves B with only y− t and thus A must offer
B y + t, which leaves A with a payoff of x− y − 2t, since A must pay both her and
B’s transaction costs. Therefore, the bargain will happen only if x−y−2t > 0, since
7Coase himself admitted that the assumption of negligible transaction costs is “very unrealistic” (Coase 1960:
15).
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Table 2.3: The Coase Theorem with insurmountable transaction costs
x > y x < y
Property right assigned to A x, 0, x x, 0, x
Property right assigned to B 0, y, y 0, y, y




In the presence of non-zero, but surmountable transaction costs, economic ef-
ficiency depends on the initial allocation of property rights. Crucially, economic
efficiency only obtains when the economic actor who will make more productive use
of the right receives it. If the property rights institution inhibits the ability of produc-
tive actors to obtain rights to valuable resources, economic efficiency likely suffers.
For example, if x > y, x is the social payoff only if A receives the property right.
Otherwise, the social result is x− 2t. Obviously, the inefficiency depends on the size
of the transaction costs. Meanwhile, distribution depends on the allocation of prop-
erty rights more so than before. If A is allocated the property right and x > y, then
she receives x; if she does not, she obtains only x − y − 2t. The cost of not receiv-
ing property rights rises in the presence of transaction costs. However, if t > |x−y|
2
,
then no mutually acceptable bargain between A and B exists, as Table 2.3 shows.
Transaction costs are insurmountable. Again, economic efficiency depends on the
initial allocation of property rights, as does distribution, because sufficiently large
transaction costs nullify the possibility of productive bargains.
This discussion suggests two effects of property rights discrimination on economic
performance. First, property rights discrimination — modeled above as a tendency
to tilt dispute resolution towards a particular actor, regardless of rights or public
interest — likely re-distributes income from “out” group towards “in” group, just as
North (1981) assumed. Regardless of the level of transaction costs imposed by prop-
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erty rights discrimination, it re-distributes payouts. That effect is likely magnified
from this static conceptualization of the problem, since the “in” group actor will put
the property rights in question to use (whether or not the “in” group actor is more
efficient), gaining benefits from that right that allow the acquisition of other rights,
etc. Thus, we might expect the “in” group winner of the dispute to expand upon
her advantage from this dispute over time. Furthermore, this explication has empha-
sized that “out” group economic actors, in addition to losing disputes over property
rights, will be more prone to expropriation by the State and be constricted in their
contracting behavior. Following the logic of institutional economics, such actors will
invest little, transact only narrowly, depressing their economic performance. This
leads to the following hypothesis:
Economic Performance Hypothesis 1: Property rights discrimination
augments the economic performance of the “in” group while depressing
economic performance in the “out” group.
Our analysis of the Coase Theorem also suggests a further drag on efficiency. In a
less discriminatory property rights institution, the most productive actor eventually
will transact for the rights to some resource. In a discriminatory institution, eco-
nomic rights inexorably accrue to the members of the “in” group, however defined,
regardless of whether that group will use the rights more efficient. Property rights
discrimination thus limits the ability of the market to place resources in the most
efficient hands, a critical foundation of claims of the superiority of institutions of
private property. This logic suggests that:
Economic Performance Hypothesis 2: Property rights discrimination
depresses macroeconomic performance.
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2.3 Bargaining for Property Rights Institutions
Section 2.2 explored both the existence and repercussions of property rights dis-
crimination. In doing so, it provides a more precise definition of the failure of property
rights institutions, one that depends on thinking of private property rights institu-
tions as differentiable goods that can be offered to only certain citizens and denied
to others. This conceptualization enables a more incisive theory of why politicians
fail to protect private property rights. Here, I argue that a change in the relative
prices of resources initiates a round of bargaining over property rights institutions, in
which economic actors wish to obtain institutional advantages, whereas politicians
wish to extend their hold on political power. The results of bargaining over economic
institutions will tend to favor actors who find it easier to build coalitions around their
economic interests, as might be expected by the collective action problem.
2.3.1 Process
Bargaining over property rights is preceded by what could be termed “normal”
economic activity. During this pre-bargaining period, extant property rights institu-
tions govern allocation, dispute resolution, and enforcement. These institutions may
be discriminatory or not, but I assume that they exist and function. In this sense, we
may think of property rights institutions as a stock and bargaining over changes to
those institutions as a flow. The set of property rights institutions thus shifts slowly
as existing rules are modified and new rules added through bargaining.
Some exogenous change in the relative prices of resources initiates the bargaining
period. Anderson and Hill (2003) argue that the process of changing property rights
institutions usually begins with sharp changes in relative prices, the technology of
protecting property rights, or the nature of collective action necessary to enforce
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rights (125-138). Libecap (1989) also concentrates on the evolution of the market,
including shifts in relative prices, the technology of enforcing property rights, and
preferences (16). Constituents may discover a new resource important to economic
activity, such as oil, gold, or land. Alternatively actors may find a new use for a
well-known resource, such as discovering that a particular crop might grow well in
land previously thought infertile. Whatever the specific instigator, economic actors’
relative demands for resources changes in response.
Changes in relative demand and prices often will strain existing economic insti-
tutions and create demand among economic actors for institutional changes. For
example, a technological change may make possible a particular form of economic
activity that had not been imagined by property rights institutions, eliciting new
questions regarding the rights of actors to use their property rights for certain ends.
The discovery of a new resource or sudden re-valuation of an existing one might call
into question the rights to the resource if they had been unclear due to a lack of
interest in it. Thus, changes in demand for rights to resources will render existing
economic institutions obsolete and create demand for changes. For past theorists,
economic actors’ demands primarily concern economic efficiency, which galvanizes
economic actors to lobby for changes to property rights institutions that will restore
economic efficiency For example, Anderson and Hill (2003) argue that economic
changes renders current property rights institutions “inefficient.” They place their
narrative in an explicitly apolitical setting, emphasizing the efforts of private eco-
nomic actors, rather than an interaction between economic and political actors. They
argue that “Like any goods, property rights must be produced by entrepreneurs who
recognize the potential gains from defining and enforcing them and are willing to
devote resources to their formation” (122). They argue that in the face of inefficient
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property rights, individual economic entrepreneurs recognize the ability to gener-
ate gains for themselves. Under such circumstances, property rights entrepreneurs
will limit access to common pool resources, re-design contracts, etc. to build more
efficient property rights institutions. Even in this account, with its emphasis on eco-
nomic efficiency, the specter of property rights discrimination and its negative effects
lurk. The authors admit that private entrepreneurialism does not always result in
net gains, since actors may redistribute rights without actually increasing wealth
(124-125). However, they do not explore the consequences of such redistribution.
In contrast, I place concerns over distribution and private gains at the center of
bargaining over changes to property rights institutions. As discussed in Section 2.2
in a more static context, an economic actor places value primarily on property rights
institutions’ ability to protect her own private property rights. The same holds for
changes to those institutions. I assume that the exogenous change in relative prices
affects the interest of some subset of constituents. Each constituent prefers rules
that will advantage her claims, which places her in conflict with other constituents
who pursue the same goal. In many cases, they will be contesting the same rules,
with each constituent preferring an institutional change that places her at odds with
the others. For example, oil or some other valuable resource might be discovered be-
neath land whose property rights were unclear due to the fact that it was previously
deemed worthless. Resolving those differences involves changes to rules concerning
land ownership that will determine whose rights to the land are formally recognized.
Each claimant will prefer rules that advantage her own claims. Alternatively, techno-
logical changes in the late 1990s (e.g., faster connection times to the Internet, larger
hard drives) made it possible for people who had purchased music on compact discs
to share it across the Internet, raising the at that point un-discussed question of
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whether sharing digital music on such a scale violated record companies’ property
rights. The resolution of this dispute and the creation of new rules would curtail
one group either consumers’ or record companies’ private property rights to digital
music. In each of these examples, a key component is that the institutional changes
made as a result of bargaining not only will assign the property rights in question,
but also determine how that assignment will be enforced and how future disputes
of a similar kind will be resolved. Thus, a stream of benefits hangs in the balance,
with each disputant hoping to secure the stream through new institutions that ad-
vance her claims. In essence, each contestant in the bargaining seeks property rights
discrimination that will block other individuals’ claims while advantaging her own.
Libecap’s (1989) account of bargaining for property rights institutions supports
such a vision. His definition of contracting includes processes as informal as group
bargaining over changes to a common resource (e.g., a neighborhood association bar-
gaining over changes to the schedule for a park) to formal shifts in laws involving
lobbying groups and professional government bureaucracies (4). In Libecap’s for-
mulation, demands for efficiency instigate shifts in property rights, but economic
actors’ concerns with their individual payoffs determines the institutional outcome.
The modification of existing property rights institutions, therefore, mainly consists
of resolving distributional conflicts among various economic actors:
In bargaining over changes in property rights, disagreements can occur
over the nature of either the aggregate benefits or the shares, but the
heart of the contracting problem is devising political acceptable allocation
mechanisms to assign the gains from institutional change while maintain-
ing its production advantages . . . Accordingly, examination of the prefer-
ences of the individual bargaining parties and consideration of the details
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of the political bargaining underlying property rights institutions are nec-
essary for understanding why particular property rights are developed and
maintained, despite imaginable alternatives that would appear to be more
rational. (Libecap 1989; 5; emphasis added)
Economic actors thus hold strong preferences for the shape of changes to prop-
erty rights institutions. Knight (1992) strengthens this point further still, arguing
that distributional consequences drive changes to institutions. We can therefore as-
sume that an economic agent’s main preference is that political leaders — whom we
assume administer property rights institutions centrally — modify economic institu-
tions in such a way that will advantage her particular interests. Sened (1997) also
argues that changes to property rights institutions are political in nature, involving
a complex bargaining process between politicians and economic actors. Politicians
thus face the demands of some subset of actors, each of whom prefers discriminatory
changes to property rights institutions. The outcome of bargaining depends on two
issues. First, will certain types or groups of economic actors lobby the politician
more effectively? Second, how do political institutions shift how politicians respond
to citizens’ lobbying?
2.3.2 Collective Action and Property Rights Discrimination
Bargaining, initiated by an exogenous change in relative prices, involves a subset
of economic actors, who hold conflicting preferences over changes to property rights
institutions. Alternatively, we may conceive of bargaining as affecting two or more
broad classes of actors, each of which has a common interest in the bargaining.
In the digital music example described above, each set of competing interests was
comprised of a number of individual actors, pitting a group of record companies
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and recording artists against a group of consumers and the companies profiting from
the sharing. Each interest is linked by the common effect that changes to property
rights institutions will have on their future economic gains, particularly because
institutional change sets a precedent for future disputes in that area.
Thus, we might conclude the bargaining story by asserting that these interests
each will lobby politicians for protection of their property rights claims. In contrast,
Olson’s (1965, 1982) research into collective action strongly implies that not all such
groupings will be equally likely to lobby for their preferred changes to property rights
institutions. Lobbying for rights incurs costs to the members of the group, whereas
the common interest they pursue is essentially a public good. A self-interested actor
will tend to shirk the effort needed to pursue the common interest, since she shares
the fruits of her bargaining with the other members of the group, but does not share
the costs. Furthermore, if the group successfully lobbies, she will not be excluded
from the gains from lobbying. Given that each member of the group possesses the
same incentive to free-ride, the group’s ability to pressure politicians suffers. Rather
than be surprised by certain groups’ inability to lobby politicians, we should be
surprised that any group successfully lobbies at all.
A key to Olson’s (1965, 1982) narrative of collective action is understanding the
characteristics of the group in question. First, Olson (1982) proposes that smaller
groups will more readily overcome the collective action problem. Members of such
groups, according to Olson, interact more frequently and more easily reach consen-
sus.8 Similarly, shirking is easier to detect in smaller groups. Smaller groups also
more likely use selective incentives to solve the collective action problem, using pos-
itive side payments to reward those who contribute to the effort and negative ones
8This logic follows the conclusions of Axelrod (1984), in which defection in the prisoner’s dilemma game decreases
when the two players believe they will play the game indefinitely.
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to punish those who do not (Olson 1982: 23). These may be material or social.9 For
similar reasons, socially homogenous groups will find it easier to overcome the col-
lective action problem and pressure politicians for mutually beneficial institutional
changes. Homogeneous groups will more efficiently use selective incentives to corral
wavering members (Olson 1982: 24) and find it easier to reach consensus on effort
level and strategies for pressuring politicians for a favorable pattern of property rights
discrimination. The effect of group size and social heterogeneity suggests a special
case where constituents will more easily overcome the collective action problem. If
a group is anchored by one constituent that stands to gain a great deal from victory
in bargaining with politicians, that individual may willingly bear the group’s costs
of bargaining and allow free-riding.
The logic of collective action therefore supplies a first glimpse into why certain
citizens will enter the “in” group that benefits from property rights discrimination,
whereas others comprise the “out” group of unprotected rights and economic depres-
sion. When standing property rights institutions are rendered obsolete by economic
and technological change, certain groups of economic actors will more readily over-
come the collective action problem and demand beneficial institutional changes (i.e.,
inclusion in the “in” group on this particular matter). Other groups will not be able
to do so. Thus, politicians are not presented with an accurate presentation of citi-
zens’ demands for institutional change; instead they view only the claims of groups
that overcome the collective action problem.
Collective Action Hypothesis 1: Bargaining over property rights in-
stitutions favors interests that are smaller and more homogeneous, all else
9As mentioned previously, Ellickson’s (1991) study of cattle ranching in Shasta County, California focuses on the




Collective Action Hypothesis 2: Bargaining over property rights in-
stitutions favors interests that are dominated by one or a small group of
actors, all else equal.
2.4 Political Institutions and Property Rights Discrimination
To this point, I have focused on how an economic shock places stress on property
rights institutions, creating an opportunity for economic actors to pressure political
leaders for changes to institutions that will favor their claims. During bargaining,
an economic actor has an opportunity to bargain for property rights discrimination
that will favor her interests. Furthermore, the collective action problem suggests
that certain types of economic interests more forcefully lobby for property rights dis-
crimination. That logic suggests that, regardless of national-level attributes, certain
types of economic interests — more homogeneous, smaller, and represented by a
dominant actor — will more likely overcome barriers to collective action and secure
well-protected private property rights, often to the detriment of other actors’ claims.
Therefore, merging a bargaining approach to property rights institutions with a focus
on collective action yields valuable insights into the membership of “in” and “out”
groups.
Nevertheless, Section 2.2’s focus on property rights discrimination established
a higher standard for theories of the origins of property rights protection. This
dissertation revolves around the question of how property rights security varies within
countries and how that variation itself varies across countries, a question that a focus
on collective action alone does not answer. In this sense, we might sub-divide this
inquiry into two questions. First, how does property rights discrimination vary across
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countries, generally speaking? Why does the distance between “in” and “out” groups
vary across countries? Answering such questions allows an investigation into the
causes of patterns of property rights discrimination across countries. However, a more
specific knowledge of property rights discrimination would involve understanding not
only how the distribution of property rights security varies across countries, but also
identifying which citizens will tend to occupy the “in” and “out” groups. In other
words, the highest standard for theories of property rights discrimination involves
being able to predict ex ante the characteristics of a citizen that should predict their
property rights confidence — and whether and how those characteristics vary across
countries.
Here, I argue that a focus on political institutions — the rules by which politicians
win and maintain political power — offers an answer to these questions. Political in-
stitutions structure the relationship between rulers and ruled and with it the nature
of bargaining over property rights institutions. The promise of a theory based on
political institutions is its ability to predict how a citizen’s political characteristics
affect her bargaining power over her property rights and how that relationship might
differ across types of political institutions. It allows a theory not only of the general
degree of property rights discrimination in some country, but also a more in-depth
prediction of economic actors who should be expected to gain from property rights
discrimination. I focus on two theories of political institutions. The first focuses
on the role of democracy in changing politicians’ receptivity to demands for prop-
erty rights discrimination. The second, the selectorate theory of Bruce Bueno de
Mesquita and his co-authors (2003) proposes a different pattern of property rights
discrimination, based on the size of key political groupings.
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2.4.1 Democracy
For many theorists, an understanding of the relationship between political insti-
tutions and the protection of private property rights is rooted in a consideration of
how democratic political institutions alter politicians’ motivations to protect private
property. Two perspectives tend to dominate this effort, diverging in their assess-
ment of democracy’s effect on property rights security. The first relies on the median
voter theorem (Black 1948; Downs 1957) and previous work into fiscal redistribu-
tion in democracies (Meltzer and Richard 1978) to claim that democracy threatens
private property. The second focuses instead on institutional constraints on the ex-
ecutive to claim that democratic politicians pose less of a threat to private property
(Olson 1993; Haber, Razo, and Maurer 2003). Here, I blend these two approaches
to describe how property rights discrimination differs across regimes.
Many nineteenth century political economists, including Marx, assumed that uni-
versal suffrage would undermine the protection of private property rights, particularly
because extending the vote would allow the propertyless to vote for the expropri-
ation of the propertied (Przeworski and Limongi 1993: 52). A generalized version
of this argument parallels Meltzer and Richard’s (1978) influential model of fiscal
redistribution, which has been translated into a model of property redistribution by
Przeworski and Limongi (1993). In such a model, political democracy’s effect on the
center of political influence creates new incentives for property rights discrimination.
When suffrage is restricted to the propertied classes, the median voter will prefer
property rights institutions that protect private property, assuming that property
ownership is right-skewed (i.e., that most citizens own very little property and a
very few citizens own a large amount of property). Extending the vote to all adult
citizens shifts the median voter and with her the collective preference for property
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redistribution. The median voter now owns less property than the average and will
support the redistribution of property, from rich to poor. In this formulation, de-
mocratization threatens the institution of private property through the ballot box,
as voters pressure self-interested politicians to expropriate the rights of the rich and
redistribute them to the poor.
My bargaining approach to property rights discrimination recasts this argument.
Both democratic and non-democratic leaders maximize their probability of retain-
ing power. In non-democracies, in which only rich landowners participate in the
political process, bargaining over property rights institutions focuses on protecting
and extending the rights of this narrow subset of the population. Past theorists
characterized such outcomes as protective of private property. However, a focus
on property rights discrimination suggests that any bargaining in non-democracies
that pits the claims of small landholders against large landowners will likely favor
the latter. Property rights institutions will impede property ownership for the poor
while facilitating the expropriation of their rights by the rich. Thinking in terms of
the collective action problem discussed previously, non-democracy exacerbates the
problem by promoting the rights of a smaller, homogenous group of landowners that
already more likely lobbies for property rights protection. This argument implies the
following:
Democracy Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, non-democratic regimes will
discriminate the protection of private property against the poor and in favor
of the wealthy.
Democratization shifts the pattern of property rights discrimination by changing
the identity and preferences of the median voter. When modifying property rights
institutions in response to demands by citizens, political leaders seeking reelection
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will seek to erode the rights of large landowners and redistribute those rights to those
with little or no property.10 Thus, the mean quality of property rights institutions
may not shift, but the distribution of property rights confidence will. A different
pattern of property rights discrimination will emerge, one that counteracts the effects
of collective action, as a larger group of actors finds its rights more duly represented
by the State.
Democracy Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, democratic regimes will dis-
criminate the protection of private property against the rich and in favor
of the poor.
The foregoing logic states that the expansion of political participation in demo-
cratic countries reshapes politicians’ preferences and with them the pattern of prop-
erty rights discrimination. However, it does not question whether politicians’ freedom
to act on those preferences might vary systematically across regimes. A focus on ex-
ecutive constraints answers that question and thus helps to complete a portrait of
democracy and property rights discrimination. Kydland and Prescott (1977) explore
the time-inconsistency problem in investment. A politician can always promise pro-
tection of a citizen’s private property rights, but after a citizen invests, the politician
can expropriate the fruits of that investment. Politicians find it difficult, therefore,
to commit credibly to protecting private property. Olson (1993) contends that an
autocrat is a kind of “stationary bandit,” who will protect citizens from any threats
to their private property rights. However, an autocrat faces few constraints on her
power and retains the power to expropriate private property herself. In contrast,
stably democratic countries develop limits on the executive’s power — a powerful
10Beginning with Meltzer and Richard’s (1978) central insight, Franzese (2002) argues that redistribution in democ-
racies increases in the voter participation rate and the skew of the underlying income distribution. That argument,
which receives ample empirical support, suggests strongly that the threat to property rights in democracies depends
on the intersection of the underlying distribution of property and voter participation.
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legislature, independent judiciary, etc. — that restrict her freedom to expropriate
property (Olson 1993: 572). Haber, Razo, and Maurer (2003: 5) agree that limited
government prevents expropriation and reduces economic actors’ fear of expropria-
tion.
This logic suggests strongly that, taking a politician’s motivations as given, a
democratic leader expropriates private property less easily than a non-democratic
leader.11 Combined with a focus on electoral institutions, this reasoning suggests
that while autocrats and democrats both prefer to discriminate the protection of
private property, autocrats more easily discriminate against the poor than democrats
discriminate against the rich:
Democracy Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, democratic regimes discrim-
inate the protection of private property less severely than non-democratic
regimes.
This discussion predicts different patterns of property rights discrimination in
democratic and non-democratic regimes. However, it leaves unexplored the question
of whether, on average, property rights institutions function better in democratic
regimes. Answering that question depends on several factors, including the underly-
ing distribution of property, political participation in democracies, and the effect of
constraints on the executive. I leave this question open for empirical exploration in
Chapter 4.
2.4.2 The Selectorate Theory
Theorists interested in the relationship between political institutions and the pro-
tection of private property rights often begin by considering the role of democracy.
11Clague and his co-authors (1996) argue that democratic regimes require a period of time to develop the institu-
tional mechanisms to limit predation. Thus, the institutions restraining a new democrat may prove as weak as those
restraining an autocrat.
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Scholars vary widely in their conclusions to these questions, depending on whether
they focus on electoral pressures or institutional constraints on the executive. My
adaptation of democratic theory to the question of property rights discrimination at-
tempts to bridge these gaps, by blending together these long-standing theories into
a cohesive account of bargaining over property rights institutions in democracies.
However, that account leaves certain issues outstanding. In particular, theorists fo-
cusing on democracy often do not consider how different forms of non-democracy
diverge in terms of their protection of private property. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita
and his co-authors (2003) (hereafter referred to as BDM2S2) construct a formal
model of political institutions that differentiates different forms of regimes and has
strong implications for the pattern of property rights discrimination.
The theory begins with the assumption that politicians maximize their probability
of winning and holding office. A country’s selectorate, of size S chooses among
competing candidates for office. A political captures political power by winning the
support of a winning coalition of citizens of size W .12 Political systems vary in
two major ways, according to the theory. First, they vary in the sizes of W and
S. In certain political systems, such as mass democracies, nearly all adult citizens
comprise the selectorate, making it large. In other systems, such as military juntas,
the selectorate is far smaller, since only a small group of privileged citizens participate
in politics. Similarly, the size of W varies across regimes, holding S constant. For
example, in a mass democracy, we would expect W to be roughly half the size of S,
since democratic leaders must win a majority of citizens to win and retain office.13 In
contrast, in one-party democracies, we might expect a similarly large selectorate, but
12By necessity, S > W .
13Democratic politics are more complicated than this conceptualization, of course. However, since the focus of
the theory is to compare political survival in a wide range of regimes, including non-democracies, the generalization
suffices.
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a smaller winning coalition, since political leaders rely mainly on the support of the
party hierarchy than on a majority of all selectors. Similarly, we might differentiate
small-S regimes by the size of the winning coalition. In certain regimes, the winning
coalition may consist of one ruling family, whereas in other regimes, it may consist
of the entire military.
Second, regimes vary in the proportion of W to S. One can interpret the ratio
W/S as the probability that a member of the winning coalition will be a part of the
next winning coalition if a new leader takes power. If W/S is low, then members
of the winning coalition are not likely to retain their status in future governments.
If W/S is high, members of the winning coalition are very likely to retain their
status in future governments. This probability drives what the authors term the
“loyalty norm,” since a winning coalition member’s probability of retaining her status
in future governments depends on the ratio. When the ratio is low, members of
the winning coalition will possess great loyalty to the leader in power, since that
leader’s expulsion will threaten her status. Conversely, a high ratio decreases the
winning coalition member’s loyalty to the leader, since she is relatively confident
future governments will require her support.
The theory therefore classifies regimes by placing them on a two-dimensional
space, as demonstrated in Figure 2.1, where regimes vary continuously in the size
of the winning coalition and selectorate.14 Large-W , large-S regimes, located in the
upper right-hand portion of the graph have a relatively weak loyalty norm; because
W/S is relatively high, winning coalition members are reasonably certain they will
be included in future winning coalitions and thus possess little loyalty to the leader.
These likely include competitive democracies in which a larger percentage of the
14The 45-degree line in the figure reflects the restriction, discussed above, that the size of the winning coalition
cannot exceed the size of the selectorate.
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Figure 2.1: Regimes according to the selectorate theory
population is free to vote and political leaders must retain at least half of voters
to retain political power. The theory, however, also differentiates non-democratic
regimes, according to the size of the selectorate. Regimes with a small selectorate
and small winning coalition members (e.g., monarchies), located in the bottom left-
hand corner of the graph restrict political participation to a small group of citizens.
The combination of a small winning coalition and restricted political participation,
however, implies a relatively high value of W/S, or a relatively weak loyalty norm.
In other non-democracies, such as in one-party democracies, political participation is
expanded, since all citizens can vote. However, leaders can retain political power with
a far smaller winning coalition than in democracies, since the support of the hierarchy
of the ruling party is key to political power. The value of W/S is smaller than in
democracies and other non-democracies, though not dramatically so, implying that
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winning coalition members are, all else equal, more insecure in their position.
A leader maintains loyalty from her winning coalition by providing it a mixture
of goods that she pays for out of tax revenues. The basket of goods is comprised of
private goods provided only to the winning coalition and public goods enjoyed by the
entire polity (including non-selectors). Public goods improve the lives of all citizens
because they are non-excludable and therefore improve economic performance. In
contrast, private goods benefit only the winning coalition. BDM2S2 argue that the
size of the winning coalition and selectorate critically affect the provision of public
and private goods. Holding the size of the selectorate constant, an increase in the
size of the winning coalition entails two related but analytically separate effects on
the mixture of goods the leader offers to retain the support of the winning coalition.
First, it raises the ratio W/S, weakening the loyalty norm. As a result, each member
of the winning coalition requires a higher level of goods to remain loyal to the leader,
since she is confident future winning coalitions will include her.
Second, an increase in W (again, holding S constant) increases the number of
people who must be provided goods. Therefore, the two effects are reinforcing in that
each increases the cost of retaining the support of the winning coalition. The result
is that the leader must provide more goods for more people. She may respond to this
pressure by taxing more efficiently and providing more private goods to the winning
coalition. However, the increase in W causes the leader to switch from private to
public good provision in her quest to remain in office. With a small W , the leader
can use her income from taxation to provide private goods to the winning coalition,
thus purchasing political support relatively cheaply. Public goods that require large
investments do not represent the optimal manner to purchase support. However,
as W increases, the cost of private good provision increases, such that public good
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provision becomes the optimal strategy for purchasing support. Providing public
goods also assists in increasing the per-member payoff for the winning coalition.
Instead of more efficient extraction, leaders increase the size of the pie from which
to extract.
The selectorate theory’s focus on private goods offered only to the winning coali-
tion and public goods that benefit the entire population translates readily to a focus
on property rights discrimination. A political leader bargains with citizens over the
shape of institutions that protect private property. Those institutions can be de-
signed so as to only protect the property rights of the winning coalition or to protect
the rights of all citizens, regardless of political grouping. The former involves con-
verting the protection of private property into a private or club good accruing only
to the politically influential. For example, we might imagine a leader deploying the
military and/or police to protect particular citizens’ private property rights from
violations, while making no effort to protect other citizens’ rights. Similarly, a po-
litical leader might create a small, politically dependent court system that she can
control easily, in order to ensure that winning coalition members win any disputes
over private property rights. Conversely, a political leader may create institutions
that protect all citizens’ rights and adjudicate disputes among citizens fairly or on
the basis of efficiency. In short, the leader can choose to protect private property as
a public good. Examples may include a judiciary that is independent of her influence
or a police force equipped to respond to all citizens’ needs.
As in the general case, the logic of the selectorate theory implies two mutually
reinforcing effects of an increase in the size of the winning coalition. First, the cost
of protecting the winning coalition’s private property rights increases. Taking an
example from above, it becomes far more expensive to station troops and police to
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protect winning coalition members’ property when that group increases in size. Sim-
ilarly, the bureaucratic costs of administering the rights of the winning coalition also
increase. Second, the concomitant rise in W/S weakens the loyalty norm, meaning
that each member of the winning coalition requires more goods to remain loyal to the
leader. In response, the leader will re-focus on providing public goods that increase
economic performance and allow a higher level of benefits to the winning coalition.
That change in her incentives will motivate her to protect the private property of a
larger group of citizens to increase economic activity. Together, these two effects will
therefore shift her focus from protecting only the winning coalition’s rights to pro-
tecting private property rights as a public good. The result will be public institutions
protecting private property.
Figure 2.2: Property rights discrimination in large-W regimes
As before, we may state the argument in terms of regime types described above
and in Figure 2.1. Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 illustrate property rights discrimination in
these ideal type regimes. Each political grouping — winning coalition, selectors not
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in the winning coalition, and citizens outside the winning coalition — are depicted
along the horizontal axis. For each grouping, the width of the column represents
the size of that political grouping as a proportion of the total population and the
height of the column represents the group’s property rights confidence. For example,
in Figure 2.2, the selectorate is 90% of the population and the winning coalition
is half the size of the selectorate, or 45% of the total population. 10% of citizens
are outside the selectorate. In such a regime, winning coalition members are more
secure in their private property rights than selectors outside the winning coalition,
but not excessively so. In turn, non-selectors also will have access to public property
rights institutions, though we may expect that they do suffer slightly relative to
selectors.15 We may expect that political leaders will tilt property rights institutions
slightly in favor of the winning coalition and against non-selectors, but the extent to
which they do so is limited. Altogether, mean confidence in the polity will equal a
weighted average of the three groups, with that average depicted by the horizontal
line; for a large-W regime, that mean confidence is quite high because no one political
group suffers severely due to property rights confidence; the gap between winning
coalition members and non-selectors is relatively small.
In regimes characterized by a small winning coalition and a small selectorate, non-
selectors comprise a far larger percentage of the population, as evidenced by the width
of that column.16 In such a regime, political leaders likely discriminate in favor of
the winning coalition, building property rights institutions that favor the protection
of their rights. However, the weak loyalty norm of the winning coalition constrains
political leaders’ ability to discriminate property rights protection, since they must
15I assume that on a one-point scale, confidence ranks 1 (the maximum) for wining coalition members, 0.8 for
selectors outside the winning coalition and 0.6 for non-selectors.
16For the purposes of Figure 2.3, the selectorate is assumed to comprise only 20% of the population and the winning
coalition half the size of the selectorate. Non-selectors thus comprise 80% of the population.
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Figure 2.3: Property rights discrimination in small-W , small-S regimes
promote economic performance sufficiently enough to afford to pay off the winning
coalition. In order to do so, they must at least partially protect the private property
rights of the other political groupings. Non-selectors suffer relative to members of the
winning coalition — more so than in democracies — but not so severely that growth
collapses.17 However, property rights discrimination in favor of the winning coalition
does decrease mean property rights confidence in such countries, as evidenced by the
position of the horizontal line. In contrast with large-W regimes, the distribution of
property rights confidence is more skewed and the mean level of that confidence is
lower.
The distribution of property rights confidence shifts once more in non-democracies
with a large selectorate, as depicted in Figure 2.4.18 As discussed earlier, in such
regimes, the selectorate is nearly as large as that in a democracy, differentiating
17For the purposes of Figure 2.3, I assume that on a one-point scale, confidence ranks 1 for wining coalition
members, 0.8 for selectors outside the winning coalition and 0.5 for non-selectors.
18For the purposes of Figure 2.4, the selectorate is assumed to comprise 90% of the population, as in Figure 2.2.
However, the winning coalition comprises only 30% of the winning coalition or 27% of the population. 10% of the
population is outside the selectorate.
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Figure 2.4: Property rights discrimination in small-W , large-S regimes
these regimes from other non-democracies. The winning coalition, in turn, is larger
than in a small-W , small-S regime, though smaller than in a large-W regime. The
leaders of such regimes will advantage the protection of the winning coalition’s prop-
erty rights, since the smaller loyalty norm is more constraining for members of the
winning coalition. However, the larger winning coalition implies that leaders will
find it difficult to protect the winning coalition’s private property rights as a club
good. Therefore, such regimes will build some public institutions to protect private
property, implying that selectors not in the winning coalition and non-selectors will
not suffer as extensively as they would have if the winning coalition had been very
small 19
This analysis suggests a mean level of property rights confidence that is similar
to that of the small-W , small-S regimes depicted in Figure 2.3. In terms of national
measures, therefore, we might expect a very similar level of property rights confidence
19Jim Morrow, one of the selectorate theory’s co-creators, has much improved this discussion by emphasizing the
presence of relatively large winning coalitions in these kinds of regimes.
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in these two non-democratic regimes. However, their distribution of property rights
confidence is quite different. In small-W , small-S regimes, we should observe an
advantaged elite and large majority with middling confidence, as shown in Figure 2.3.
In contrast, the regimes represented in Figure 2.4 will have a larger grouping with
high property rights confidence, and a smaller majority with lower property rights
confidence.
2.5 Conclusions
This chapter expands upon ideas summarized in Chapter 1 to build a political
institutional theory of property rights discrimination. As such, it builds upon existing
theories from institutional economics, while making three simple yet fundamental
changes to how scholars traditionally have thought about property rights. First,
I reconsider how property rights institutions fail. As discussed in Chapter 1, most
accounts of the effect of private property rights institutions on economic performance
assume implicitly that politicians cannot differentiate the provision of property rights
protections. Economic institutional failure thus consists of politicians’ expropriation
of private property or their failure to protect private actors’ rights from each other. In
either case, scholars generally have assumed such institutional failures to be public in
nature, a decline in the quality of a public good that in turn decreases macroeconomic
growth. The primary theoretical contribution of this dissertation is thus quite simple
— I assume that politicians can decide strategically whose rights to violate or allow
to be violated. Doing so is consistent with North’s (1981) vision of a predatory state
in which politicians use redistribute property rights to confer benefits on favored
constituents. Section 2.2 carefully develops this conceptualization of property rights
discrimination. It recasts the empirical puzzle discussed in Chapter 1 — which
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portrayed shifting distributions of property rights confidence among firm managers
across countries — in a new light.
Second, this chapter revamps current understandings of the impact of protecting
private property rights. As discussed in Chapter 1, the intuition linking property
rights protection to long-term macroeconomic performance relies on microeconomic
logic — specifically, that an economic agent who fears the violation of her economic
rights will refrain from investment, innovation, etc. Subsequent empirical research
has committed a kind of ecological inference, justified in part by the assumption that
the protection of private property rights represents a public good. By thinking the
protection of private property rights as a distributed good, I disaggregate the link
between property rights protection and economic growth. Property rights discrim-
ination creates parallel economies of protected and unprotected rights. In turn, we
should expect the “in” group to thrive economically, while the “out” group stagnates.
Property rights discrimination thus helps to create patterns of economic inequality.
Thinking at the macroeconomic level, property rights discrimination also depresses
growth.
Finally, this chapter builds on existing bargaining models to offer a political in-
stitutional explanation of property rights discrimination. If property rights discrimi-
nation exists, then an explanation of its origins must account for how the protection
of private property rights varies within countries and how that within country vari-
ation itself varies across countries. The bargaining model I develop in Sections 2.3
and 2.4 offers such an explanation. In that model, self-interested economic agents,
responding to exogenous changes in relative prices, demand changes to existing prop-
erty rights institutions. Agents will vary in their ability to overcome the collective
action problem and lobby politicians for changes beneficial to their interests, imply-
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ing that smaller, more homogenous groups of agents will more likely inhabit the “in”
group of protected rights. These dynamics likely present themselves across countries.
However, bargaining over property rights institutions also depends on the interests
of politicians. Differences in political institutions predict not only the the general
pattern of property rights discrimination, but also whose rights likely suffer.
This chapter thus yields three sets of empirically verifiable predictions. First,
property rights discrimination exists and varies meaningfully across countries. We
should expect a relatively uniform distribution of confidence in certain countries and
a more discriminatory distribution in others. Second, property rights discrimina-
tion exerts a substantively significant effect on economic activity. Citizens with less
confidence in their private property rights will suffer economically relative to their
more confident counterparts. Third, property rights discrimination will depend on
the nature of political institutions. In the next two chapters, I test these predictions
using firm-level data from the World Bank.
CHAPTER III
Property Rights Discrimination: Measurement and
Economic Repercussions
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, I make three related empirical claims. First, I contend that self-
interested politicians discriminate the protection of private property rights, using
their power over the design of institutions to protect certain citizens’ rights, but
not others’. Second, I propose that certain sets of economic actors — richer and
more politically connected — will in general more adeptly bargain for State sanction
and protection of their rights. Furthermore, political institutions affect the shape of
property rights discrimination. Finally, property rights discrimination tilts economic
activity towards an “in” group of protected property rights and away from the “out”
group of insecure rights, in the process also depressing aggregate performance. In this
chapter and the next, I conduct careful statistical tests of these core propositions.
Here, I concentrate on the first and last of these. I use firm-level surveys to design
new measures of property rights discrimination that attest to its existence in a wide
range of its countries and to the meaningful variation in its shape across countries. I
then leverage those measure to estimate the effect of property rights discrimination
on both micro and macroeconomic behavior, particularly informality. As we shall
see, this analysis tentatively supports the core narrative of Chapter 2.
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This is no small task, particularly in terms of measurement. As I discuss in Sec-
tion 3.2, extant efforts to measure the quality of economic institutions neglect the
possibility that the protection of private property is distributed unevenly within a
country. Instead, they must make strong and often implicit assumptions regarding
that justify their measures as accurate representations of an entire population’s prop-
erty rights security. In place of these efforts, I contend that firm-level data from the
World Bank allow us to answer these questions with a new and exciting degree of
precision. As part of its Enterprise Surveys (ES ), the Bank has surveyed over 75,000
firms in 105 countries between 2002 and 2006. The surveys contain an impressive
array of data on each firm, including its basic characteristics and recent performance.
Most importantly for the purposes of this study, each firm manager also answers
a battery of questions regarding the security of her firm’s private property rights,
including her confidence in the ability of the judicial system to fairly resolve disputes
over rights and in the tendency of the State to encroach on private property through
excessive regulation. These data are certainly imperfect — they likely understate
the degree and consequences of property rights discrimination and the perceptual
basis of the data may contaminate the comparison of firms within and across coun-
tries. Nevertheless, the careful analysis of these data paints an empirical portrait of
property rights discrimination. As predicted in Chapter 2, the protection of private
property rights does vary within countries. Moreover, variation in property rights
confidence itself varies meaningfully across countries. Countries with a similar mean
level of property rights confidence often divergent distributions of that confidence.
In addition to varying meaningfully across countries, property rights discrimina-
tion has important repercussions for firm behavior. Firm managers with less confi-
dence in their private property rights — i.e., those in the “out” group — invest less,
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operate at lower capacity, and hide a greater percentage of their revenues from the
State, all else equal. Concentrating on the question of firm informality, I find that a
firm manager’s individual decision to hide revenues from the State depends far more
strongly on the security of her own private property rights than on the mean level
of property rights security in her country. Finally, this trend reverberates at the
macroeconomic level. Total informality responds strongly to variation in property
rights confidence; in countries with a high degree of property rights discrimination,
increases in the mean level of property rights confidence will not reduce informality.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes previ-
ous attempts to measure the security of private property rights, highlighting their
distributional assumptions regarding government protection of individual rights. Sec-
tion 3.3 describes the Enterprise Surveys in detail, particularly the questions related
to property rights. In it, I also explain the new variables I create as summary mea-
sures of firm managers’ property rights confidence. With these in hand, I describe
the major patterns of property rights discrimination across the countries surveyed
by the World Bank. Section 3.4 endeavors to demonstrate the effects of property
rights discrimination by testing the effect of property rights confidence on key com-
ponents of firm performance, including capacity utilization, transactional behavior,
informality, and investment. Section 3.5 discusses these results and looks ahead to
Chapter 4.
3.2 A Primer on Measuring Property Rights
Chapter 2 predicts an empirical regularity — property rights discrimination —
unexpected by extant research in institutional economics. Consequently, a central
goal for this chapter is to search for measures that allow us to differentiate this
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new account from the hegemonic conceptualization of property rights protection as
a public good. I begin that process by reviewing pre-existing endeavors to measure
the security of citizens’ private property rights.1 This brief survey reveals the key
challenges to building measures of property rights discrimination, which will form
the basis of my own measurement strategy.
Perhaps most importantly, researchers must resolve the question of what they seek
to measure. Scholars intermittently have criticized the literature on property rights
and governance for not attending sufficiently to concept development.2 Each mea-
surement strategy reviewed here must accomplish two tasks. First, it must define the
underlying construct it wishes to measure. Second, researchers then must confront
the question of how to measure it. This discussion uncovers a number of responses
to this question, ranging from expert assessments by the staffs of commercial risk
rating agencies to analysis of commercial codes. Inherent in this choice of method
is the concern at the core of this research — that of the distribution. Regardless of
method, researchers necessarily make assumptions — whether explicit or implicit —
about how the security of private property rights is distributed across citizens.
3.2.1 Knack and Keefer (1995)
One of the first ambitious efforts to measure the security of private property rights
— and one that has remained influential — emerged in Knack and Keefer’s (1995)
study of the effect of institutions on economic performance. In reviewing the then-
nascent empirical literature in institutional economics, the authors proposed that
the testing of institutional economists’ central insights into economic growth had
1This relatively brief review does not purport to offer an encyclopedic list of contending measurement strategies,
nor a complete description of each measurement strategy reviewed. Rather, it offers an instructive comparison of the
more prominent attempts currently in use in the literature as a guide for my own measurement strategy.
2For an instructive discussion in this vein, see a recent debate regarding measures of governance (Kurtz and
Schrank 2007a, 2007b; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2007a, 2007b ).
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been constrained by data availability (Knack and Keefer 1995: 207-208). Previous
studies relying on measures of political freedoms and/or political instability had only
indirectly captured the relationship North (1981, 1990) and others had proposed.3
Identifying an opportunity to improve empirical testing, they propose that an-
alysts create “more direct measures of the institutional environment” (Knack and
Keefer 1995: 208). Their discussion strongly suggests the ambition in their mea-
surement strategy; unlike previous attempts, they propose that data can be used
to more directly measure the underlying construct of the institutional environment,
rather than corollaries of it. To build those indicators, they rely on data from two
private firms offering advice on international investment risk: the PRS Group and
the Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI). Each of these firms publishes
multiple risk guides for businesses contemplating investments in foreign countries.
Knack and Keefer (1995) use the PRS Group’s International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) as the basis for their measures. In particular, they leverage the ICRG’s
index of political risk, which involves 12 component variables and as many as three
sub-components per component, with each assigned a particular number of points.
BERI offers several products, each of which include political variables. Each firm
relies on its staff and/or surveys of outside experts to create these risk guides, which
blend both quantitative and qualitative data.
With these data in hand, they cite North’s (1981) delineation of contract and
property rights as their guide. To measure a particular country’s security of con-
tractual rights, they rely on the “rule of law” and “repudiation of contracts by gov-
3For an example of research identifying political instability as a threat to private property — and in particular,
the probability of expropriation by political leaders with short time horizons — see Barro (1997). For a dissenting
view, see Haber, Razo and Maurer (2005). For an example regarding political and civil rights, see Kormendi and
McGuire (1985). In a review of the effect of democracy on economic growth, Przeworski and Limongi (1993) also
discuss the link between political and civil rights and the protection of private property.
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ernment” measures from the ICRG and “contract enforceability” from the BERI.4
For measures of property rights, they use the “expropriation risk” measure from the
ICRG and “nationalization potential” from the BERI. In each case, the variables
seem to correspond reasonably closely to the security of contractual and property
rights. However, rather than using these measures as predictors of economic growth,
either combined into a one-dimensional index of private property rights or as sep-
arate indicators of contractual and property rights, they add more variables from
the ICRG and BERI and create two measures, one based on each source. They add
measures of corruption and bureaucratic quality from the ICRG and measures of
bureaucratic delays and infrastructure quality from BERI. They justify the inclusion
of these measures because they represent measures of “government credibility” and
“proxies for the general efficiency with which government services are provided and
for the extent and damage of rent-seeking behavior” (Knack and Keefer 1995: 211).
In short, they create two measures of general “institutional quality.”
These coding decisions raise the question of concept development, particularly
the question of the breadth of the measures of the underlying construct. Knack and
Keefer explicitly justify their study as a test of “the impact of property rights on
economic growth” (1995: 207). However, both their description of the basic problem
and their measures of it begin to conflate a number of different issues under the
rubric of property rights.5 For example, in the first sentence of the article, they
propose the following:
Few would dispute that the security of property and contractual rights
and the efficiency with which governments manage the provision of public
4The “rule of law component from the ICRG has since been re-named the “law and order” component.
5Knack and Keefer’s (1995) inclusion of other aspects of what might be termed “good governance” in a measure
of the security of property rights reverberates in the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators and attempts by
the Fraser Institute and Heritage Foundation to measure “economic freedom.”
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goods and the creation of government policies are significant determinants
of the speed with which countries grow. (207)
The provision of public goods (e.g., roads, communications, electric power) and im-
plementation of sound macroeconomic policies represent important focuses for the
study of economic performance. Yet the authors never pause to justify exactly how
these important factors affect the underlying construct they purport to measure —
the security of citizens’ private property rights. High taxation and crumbling roads
indeed may restrict an actor’s ability to use her resources productively, but a higher
burden of proof is needed to characterize those barriers as inherently concerning
property rights. The “concept creep” present in their measurement strategy risks
debasing the relationship between private property rights and economic growth into
a tautology — i.e., that countries with a high-quality environment for economic
growth tend to grow faster.
These more conceptual difficulties are exacerbated by their use of the ICRG and
BERI indicators. As discussed above, both the PRS Group and BERI publish risk
guides for potential international investors. According to the PRS Group, its guides
are designed to help “institutional investors, banks, multinational corporations, im-
porters, exporters, foreign exchange traders, shipping concerns, and a multitude of
others” (Coplin, O’Leary, and Sealy 1996: 27). Advertisements of the BERI mea-
sures speak of imparting a strategic advantage to companies who use the ratings. The
inherent purpose of their data collection efforts is to assist foreign businesses con-
templating economic relationships with the country in question. Keefer and Knack’s
(1995) use of such data as a measure of a country’s institutional quality thus makes
one of two somewhat unpalatable assumptions about the distribution or property
rights confidence. First, they might assume that a government’s treatment of foreign
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businesses (as measured by the severity of restrictions on the repatriation of capi-
tal) represents an excellent proxy for the government’s protection of citizens’ private
property rights. Second, they might assume that its treatment of foreign businesses
itself is the key to macroeconomic performance. The authors seemingly gravitate to
the former assumption, given their emphasis on North’s (1981, 1990) discussion of
private property. This tendency reflects a particular conception of the distribution
of the security of private property rights. In short, the authors assume that the
protection of private property rights is fixed in an economy across its citizens (i.e.,
is a public good) and that that fixed level of protection can be described well by a
government’s friendliness towards large foreign businesses.
Knack and Keefer’s (1995) ambitious measurement strategy provides a conve-
nient point of departure for the remainder of this discussion. Within institutional
economics, their approach has remained hegemonic. Knack and Keefer’s (1995) mea-
sures have been used in a number of influential studies of macroeconomic performance
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 2002; Hall and Jones 1999). However, two
nagging issues — conceptual breadth and the conceptualization of property rights
security as being distributed — remain, issues that remain with us as we continue
this review.
3.2.2 The Doing Business Project
The World Bank’s Doing Business project, seemingly as a counter to the concerns
with Knack and Keefer’s (1995) measurement efforts, has sought to create objective
measures of property rights security, as opposed to Knack and Keefer’s (1995) re-
liance on subjective assessments provided by outside experts. Specifically, the Doing
Business project team concentrates on the costs of executing a narrow set of criti-
cal business activities. According to its 2008 report, it investigates “the regulations
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that enhance business activity and those that constrain it” (World Bank 2008: i).
Institutional economics’ concerns comprise the core of the underlying construct the
project wishes to measure. In its initial report, the World Bank argues that “no in-
dicators assess specific laws and regulations regarding business activity or the public
institutions that enforce them” (World Bank 2004: viii).
For the most part, the project focuses on the roadblocks governments create for
entrepreneurs (i.e., firm owners and those seeking to start new firms), particularly
by raising the cost of legally starting a business, transferring ownership of property,
etc. In this sense, they argue, a critical challenge for many under-developed coun-
tries remains removing burdensome regulations that destroy entrepreneurial activity
(World Bank 2004: xiv). Their claim regarding the negative effects of regulation is
rooted in the logic of institutional economics; regulation as they define it results in
the expropriation of private property rights. Rather than ban private property rights
as such, governments effectively accomplish the same goal when they use regulations
to limit the ability of individuals to use their private resources at key points of their
business’ lives.
However, the project implicitly recognizes the first dimension of private property
rights — the government’s protection of citizens’ private property rights from viola-
tions by other citizens. In its first report, the Doing Business project team states
that: “Good regulation does not mean zero regulation . . . . Governments are better
off defining the property rights of their citizens and protecting them against injury
from other citizens and from the state” (World Bank 2004: xv-xvi). The research
team suggests that, properly conceived, regulation plays a normatively positive role
in supporting private economic activity, particularly by defining citizens’ rights and
protecting them from encroachment by other citizen.
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The Doing Business project then implements a novel strategy to measure the
underlying constructs just described.6 First, the project defines ten important en-
trepreneurial activities: starting a business; obtaining licenses for construction; hiring
and firing workers; registering property; obtaining credit; investing in local busi-
nesses; paying taxes; trading internationally; enforcing contracts that have been
violated; and closing the business. For each of these activities, it carefully describes
a case study that may be compared across countries. Put differently, the creators
of the dataset wish to measure an underlying construct — the ease of private en-
trepreneurial activities.
I concentrate on starting a business as one example of this method. In that area,
the project team assumes that a group of five citizens create a 100% domestically
owned limited liability company operating in the country’s most populous city. The
case also assumes that the company has between 10 and 50 employees (all of whom
are nationals), start-up capital of 10 times per capita GDP, and turnover of 100
times per capita GDP. Finally, the case assumes that the company does not own
property and engages in generic industrial and commercial activities that do not
involve a special tax regime or regulatory scheme. This detailed description is meant
to ensure comparability of regulations across countries. In order to measure the costs
of starting a business, the project team describes the case study in a survey, which is
forwarded to experts — academics, government officials, accountants, businesspeople,
and lawyers — within each of the countries sampled.7 Local experts complete the
survey, describing the number of procedures, the time and cost to complete them,
6This strategy plainly finds its inspiration in Hernando de Soto’s (1989, 2000) work on the informal economy of
Peru and other developing countries. De Soto (1989) famously enumerated the number of regulations required to
legally register property in Peru and later repeated the study in Egypt and several other countries (2000).
7For Doing Business 2008, the most recent version of the report, the project team consulted with 970 experts in
178 economies for roughly 5.4 advisers per country for the starting a business measure and roughly 5,000 advisers
overall, for about 28 advisers per country (World Bank 2008: 67)
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and the paid-in minimum capital necessary to begin a business.8 The final measures,
therefore, entail the number of procedures, time to completion and cost of completion
for a number of important business activities. To take a different example, Doing
Business also records the difficulty for a business of using the judicial system to
adjudicate a dispute with a buyer who has not paid a contract worth 200% of per
capita GDP (World Bank 2008: 80-81).
The Doing Business project represents one of the most sophisticated attempt to
measure the environment for business in a wide range of countries and one that maps
onto the set of issues at stake in this dissertation. In doing so, the indicators mea-
sure costs to domestic actors of asserting contractual and property rights. By stan-
dardizing the business case measured, the project allows cross-country comparisons.
Nevertheless, this standardization does assume implicitly that these costs do not
vary meaningfully with a country; put differently, the protection of private property
rights is not distributed. The Doing Business project team takes pains to consider
these issues, arguing that inefficient regulations differentially affect businesses, plac-
ing particularly strenuous burdens on smaller businesses and on businesses owned by
women (World Bank 2004: xv). These claims are certainly plausible. However, the
implicit distributional assumption remains the same; the costs of obtaining property
rights protections do not vary, though their effects may. Therefore, there is little
effort to describe any variation in costs or their effects. A hypothetical firm com-
pared by legal and business experts does not by necessity suffer from gender, ethnic,
religious, or political discrimination.
Even if we think of the protection of private property rights as being distributed,
8The project team and local experts make several assumptions regarding the procedures. For example, they do
not include the time necessary to gather information in their calculations, nor do they include bribes, preferring to
code only official costs of regulations. Importantly, they assume that “the entrepreneur does not waste time and
commits to completing each remaining procedure without delay” (World Bank 2008: 70).
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we might claim that the Doing Business project as measuring the median of that dis-
tribution. Such a measure might represent an improvement over Knack and Keefer’s
(1995) measures, which measure the property rights security of a specific class of
actors whose experience likely does not parallel that of a domestic businessperson.
Yet, however accurately measured, describing this central tendency does little to
describe the shape of the distribution of property rights confidence. Furthermore,
we might also ask whether the indicators actually measure the median experience of
businesspeople. Thinking once again of the costs of starting a business, the standard
case assumes the firm exists in the country’s most populous city.9 The case also as-
sumes that the start-up capital for the potential business is 10 times per capita GDP.
For example, the standard case assumes that the experience of five businesspeople in
Washington, DC starting a factory with $400,000 of start-up capital is representative
of businesses enterprises in the United States. In a country with little property rights
discrimination, that assertion may be true. However, in a country that discriminates
against small businesses, it almost certainly will not be. The standard cases reflects a
particular assumption about the distribution of the costs of doing business, particu-
larly the centrality of medium-sized, urban, manufacturing businesses.10 In countries
with little property rights discrimination, that assumption may be justified, as the
ease of starting a business will not depend on location, sector, or size. In countries
with a great deal of property rights discrimination, however, the standard case may
tell us little about the experience of most entrepreneurs.
9The Doing Business Project has begun to adopt sub-national measures for particular countries and regions,
though they concentrate on the ease of entrepreneurship in different cities, rather than across different groups of
people or types of businesses. Countries and regions included are: Colombia, Egypt, Morocco, Mexico, and South
Asia.
10A recent report by the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (2008) goes one step farther, arguing that
the Doing Business project represents an anti-regulatory bias harnessed to large business interests.
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3.2.3 Contract-Intensive Money
In contrast to other measures of the security of private property rights reviewed
here, Clague and his co-authors (1999) offer a proxy for contractual and property
rights based on easily available objective data. In terms of conceptual development,
the authors begin with a schematic quite similar to North’s. The authors begin by
focusing on the role of “government-provided third-party enforcement” of contracts,
the first of North’s two dimensions of property rights and key to Chapter 2’s dis-
cussion (Clague et al, 1999: 187). They argue that, although actors’ concerns over
reputation and private mechanisms at times may suffice to enforce contracts, the
market generally cannot be relied upon to fulfill this function (ibid). Therefore, gov-
ernments must play the role of third-party enforcer of contracts, in addition to two
other roles: providing a general level of security (i.e., a monopoly on violence) and
refraining from expropriating rights itself (ibid).
The question remains how best to build a measure of the security of contrac-
tual and property rights, as defined by North (1981) and reiterated by Clague and
his co-authors. Their answer to this question is creative: “we take advantage of a
fortuitous circumstance that enforcement problems underlying the use of different
forms of money and credit mirror enforcement problems underlying trade in goods
and services in much the way a negative resembles a print” (ibid). In short, when
private actors fear the violation of contracts and/or the expropriation of their private
property rights, they will tend to hold currency instead of bank deposits, fearing that
banking institutions may violate their contractual rights without censure by the gov-
ernment. Likewise, if the risk of public expropriation of private property is high, the
resulting black markets also will favor the use of currency instead of other monetary
instruments. In contrast, a secure institutional environment will favor the use of
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non-currency financial instruments that offer a rate of return and more convenience
(Clague et al 1999: 188).
Based on widely available data from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF)
International Financial Statistics (IFS ), defining “contract-intensive money” (CIM)
as the ratio of non-currency money to the total amount of money.11 The measure
ranges from 0 to 1, with smaller values representing a greater reliance on currency and
hence worse protection of contractual and property rights. The authors defend CIM
against suggestions that it proxies more strongly for financial sector development,
showing that it correlates strongly with Knack and Keefer’s (1995) measures, as well
as economic growth and investment.
CIM is an intriguing measure that stands up to a great deal of empirical security
and appears based on sound logic. The measure is based on publicly available ob-
jective data that offers a reasonably long time series for a surprisingly broad array
of countries. However, as with previous measures, Clague and his co-authors (1999)
make a particular set of claims regarding the distribution of the security of contract
and property rights in an economy. If we think of M2 and C, as the sum of each
citizen’s money holdings, then we could hypothetically define each citizen’s CIM.
Thinking of the aggregates in this manner and combining that line of thinking with
Clague et al (1999), then their measure is actually a proxy for the average confi-
dence in contractual and property rights, weighted by each citizen’s total monetary
holdings. If a large percentage of the money in an economy is held in only a few
hands, then CIM doesn’t tell us very much regarding the average citizen’s property
rights confidence; rather, it tells us much more about the property rights confidence
of richer citizens. More generally, the more unequal an economy, the more skewed
11More specifically, CIM = (M2−C)/M2, where M2 is a broad definition of money and C is a measure of currency.
For more on the definition and coding of these concepts, see Clague et al (1999: 188), particularly footnote 3.
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the measure. As with the Doing Business indicators and Knack and Keefer’s (1995)
measures, CIM seems to steer the measure of the security of private property rights
towards the security of a particular group of citizen, based on an implicit distribu-
tional assumption.
3.3 Measuring Property Rights Discrimination with Firm Surveys
The foregoing review has served an important purpose in this chapter’s mission
to develop measures of property rights discrimination, raising a number of impor-
tant issues regarding any attempt to measure the security of private property rights.
Therefore, I pause to consider those lessons and their implications for my efforts.
First, difficulties in concept development — and particularly fidelity to an explicitly
and carefully defined definition of property rights security — remains a common
theme in the various measures reviewed in Section 3.2. In short, we must still care-
fully attend to what we hope to measure. An important aspect of the question of
conceptual development is the issue of breadth. Whereas Knack and Keefer (1995)
proposed a broad set of indicators, the Doing Business project chooses a narrow set
of important entrepreneurial activities, many of which clearly map onto the two di-
mensions of institutions cited by North (1981). The question of what we measure also
suggests a series of questions regarding how we measure it. One dimension of this
question is the use of subjective versus objective measures. Measurement strategies
making use of data from commercial risk rating agencies, for example, rely on the
subjective ratings of outside “experts” regarding the institutional environment of the
countries they study. In contrast, more objective measures (e.g., Doing Business and
Clague et al’s (1999) measure of CIM) rely on analysis of commercial codes or pub-
licly available data on the money supply. Finally, the choice of method often relates
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to the question — critical for this research — of distribution. Each of the projects
described above faces a tension over this question. Each assumes implicitly that the
protection of private property is uniform within a country, but chooses a particular
set of actors as being the focus of its measurement strategy (e.g., foreign businesses
in Knack and Keefer (1995); medium-sized, urban firms in Doing Business).
In the final analysis, none of these measurement strategies investigate the simple
question of how confidence in private property varies within countries and whether or
not that variation itself varies across countries. We are therefore left with the question
that initiated this chapter: how would we know that property rights discrimination
exists? The remainder of this section answers this question and provides an empirical
portrait of property rights discrimination.
3.3.1 The World Bank Enterprise Surveys
The World Bank Enterprise Surveys (ES ) are a project initiated in 2002 to ask
detailed questions of a representative sample of firm managers in a large number of
countries. As of its 2006 surveys, the World Bank has surveyed approximately 75,000
firms in 105 countries.12 The project team publishes a comprehensive dataset of firm
managers’ responses online.13 Among other things, the data offer glimpses into firm
managers’ confidence in the legal system’s protection of their private property rights
and recent firm efforts to invest in hiring new employees, offering new products, and
investing in new technologies.
The Bank implements the surveys as follows.14 The Bank chooses the countries to
survey, focusing mostly on larger countries every three years, citing the difficulty and
12Please note the difference between the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) and the World Bank
Enterprise Surveys (ES), which I use here. The WBES was a forerunner of the ES conducted by the World Bank
in 2000-2001. Because of the identical acronyms, the two datasets are easily mistaken. I use the latter and refer to
them as the ES.
13To download the comprehensive dataset, see http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.
14This discussion follows the ES’ website and implementation notes (World Bank 2007).
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high costs necessary to conduct the surveys. In each country, the Bank hires private
contractors to administer the survey; though it usually cooperates with governments,
it avoids having government or quasi-government agencies conduct the surveys for
the purposes of confidentiality. The implementing agency constructs a sample frame
based on field research conducted through cooperation with government statistical
agencies, business associations, or other organizations (World Bank 2007: 4). The
sample frame is establishments in either manufacturing or services (either retail or
wholesale) located in major urban centers and with at least five employees(World
Bank 2007: 3-4).15 The private contractor then creates either a simple random or
stratified sample of establishments 16
Potential respondents are administered a screening questionnaire. Assuming an
establishment fits the survey requirements, the core questionnaire is comprised of
two parts, with several sections in each. The first part is comprised of several sub-
sections, including: control information (e.g., industry, location); general informa-
tion on the firm (e.g., ownership); infrastructure and services (e.g., communications,
roads, electricity); sales and supplies (e.g., supply and demand conditions); com-
petitive conditions (e.g., number of competitors, degree of price competition); land
access and ownership issues; crime; business-government relations; and constraints
on the establishment. The second part is more oriented towards accounting, asking
the respondent to answer questions related to its financing, labor, and productivity.17
The ES offer us an opportunity to measure with some statistical confidence the
degree to which confidence in property rights varies across firms within a country,
as well as compare how that variation itself varies across countries. Though the sur-
15The size requirement is designed intentionally to rule out informal establishments, with a set of special surveys
of micro-enterprises designed to study informal businesses. I return to this point presently.
16Stratified random sampling was implemented in the 2006 surveys; However, for the surveys I use, simple random
sampling was used.
17The comprehensive questionnaire is available for download at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/
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veys over-sample larger economies, democracies, and Eastern European countries, a
number of small economies enter the sample, as do a number of non-democracies
(e.g., Egypt, Vietnam). Within countries, we can be more confident that a country’s
responses will include the voices of a wider range of firms than in previous measure-
ment efforts. Rather than making an implicit distributional assumption regarding
property rights security, we can allow firm managers’ responses to guide us.
3.3.2 Measuring Property Rights Discrimination
Using the ES, how would we know that a particular firm’s private property rights
are protected? Given its emphasis on comparing the investment climates of different
countries, the ES contain measures that correspond closely to both dimensions of
private property rights protections. As discussed above, the surveys contain sections
titled “investment climate constraints,” “business-government relations,” and “con-
flict resolution/legal environment.” These sections allow respondents to forward both
a subjective and an objective assessment of their institutional environment, evoking
Section 3.2’s comparison of these different measures. Subjective questions ask man-
agers to generally assess their institutional environments. For example, Chapter 1
discussed summarized responses to Question 46, which asks respondents to rate their
confidence in the judicial system’s protection of their contractual rights. In contrast,
objective measures ask the firm manager to assess her experience in dealings with
the State. For example, one question asks firm managers to assess how many weeks
courts generally take to resolve cases over overdue payments.18
Political economists continue to debate the relative merits of subjective and objec-
tive measures in the ES (Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido 2007; Aterido, Hallward-
Driemeier, and Pagés 2007). [10] [50] As discussed in Chapter 1, though the central
18This is question c247g in the ES.
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logic underlying the consensus on property rights is inherently perceptual, scholars
have tended to focus on the “quality” of specific institutions (e..g, regulations in Do-
ing Business). We might therefore measure the perceptions directly through general,
subjective assessments of property rights confidence. Alternatively, we may measure
specific institutions’ performance by measuring respondents’ experience with them.
Subjective measures have the value of being direct, but contain several potential pit-
falls, most notably the “optimism or kvetch” factor (Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido
2007). If particular firm managers are more optimistic than others, then they will
tend to rate their institutional environment far more generously than it deserves.
And if this propensity towards optimism or pessimism systematically varies across
countries, then the ES may over-estimate the institutional environment of certain
countries while under-estimating that of others.
Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether objective measures offer a clear improve-
ment. Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier, and Pagés (2007: 12) highlight the endogeneity
concerns in the use of raw objective assessments. Burgeoning firms are more likely
to interact with State agencies as they obtain permits and licenses, construct new
facilities, etc. Therefore, they will more likely understand the obstacles posed by
State institutions. Conversely, successful firms may tend towards a more sanguine
assessment of their experience with the State more generally.19
In reality, the division between the two types is likely narrower than conceived.
The latter strongly involve a very similar subjective components, as when a firm
manager must judge how much time she spends with regulators in a typical week.
A pessimistic firm manager likely is prone to over-estimating that time, relative to a
counterpart with a sunnier outlook. Moreover, these questions often ask firm man-
19Analysis using data from ratings agencies such as Political Risk Services’ (PRS) International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG) have tackled this latter issue, referring to it as a “halo effect.” For a more in-depth discussion of these
issues, see Kurtz and Schrank (2007a and 2007b).
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agers to rely on their memory over a longer time period, magnifying the subjective
nature of the answer. For example, questions 47f and 47g ask entrepreneurs to as-
sess the percentage of payments disputes resolved by court and the average time
needed to resolve such cases, over the last two years. Other questions ask firm man-
agers to assess their objective experience in a “typical week,” as in questions asking
firm owners to assess how much time they spend with government regulators. Re-
sponses to such questions likely involve a subjective component similar to that of
“subjective” measures; pessimistic firm managers will complain of the intrusiveness
of such experiences, where the more optimistic will rate such experiences as generally
favorable.20
I resolve this challenge by relying on subjective measures, creating two types of
measures. First, I create “simple” measures that rely on the raw scores from firm
managers. Second, I create a de-meaned score by subtracting the mean of a firm
manager’s subjective assessments of other aspects of the institutional environment
from her subjective assessment of the security of her private property rights. Thus,
p∗ij = pij− z̄ij, where p∗ij is the de-meaned measure, pij is the raw subjective measure
and z̄ij is the mean of the respondent’s answers to other aspects of the investment
climate (e.g., access to finance, reliability of telecommunications, etc.). By explicitly
setting a baseline for comparison, the de-meaned measure improves the comparison
of optimistic and pessimistic firm managers. A generally pessimistic firm manager
(i.e., one who tends to rate the institutional environment as unfavorable, regardless
of her objective experience) will only garner a low de-meaned measure if her prop-
erty rights confidence is worse than her rating of other aspects of the institutional
environment.21 The same logic suggests that this de-meaning process also assists in
20Furthermore, objective and subjective measures of the same construct (e.g., the fairness of the judiciary) tend
to be strongly correlated empirically (Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier, and Pagés 2007).
21The de-meaned measure presents a different problem. Imagine a firm manager who has assessed her entire
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comparing firms across countries. If a particular country has a cultural predilection
towards either optimism or pessimism, we should expect its distribution to generally
shift down or up the scale, respectively.22
Before describing the actual measures from the ES used, I pause to discuss data
availability. The WBES cover a wide range of types of firms in a number of different
countries. Therefore, certain questions will almost certainly mean something different
across respondents. In particular, some questions may mean something different to
smaller/simpler businesses. For example, certain questions seeking to ascertain the
experience of firms with regulators have a very low response rate (about 10% at
times), suggesting that many firm managers felt they lacked the experience to answer
the question. Therefore, I tend to concentrate my attention on measures that would
make sense to a broad array of firms. Since a primary purpose of the dissertation
is to study the width of the protection of private property rights (i.e., its variability
within countries), I place a premium on generalizable measures.
I begin with subjective measures of the first dimension of property rights institu-
tions: citizen-citizen interactions. I take three measures from the ES. The first asks
firm managers to assess on a six-point scale (from “fully agree” to “fully disagree”)
the degree to which they agree with the following statement: “I am confident that the
judicial system will enforce my contractual and property rights in business disputes.”
The second asks the firm manager to assess on a five point scale (from “no obsta-
cle” to “very severe obstacle”) the degree to which crime represents a constraint on
investment climate, including the protection of her private property rights, as being poor. The firm manager may
truly suffer from a consistently limiting business environment, in which case her raw subjective assessment is correct.
Second, the firm manager may be overly pessimistic, in which case the raw subjective assessment should be corrected.
The de-meaning strategy fails to distinguish between these two cases.
22I also implement a strategy in which I compare each firm manager’s de-meaned measure to that of “like” firms,
where firm similarity is defined by location, size, sector, and line of business. This measure indicates when a firm’s
de-meaned assessment of its private property rights is worse than firms very much like it by subtracting the mean
score for “like” firms from its score. The measure is “‘doubly de-meaned” in that the firm manager’s raw score has
been compared to its other scores and the relative scores for other firms like it. This measure is highly correlated
with the de-meaned measure and does not produce a meaningful change in estimates of the effect of property rights
confidence on firm behavior.
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business. The third asks the same question with regard to the legal system and insti-
tutions of conflict resolution. Each of these questions has a relatively high response
rate. Taken together, these measures provide a measure of each firm’s assessment
of the security of its private property rights from threats from other citizens (crime)
and from weak policing of contract violations (courts). I create an index from the
measures equal to the sum of the three measures divided by 16, the total number
of points possible.23 The resulting measure ranges from 0 to 1. As discussed above,
I demean the measure, subtracting the the mean score for all other measures of
business constraints from the mean score for these three measures. The de-meaned
variable also ranges from 0 to 1.
For the subjective measure of the second dimension of property rights institutions
(i.e., expropriation), I take five measures from the ES. The first asks respondents to
assess on a six-point scale the degree to which they agree with the following state-
ment: “In general, government officials’ interpretations of regulations affecting my
establishment are consistent.” The remaining questions ask firm managers to assess
whether the following place constraints on their businesses: business licensing and op-
erational permits; regulatory uncertainty; corruption; and anti-competitive policies.
Consistent with the argument forwarded above, each of these variables helps us un-
derstand the severity of State restrictions on a firm’s private property rights. Business
licensing and operational permits are cited prominently in the World Bank’s Doing
Businesses dataset. Corruption places extra-legal restrictions on private property
by forcing firms to devote a greater share of their resources to obtain such permits.
Two of the measures provide a glimpse into the consistency of regulations, as well.
As before, I create an index from the measures equal to their sum divided by 26, the
23In cases where fewer than three of the measures was available, I calculate the index with the remaining available
variable(s).
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total number of points possible. The measure ranges from 0 to 1.
3.3.3 An Empirical Portrait of Property Rights Discrimination
Having defined data and measures that would manifest the presence of property
rights discrimination if it does exist, I now turn to two questions of great impor-
tance to this dissertation. Does property rights discrimination exist? And does it
vary across countries? To answer those questions, I paint an empirical portrait of
property rights discrimination. If the protection of private property rights — which
I propose is the result of political bargaining — resembles a public good, then firm
managers within a country will tend to agree on the security of their private prop-
erty rights. Alternatively, if property rights discrimination exists, then we should
see marked differences among firm managers in their assessments of the security of
their property rights. Furthermore, if property rights discrimination exists and varies
meaningfully across countries, then we will observe clear cross-national differences in
the distribution of property rights confidence.
The Enterprise Surveys likely pose a difficult test for the existence of property
rights discrimination, for a number of reasons. First, the ES do not record how
the State treats private citizens’ property rights (e.g., registering property, obtaining
protection from thieves, etc.). Instead, the ES concentrate on discrimination in the
business community. In that sense, the firm-level surveys can describe variation in
property rights confidence among firms that exist. However, property rights discrim-
ination likely slows firm creation among citizens in the “out” group and accelerates
the death of their businesses when they successfully incorporate them. Thus, the
population of existing firms that the World Bank samples is biased, comprised only
of firms that the State allows to exist. The need to rely on official lists of firms — as
well as the ES’s reliance on urban firms employing at least five people — exacerbate
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this problem.24 A number of very small, rural firms do not enter the population that
the World Bank samples randomly, along with firms that, for a variety of reasons,
do not find themselves on official registries of businesses. We may reasonably expect
such firms to suffer from property rights discrimination.
This logic suggests that the ES likely constitute a hard test of the existence of
property rights discrimination in any given country. It also implies that the extent of
the downward bias increases in the degree of property rights discrimination. Imagine
two countries, one of which strongly discriminates the protection of private property
and the other of which does not. The latter country’s population of firms will not
suffer from very much bias, since any citizen that wishes to start a firm can do so.
The former country’s population of firms will be much more biased, comprised only
of firms that are free enough to be incorporated and continue to exist. The ES not
only understate the degree of property rights discrimination within any given country;
they also depress variation in the severity of property rights discrimination across
countries. The foregoing logic suggests that the ES likely constitute a difficult test
of the propositions that property rights discrimination exists and varies meaningfully
across countries. Still, they represent an opportunity to describe the phenomenon,
and in the remainder of this section, I do so.
To conduct a simple empirical test of these expectations, I create a measure of
overall property rights security for each firm manager. This combined property rights
measure equals the measure of the first dimension of property rights security (i.e.,
security from other firms and individuals) minus the measure of the second dimension
(i.e., security from public expropriation of private property rights).25 The measure
24A cursory examination of the surveys shows that firms with five or fewer employees are included, whether by
accident or some change in policy.
25Technically, the measure is equal to combined = d1ij − (1− d2ij), where d1ij and d2ij are the simple subjective
measures of the first and second dimensions of private property rights, respectively. By reversing the scale of d2ij
and then subtracting that quantity from the measure of d1ij , I conceptualize the combined score as the value of the
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effectively summarizes the benefits to an individual actor minus the costs in terms
of government expropriation of her private rights; a summary measure less than 0
indicates that restrictions on the firm’s private property rights placed by the state
outweigh the benefits offered through protection of firm’s rights from others.26 For
each country, I summarize the combined measured by deciles. In other words, I rank
firm managers within each country in descending order of their combined measure;
create groups for the top 10% of respondents, the next 10%, through to the bottom
10%; and calculate the average response for each decile.
Figure 3.1: Property Rights Confidence in Germany (2005)
I use this method to describe property rights protection in Germany in Figure 3.1
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of confidence in private property rights. At first
glance, Germany’s distribution favors a more conventional approach to private prop-
property rights system (i.e., its protection of private actors) versus its costs in the interference in an actor’s use of
her private property.
26In this discussion, I use the simple measures, as discussed above. These measures allow for a more intuitive
interpretation of the measures, which aids in the explication. However, the discussion does not shift substantively if
the de-meaned measures are used.
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erty rights, one that conceptualizes the protection of private property as a public
goods. German firm managers rank the overall security of their private property
rights relatively highly, with the horizontal line at y = 0.71 marking the mean re-
sponse for all firms surveyed. The highest decile of firm managers rank their con-
fidence especially highly, nearing the maximum of 1 for the measure. The next six
deciles, while declining slightly in their assessments, remain above the mean assess-
ment or just below it. However, German institutions fail to protect all firm man-
agers adequately; the lowest decile of respondents’ average score is approximately
0.27. However, these respondents still judge the protection of their property rights
as positive, since their assessment of the state’s protection of their contractual rights
outweighs their assessment of government expropriation. The German state, one
might conclude, has created rules that instill robust property rights confidence in
a clear majority of respondents, but even this stable, rich, and democratic country
does not protect all firms equally; some respondents report more anemic confidence
in their property rights.
Figure 3.1 provides some evidence for the proposition that firm managers’ con-
fidence in their private property rights is not uniform, even in a rich, historically
capitalist, and stably democratic country. Next, I examine the protection of private
property in two less-advantaged countries, Peru and Nigeria. Peru and Nigeria rep-
resent an ideal comparison, since each has a combined summary measure of about
0.065. Their distributions follow similar patterns, in contrast to the German ex-
ample depicted in Figure 3.1. Each shows a larger differences across deciles than
in Germany; overall, there is far more variation about the mean in each of these
countries than in the German example. Furthermore, four deciles in each country re-
port negative property rights confidence, according to the summary score introduced
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Figure 3.2: Property Rights Confidence in Nigeria (2001) and Peru (2002)
above; a large minority in each country indicate that the state protection of private
property rights bestows more harm than good. These graphs present preliminary
evidence that institutional failures in these countries follow the contours of Chapter
2; each country protects certain groups’ private property rights quite well, but fail a
far larger segment of the population.
A closer examination of Figure 3.2 yields further insights into how the two coun-
tries differ. In short, firm managers’ confidence in their private property rights varies
far more dramatically in Nigeria than in Peru. Comparing the top two quintiles in
each country reveals a far more secure top echelon in the former than in the latter.
Nigeria’s top two deciles’ average property rights confidence is 0.98 and 0.63; in Peru,
the corresponding deciles’ averages are 0.62 and 0.37. This pattern is mirrored for
the bottom two deciles; Nigeria’s bottom two deciles suffer from a far more dire crisis
of confidence than Peru’s bottom two. In the language of Chapter 2, Nigeria evinces
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a more stark pattern of property rights discrimination; its “in” group is far better
protected, whereas its “out” group is far more insecure.
Figure 3.3: Property Rights Confidence in Egypt (2004) and Romania (2002)
What of countries that have an intermediate level of property rights protection?
Figure 3.3 depicts two such countries, Egypt and Romania. Each country’s average
combined property rights score is about 0.35. As in Figure 3.2, firm managers’
responses form a similar pattern in the two countries, though with a more severe
skew in Egypt. In Romania, the bottom 20% of firm managers find themselves below
the zero line, with average scores of -.0.005 and -0.15. However, Egypt’s bottom 20%
of firm managers find themselves in a far more dire institutional environment, with
the bottom two deciles averaging summary scores of -0.20 and -0.44. Meanwhile,
the top deciles in Egypt rank the institutional environment far more highly than
their counterparts in Romania, with Egyptian firm managers in the highest decile
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ranking their institutional environment as nearly perfect and its second decile ranking
about as highly as Romania’s first. Put differently, the gap between the highest and
lowest decile in Romania 1.02 points on the two-point scale. In Egypt, the figure
is 1.43 points. In short, the protection of private property in Egypt is far more
discriminatory than in Romania.
This analysis provides preliminary evidence for the proposition that property
rights discrimination exists and that its shape varies across countries. Figures 3.1, 3.2,
and 3.3 show that, even in countries with on average weak property rights protection,
governments carefully can protect the private property rights of an upper echelon of
firm managers, such that the top tiers of firm managers in Egypt are as well- pro-
tected as their counterparts in Germany. The key difference between countries with
sound protection of private property and those without is not the ability to protect
certain groups’ rights well, but their ability to extend those protections to a broader
set of firms.
3.4 Does Property Rights Discrimination Matter?
We have shown that property rights discrimination exists and varies meaning-
fully, but does it matter? In particular, Chapter 2 makes three predictions that
bear empirical testing with these data. First, a firm’s business decisions should re-
spond strongly to its confidence in its private property rights. Second, firms should
respond more strongly to their own confidence in their private property than the
general level of confidence in private property in the economy. If property rights
discrimination exists and matters for economic performance, then we should observe
“out group” firms struggling while “in” groups succeed, all else equal. Finally, vari-
ation in the protection of private property should affect macroeconomic indicators
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of firm performance.
Before presenting empirical tests of those intuitions, I expand upon a point from
Section 3.3 regarding the representativeness of the Enterprise Surveys. There, I ar-
gued that the ES likely under-represents firms suffering from property rights discrim-
ination, with the side effect of under-stating property rights discrimination within
countries and its variation across countries. If “out” group firms’ performance does
suffer, then this argument implies that the ES under-samples a set of firms with
both lower property rights confidence and poor performance. This exclusion should
attenuate our estimates of the positive impact of property rights confidence on firm
performance, making these estimates a difficult test of Chapter 2’s argument.
3.4.1 Modeling Multi-Level Data
Recall that the ES is structured hierarchically in two levels, with firms (i.e., level-
1 units) nested within countries (i.e., level-2 units). Fortunately, methodologists
in economics and political science have devoted special attention to just this data
structure and I pause to consider the implications of these advances for the models
specified here and in Chapter 4.27
Chapter 2, in line with previous theory in economics, suggests that a firm’s perfor-
mance depends on the protection of its private property rights. We therefore might
specify a model of firm performance as follows:
yij = β0j + β1j ∗ pij + εij
β0j = γ00 + δ0j(3.1)
β1j = γ10 + δ1j
27This discussion relies heavily on articles from Political Analysis’ 2005 special issue on multi-level models, par-
ticularly Bowers and Drake (2005) and Franzese (2005).
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In 3.1, yij denotes the performance of firm i in country j and pij denotes the security
of private property rights for firm i in country j. We assume that β0j is drawn
from a normal probability distribution with mean γ00; δ0j is a mean-zero error term.
In other words, holding firm-level values of pij constant, we assume that countries’
mean performance will vary randomly. The same holds for β1j. We assume that
a firms’ reaction to property rights protection will vary randomly across countries.
Substituting yields the following equation for estimation:
(3.2) yij = γ00 + γ10 ∗ pij + (εij + δ0j + δ1j ∗ pij)
We may estimate Equation 3.2 in at least two ways. First, we may use simple
OLS, ignoring the hierarchical (i.e., two-level) structure of the data. Doing so, how-
ever, assumes that all observations are drawn from a common normal probability
distribution (Bowers and Drake 2005: 306). However, as we have already seen, firms
in one country are not exchangeable for firms in another; they cannot be treated
as arising from a common normal probability distribution. By extension, we can-
not regard each country’s sample as being drawn from an identical distribution and
therefore yij is not independent of the country it inhabits (ibid). Rather than being
drawn from a single probability distribution, they are drawn from J national-level
probability distributions. The true error term, (εij + δ0j + δ1j ∗ pij), is heteroskedas-
tic, violating the OLS assumption of homoskedasticity (i.e., that V (eij) = σ
2) (ibid).
OLS over-estimtes the degrees of freedom available for estimation and the statistical
significance of γ10 is over-stated. In summary, using OLS on this hierarchical data
produces coefficient estimates that are unbiased, but inefficient and standard errors
that are biased downwards, inconsistent, and inefficient (Franzese 2005: 435).
Alternatively, we could introduce fixed effects by inserting a series of indicator
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variables for J−1 countries, which decreases the number degrees of freedom available
for estimation of γ10. However, doing so “fixes” the intercept for each country,
rather than considering each country’s intercept as a draw from a normal probability
distribution (ibid). Similarly, fixed effects estimation treats β1j, the reaction of firms
to property rights protections, as constant across countries, rather than drawn from
a normal probability distribution with mean γ01.
This difficulty intensifies if we hypothesize that some national-level factor zj affects
firm performance and shifts the effect of firm-level property rights confidence on firm
performance. Now, we might specify the equation as follows:
yij = β0j + β1j ∗ pij + εij
β0j = γ00 + γ01 ∗ zj + δ0j(3.3)
β1j = γ10 + γ11 ∗ zj + δ1j
In this fully interactive specification, firm-level and national-level factors interact to
affect firm performance. We characterize β0j and β1j as being drawn from a multi-
variate normal probability distributions, the shape of which depend on zj (Bowers
and Drake 2005: 305). Substitution yields the following equation for estimation:
(3.4) yij = γ00 + γ01 ∗ Pj + γ10 ∗ pij + γ11 ∗ pij ∗ zj + (εij + δ0j + δ1j ∗ pij)
As before, neither OLS or fixed effects estimation adequately model the multi-
level structure of the data. As discussed fully in Franzese (2005), two statistical
techniques suffice to capture this structure and model the interactive properties of
Equation 3.4. The first approach, a “two-step” method, estimates the firm-level re-
lationship for each separate sub-sample (i.e., country) and then, in the second step,
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models the country-level estimates of β0j and β1j as functions of zj. The second ap-
proach recognizes the similarity of Equation 3.4 to any other linear-interactive model,
with the added difficulty of correcting for heteroskedasticity (Franzese 2005: 433).
That approach therefore pools the J national-level sub-samples and uses maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE) to specify the probability distribution for the coefficient
and estimate the mean and variance of the distributions. Either approach respects
the structure of the data and the interactive nature (if present) of the hypotheses
being tested. The choice of two-step or one-step techniques depends on the substan-
tive interest of the researcher and the structure of the data (Franzese 2005). I opt
for the latter technique. As we shall see in Chapter 4, this technique is useful for
specifying the inherently interactive nature of the political hypotheses in Chapter 2;
namely, that political institutions (a level-2 characteristic) affect a citizen’s property
rights protection, but that that effect depends on a citizen’s place in the political
institutional universe.
3.4.2 Measuring Performance
The institutional economics literature makes a number of claims regarding the
effect of property rights institutions on individual economic actors. The first set of
claims involves investment. According to this logic, when economic actors fear expro-
priation by the State (i.e., the second dimension of property rights), they will invest
less in physical capital, technology, and (presumably) human capital, because they
suspect that they will not enjoy the gains from those investments. This line of rea-
soning suggests that it is the second dimension of private property rights protection
(i.e., safety from expropriation by the State) that is the key to firm investment.
I code several measures of investment. First, I code two variables for investments
in physical capital. The first is based on Question 50 in the ES, which asks the firm
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manager to assess the firm’s capacity utilization over the last year. The variable
ranges from 0 to 100. Question 52 asks the firm manager the share of net profits
re-invested in the firm in the last year, which again ranges from 0 to 100. These vari-
ables should correspond to investments in physical capital, though the re-investment
variable more closely corresponds to the kinds of long-term investment decisions that
institutional economists have in mind. Second, I code one variable for investments
in technology. Question 58 asks the firm whether it has “introduced new technology
that has substantially changed the way that the main product is produced.” The
variable is dichotomous. Third, I code a variable that capture investments in human
capital, a dichotomous measure of whether the firm formally trains its employees
(Question 67a).
Such measures closely approximate a major argument of the institutional eco-
nomics literature. However, firm performance should also respond to the property
rights protections in more subtle ways. I begin by discussing informality. De Soto’s
(1989, 2000) research into informality in Peru and elsewhere in the developing world
focused public attention on a problem that has long interested economists. Why does
the size of the informal (also referred to as the “shadow” or “black” economy) vary
in size across countries? The ES give us an opportunity to shed more empirical light
on the subject by providing a firm-level measure of the size of the informal economy.
Question 41 asks the entrepreneur the following: “Recognizing the difficulties many
enterprises face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of
total sales would you estimate the typical establishment in your area of activity re-
ports for tax purposes?” I subtract a firm manager’s response from 100 to capture
the percentage of total sales that each firm hides from the government. However,
the question remains whether a firm’s propensity to move into the informal economy
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is a result of the first or second dimension of property rights protection, or both. I
leave this as an open empirical question.
The question of informality suggests that firms will hide revenues from the State,
but in order to do so firms often make other changes to their behavior. One visible
manifestation of this range of behaviors is a firm’s reliance on methods of payment
that require trust, as proposed by the Clague and his co-authors (1999) in their
argument regarding CIM. Many forms of transactions require delayed payment or
payment by credit. All else equal, a firm insecure in the ability and/or willingness of
the State to protect its contractual rights will likely demand that its sales be pre-paid
with cash, in order to protect itself from being cheated by consumers and/or other
firms. I create three variables in order to capture this potential relationship. The
first, corresponding to Question 47a in the ES, asks the firm what percentage of its
sales are pre-paid. The second, corresponding to Question 47b, asks the percentage
of the establishment’s sales sold on credit.
3.4.3 Results
I estimate each of the models suggested above using the ES. For each country, the
sample includes all firms sampled by the ES. The country-level sample is all countries
surveyed by the ES. Certain countries are surveyed more than once, as discussed in
Section 3.3. This repeated sampling of particular countries infers a model of yijt, or
of firm i in country j at time t. However, several factors recommend a reliance on a
cross-sectional model. First, in countries with multiple surveys over time, firms have
not been indexed so that we can identify changes in firms over time. Second, most
countries surveyed repeatedly have only been surveyed twice; there is no real time
series of data to make inferences across time possible. Therefore, I use only the first
survey for each country surveyed by the Enterprise Surveys. I list those countries in
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Table 3.1.28
The Impact of Property Rights Discrimination
I begin the presentation of statistical results by estimating Equation 3.2 for each
of the dependent variables described above. Rather than reporting the full set of
estimates for each dependent variable, I concentrate on the key relationships at
stake in this testing — the effect of property rights protections on firm behavior and
performance. Table 3.2 summarizes the coefficient estimates for γ10 in Equation 3.2.
The dependent variables are measures of investment, informality, and payments. As
discussed above, I focus on either the security of contractual or property rights for
each of the dependent variables. The one exception is informality, where either or
both of the dimensions of the institutional environment may prove relevant. Each
of the estimates controls for firm size (using dummy variables), foreign origin, age,
sector (a dummy for manufacturing firms) and a constant.29 In all cells other than
for informality, a positively signed coefficient supports the hypothesis that firms
perform better when the State protects their private property rights. In the case of
the informality, the opposite is true.
The results present a mixed portrait of the effect of property rights confidence on
firm performance. I begin with the models of investment. Firms’ reinvestment per-
centage is negatively correlated, all else equal, with the simple measure of property
rights security, but positively correlated with the de-emeaned mesure. This pattern
repeats itself for measures of the security of contractual rights, which is positively
correlated with re-investment for the de-meaned measure. In contrast, capacity uti-
lization is correlated strongly and positively with safety from expropriation, regard-
28Results are generally robust to whether the set of first or last surveys are included in the models.
29Even though the technology investment and employee training variables are dichotomous, the estimates do not
use logistic regression.
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Country Year Firms Country Year Firms
Albania 2002 170 Latvia 2002 176
Algeria 2002 557 Lithuania 2002 200
Armenia 2002 171 Madagascar 2005 293
Azerbaijan 2002 170 Malawi 2005 160
Bangladesh 2002 1001 Mali 2003 155
Belarus 2002 250 Mauritius 2005 212
Benin 2004 197 Moldova 2002 174
Bhutan 2001 98 Montenegro 2003 100
Bosnia 2002 182 Morocco 2000 859
Bolivia 2000 671 Mozambique 2001 194
Brazil 2003 1642 Nepal 2000 223
Bulgaria 2002 250 Nicaragua 2003 452
Cambodia 2003 503 Nigeria 2001 232
Chile 2004 948 Oman 2003 337
China 2002 1548 Pakistan 2002 965
Costa Rica 2005 343 Peru 2002 576
Croatia 2002 187 Philippines 2003 716
Czech 2002 268 Poland 2002 500
Ecuador 2003 453 Portugal 2005 505
Egypt 2004 977 Romania 2002 255
El Salvador 2003 465 Russia 2002 506
Eritrea 2002 79 Senegal 2003 262
Estonia 2002 170 Serbia 2001 402
Ethiopia 2002 427 Slovakia 2002 170
Macedonia 2002 170 Slovenia 2002 188
Georgia 2002 174 South Africa 2003 603
Germany 2005 1196 South Korea 2005 598
Greece 2005 546 Spain 2005 606
Guatemala 2003 455 Sri Lanka 2004 452
Guyana 2004 163 Syria 2003 560
Honduras 2003 450 Tajikistan 2002 176
Hungary 2002 250 Tanzania 2003 276
India 2000 895 Thailand 2004 1385
Indonesia 2003 713 Turkey 2002 514
Ireland 2005 501 Uganda 2003 300
Kazakhstan 2002 250 Ukraine 2002 463
Kenya 2003 284 Uzbekistan 2002 260
Kosovo 2003 329 Vietnam 2005 1150
Kyrgyzstan 2002 173 Zambia 2002 207
Total 78 countries, 34,638 firms
Table 3.1: List of Surveyed Countries
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Table 3.2: Summary of Results
Independent Variable
D1: Contract Rights D2: Property Rights
Dependent Variable Simple Demeaned Simple Demeaned
Investment (D2)
Reinvestment −3.86.20 8.81.03 −4.58.16 12.56.01
Capacity utilization 3.89.00 −2.23.10 7.77.00 3.88.04
Technology −0.11.00 0.06.07 −0.17.00 −0.06.13
Employee training −0.08.00 0.07.05 −0.12.00 0.02.56
Informality (D2)
Informality −8.27.00 −6.88.00 −8.55.00 −6.28.01
Payments Behavior (D1)
Post-paid txns. -0.39.72 −0.85.72 −0.51.66 −0.63.69
Sales paid on credit −6.86.00 4.70.10 −15.29.00 −13.76.00
Cell contents are coefficients with p-valuessuperscripted.
less of the measure chosen.30 For investments in technology and employee training,
the estimates provide only weak support. The coefficients on the simple measures
are negative and statistically significant, indicating that firms with greater confi-
dence in their private property rights less likely invest. For each form of investment,
the negative effect dissipates at least partially when the de-meaned measure replaces
the simple measure. Instead, firm managers appear to respond to improvements in
the security of their contractual rights in a manner more in line with expectations;
our coefficients are negative for the simple measures, but positive for the de-meaned
measure.
In contrast, the results for informality strongly support the theoretical story dis-
cussed in Chapter 2; firm managers’ decisions to abandon the formal economy re-
spond to both contractual and property rights protections. The greater a firm man-
ager’s confidence, the less of its income it hides from the government.
Finally, transacting and payments behavior does not respond as expected to safer
30This finding suggests that removing the threat of expropriation has short-term as well as long-term effects.
Decreasing the burden of expropriation will boost firms’ capacity utilization while increasing re-investment. While
the effects of the latter likely are delayed somewhat, the effects of the former will manifest themselves quickly, as
firms hire more employees and produce more.
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contractual security. The safety of contractual rights does not exert a statistically
significant effect on the percentage of a firm’s transactions that is post-paid. In con-
trast, contractual rights have a strong relationship with the percentage of sales paid
on credit, though the direction of the effect depends on the measure used. The sim-
ple measure of contractual security is negatively correlated with credit transactions,
whereas the de-meaned measure more closely reflects our theoretical expectation of a
positive effect. Though the latter evidence is encouraging, the relationship between
second-dimension property rights security and sales paid on credit suggests that firm
managers react to a more expropriating institutional environment by selling more on
credit.
This discussion raises an intriguing point regarding the results contained in Ta-
ble 3.2. In general, estimates of the effect of the institutional environment on firm
behavior are more supportive when de-meaned measure is used. This pattern is ap-
parent in models of reinvestment, technology, employee training, and sales paid on
credit (though only for contractual rights). However, the pattern reverses itself for
contractual security measures in models of capacity utilization.
In addition to observing the sign and statistical significance of these equations, I
also attend to the substantive impact of property rights discrimination. Figure 3.4
depicts the distribution of firm-level confidence in private property rights in Brazil
in 2003 and its predicted effect on informality. The histogram shows the distribution
of firm managers’ confidence and the line the predicted level of informality in the
economy for that level of confidence.31 Firm managers with little confidence in their
security from government expropriation tend to under-report their income greatly,
hiding roughly 30% of their income when their score is 0.1. Over 60% of Brazilian
31For comparison’s sake, the predicted values are for a domestic, small, manufacturing firm that has been in
business for ten years. The slope of the line equals the estimate of γ10 in Table 3.2.
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Figure 3.4: Substantive Impact of Property Rights Discrimination on Informality
firm managers report property rights confidence between 0.3 and 0.6, with their
predicted informality lying between 28% and 25%. For the fortunate few firms with
strong confidence in their institutional environment, informality remains a less viable
response, with just over 22% of their revenues hidden from the government.
The substantive effect of property rights discrimination is perhaps smaller than
we might expect, given the strong claims of the literature in institutional economics,
as well as Chapter 2. For instance, the estimate of γ10 evaluated in Figure 3.4 implies
that, all else equal, an increase in a firm manager’s confidence in her private property
rights from the bottom of the scale to the top will increase her reporting of income
by only 8.55 percentage points. The relatively small substantive effect may well
derive from the under-estimation of property rights discrimination and its impact
on firm behavior, as discussed above. Furthermore, small shifts in informality may
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reverberate far beyond the estimates recorded here. A firm that hides its income
from the State decreases tax revenues and forces the firm into the informal economy,
in which it may find itself limited in the kinds of investments it undertakes and with
whom it transacts.
Firm-Level vs. National-Level Confidence
These results provide tentative evidence in support of the proposition that firm
managers condition their behavior on their confidence in the protection of their pri-
vate property. However, does firm-level property rights confidence matter more than
national-level confidence for a firm’s performance? We can answer this question
preliminarily by estimating an equation of Equation 3.4’s form, substituting a mea-
sure of national-level property rights security for zj. Doing so allows us to analyze
whether the positive impact of improving an individual firm’s property rights pro-
tection changes on the basis of the national environment. For example, if we could
examine two firms alike in all respects, including their low property rights confi-
dence, we might expect better performance of one if it was located in a country with
generally robust property rights protection. Alternatively, the general environment
might matter little for firm performance so that, regardless of national property
rights confidence, low-confidence firms will suffer. 32
I estimate that equation using our firm-level measure of informality as the de-
pendent variable and the second-dimension de-meaned measure of private property
rights confidence (i.e., safety from expropriation). For a measure of Pj, I calculate
the country-level mean of the second-dimension de-meaned measure, thus creating
32Admittedly, this logic is somewhat speculative and infers a specific interpretation of Chapter 2’s argument that an
individual’s economic decisions depend more strongly on the protection of her rights than on the general protection
of other citizens’ rights. Nothing in Chapter 2’s logic necessarily implies an interaction effect. Therefore, we might
estimate these models by removing the interaction, assuming that the effect of improving a firm manager’s property
rights confidence will not vary according to the national environment. Unfortunately, Chapter 2’s argument offers
little guidance as to whether an interactive or non-interactive specification is preferable. In that light, I prefer the
fully interactive specification to allow the data to suggest the functional form of the relationship.
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a proxy for country-level confidence in the protection of private property.33 Recall
from Chapter 2 that there is some reason to expect Pj to exert a positive effect on
firm performance; the protection of other citizens’ private property rights assists in
an individual’s ability to trade her rights easily. Nevertheless, Chapter 2 concludes
that individuals value their own private property rights more strongly than others’.
Table 3.3 describes the results of the estimation of Equation 3.4, with controls for
size of the business, foreign ownership, age, and sector. The results generally support
the role of property rights institutions in decisions to hide revenues for tax purposes.
A test of the joint significance of the three variables rejects the null hypothesis of
insignificance at p = 0.007. The effect of increasing national-level confidence when
firm-level confidence is non-existent (i.e, when pij = 0) is to decrease informality,
which supports the notion that the national-level institutional environment matters
for firm-level decisions. That effect is only marginally distinguishable from 0, but is
larger than the effect of firm-level property rights confidence (p = 0.02). This runs
counter to intuition, but the effect of national level property rights confidence only
dissipates as firm-level confidence increases, as evidenced by the positive estimate of
the coefficient on the interaction term. The same could be said of the effect of firm-
level confidence, whose effect is to reduce informality when the national-level is at
its worst (which never occurs in reality) and dissipates as the national environment
improves.34
In order to compare the effect of both firm and national-level property rights con-
fidence, I graph the effect of each against values of the other. Figure 3.5 graphs the
effect of firm-level property rights confidence against the entire range of values of Pj,
33The description of results that follows is robust to using measures of the median of the distribution, as well.
34When Pj is entered alone, its coefficient is negative and insignificant. When it is entered alongside pij in a non-
interactive specification, the coefficient on pij is negative and statistically significant, as expected. The coefficient
on Pj , in contrast, is negative, but statistically insignificant.
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Variable Parameter Estimate St.ErrorP−value
Firm-level property rights
confidence (pij) γ10 -66.1 27.6.02
National-level property
rights confidence (Pj) γ01 -82.9 46.3.07
Interaction (pij ∗ Pj) γ11 127.0 58.303
Constant (γ00) γ00 62.5 21.8.004
Table 3.3: Comparing the effect of firm-level and national-level property rights confidence on firm-
level informality
as well as the upper and lower 95% confidence interval of the effect.35 Figure 3.5
demonstrates that the effect of firm-level confidence is to reduce informality in a
broad range of national-level institutional environments. However, when that envi-
ronment is sufficiently supportive of private property rights (i.e., when Pj > 0.48),
the effect becomes statistically insignificant. Figure 3.5 suggests that firm managers
respond to improvements in their private property rights, but that response attenu-
ates in the general quality of the institutional environment; in sufficiently confident
economies, firms no longer reduce informality when their individual private property
rights confidence increases.
In contrast, increases in national-level confidence never reduce informality with
statistical significance, as shown in Figure 3.6. The effect of national-level insti-
tutions is strongest when pij = 0, as discussed above, but the effect is marginally
insignificant. As a firm’s confidence in its private property rights increases, the effect
of increases in national-level institutions further dissipates. Figure 3.6 implies that
when firms lack confidence in their private property rights, increasing the mean level
of protection by protecting other citizens’ rights while leaving the firm manager in
question unprotected, has a marginally significant effect on informality. A firm man-
ager may reduce informality when it observes that other firms are better protected,
35The range of Pj is 0.30 to 0.62, as reflected in Figure 3.5. The effect line is γ10 + 127.0 ∗Pj = −66.1 + 127.0 ∗Pj .
For a useful discussion of the proper interpretation of interaction effects, see Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006).
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Figure 3.5: Impact of Firm-Level Property Rights Confidence on Informality
opening opportunities for legitimate transactions with other firms that are better
protected. However, this effect is quite limited; even if a firm is only marginally
confident in its rights, securing other firms’ confidence has no statistically significant
effect on its decision to “go informal” by hiding revenues from the State for tax
purposes.
National Models of Informality
Thus far, we have shown that property rights discrimination affects firm-level de-
cisions. Firms with security in their private property rights more likely invest and
operate in the formal economy. Furthermore, this analysis showed tentatively that
a firm manager’s decision whether or not to “go informal” depends more heavily on
her own property rights confidence than on the national environment for property
rights protection. Chapter 2 argues that, by affecting such individual-level deci-
sions, property rights discrimination ultimately affects macroeconomic performance.
However, as before, it does not provide specific guidance as to precisely how it does
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Figure 3.6: Impact of National-Level Property Rights Confidence on Informality
so. Will any variation in property rights confidence debilitate macroeconomic per-
formance? Imagine an economy in which all economic agents have no confidence
in the protection of their private property rights. If the government were to sud-
denly protect only a small percentage of the population’s private property rights,
it likely would improve macroeconomic performance, despite the fact that the ma-
jority of citizens would continue to lack property rights protection. The question is
when the continued improvement of only that small group’s rights would cease to
improve macroeconomic performance. For example, referring to Figures 3.2 and 3.3,
we might expect that firm performance will suffer more in the countries (i.e., Nigeria
and Egypt) that exhibit deeper and larger “out” groups.
However, given the lack of explicit theoretical guidance, only the most rudimen-
tary estimates of the effect of property rights confidence on macroeconomic perfor-
mance are possible. I estimate the following equation:
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(3.5) Yj = β0 + β1 ∗ Pj + β2 ∗ STDEVj(pij) + β3 ∗ Pj ∗ STDEVj(pij) + α ∗ Zj + εj
Equation 3.5 captures these effects, if imperfectly. In it, some measure of macroeco-
nomic performance is a function of the national-level mean of property rights con-
fidence (Pj), the standard deviation of property rights confidence (STDEVj(pij)),
and their interaction. The effect of a higher mean should be to improve macroeco-
nomic performance (as evidenced by a larger literature in institutional economics),
but variation about that mean will negatively affect macroeconomic performance and
decrease the effect of increasing the mean.
I estimate Equation 3.5 using simple ordinary least-squares regression (OLS),
including regional dummies for control variables. For the dependent variable, I use
the Doing Business project’s estimate of the size of a country’s informal economy
as a percentage of the formal economy.36 As before, I use the de-meaned second-
dimensional measure of property rights to create country-level measures of the mean
and standard deviation of firm managers’ confidence in their private property rights.
Table 3.4 records the results of these estimates, concentrating on the main vari-
ables of interest. The negative sign on the mean measure indicates that, when the
protection of private property rights is perfectly uniform (i.e., SDj[pij] = 0), in-
creasing the mean level of property rights confidence decreases informality in the
economy; that effect is statistically significant at p = 0.002. Similarly, the negative
sign for our coefficient on variation in property rights confidence suggests that, when
the country-level mean of property rights confidence is 0 (i.e., perfectly absent), in-
36I also estimate Equation 3.5 using the country-level mean of firm managers’ assessment of the percentage of
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confidence (Pj) -344.7 104.7.002
Variation in property
rights confidence (SDj [pij ]) -1067.6 421.8.01
Interaction (Pj ∗ SDj [pij ]) 2322.6 870.2.01
Constant 204.1 53.7.000
Table 3.4: Comparing the effect of mean property rights confidence with variation
creasing variation in property rights confidence also reduces informality. Though
counter-intuitive, this result suggests that in countries where the protection of pri-
vate property rights is uniformly poor across citizens, increasing one sub-population’s
property rights confidence, which increases variation in citizens’ confidence, also re-
duces informality; put differently, property rights discrimination might result in less
informality than uniformly poor property rights protection.
In order to evaluate these effects more carefully, I once again graph the effects
of each variable against values of the other in Figures 3.7 and 3.8. Figure 3.7 de-
picts the effect of the mean level of property rights confidence. As already discussed,
augmenting the protection of firm managers’ private property rights reduces infor-
mality, but that effect is statistically distinguishable from zero only when protection
is relatively uniform. These effects support the idea that, if property rights discrimi-
nation is severe enough, continuing to increase the mean level of confidence in private
property has no effect on macroeconomic performance. Similarly, Figure 3.8 depicts
the effect of the standard deviation in property rights confidence on informality. As
indicated in Table 3.4, for low levels of mean confidence, increasing variation in firm
managers’ confidence reduces informality; this effect suggests that in certain coun-
tries with incredibly low confidence (which are likely to be low-variation countries),
increasing variation in the protection of private property likely increases the mean
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as well, resulting in a net reduction of informality. This negative effect becomes in-
significant at about Pj = 0.34. At about Pj = 0.46, the effect becomes positive and
that positive effect is significant at when Pj > 0.53. Therefore, in countries with a
relatively high mean protection of private property, increasing variation in protection
of private property increases the size of the informal sector.
Figure 3.7: Impact of National-Level Property Rights Confidence on Informality
Together, these results suggest that, in countries with very low average confidence
in private property rights, policy makers can reduce informality by protecting only
certain actors’ rights. Doing so creates property rights discrimination, but also allows
the newly formed “in” group to reduce their informality and thus reduces the total
level of informality in the economy. However, in economies with a greater general
confidence in private property rights protection, it is eliminating property rights dis-
crimination that more effectively reduces informality. Table 3.5 conveys this sense by
comparing the statistical model’s predictions of informality for four types of property
rights systems, varying according to the mean and standard deviation of property
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Figure 3.8: Impact of Variation in Property Rights Confidence on Informality
rights confidence. Comparing the two low-mean countries, we find that countries
with higher variation in their property rights confidence have less informality as a
percentage of the economy. However, once an economy has created a high amount
of variation in property rights confidence, its best hope to reduce informality is to
reduce property rights discrimination. Though these predictions derive from a cross-
section, they suggest two time-paths for improving the protection of private property
rights, assuming an economy beginning from the “low mean, low variation” category
in Table 3.5. First, policy makers can protect only a specific portion of the economy
first, creating “in” and “out” groups before reducing property rights discrimination
by opening economic opportunities to the “out” group. Second, policy makers can
slowly improve all citizens’ rights while keeping property rights discrimination low.
Non-Random Selection
Throughout this chapter, I have contended that the nature of firm-level surveys
in general and the design of the Enterprise Surveys create a bias against finding
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Scenario Mean St. Dev. Prediction
Low Mean, Low Variation 0.35 0.07 69.6
Low Mean, High Variation 0.35 0.17 44.1
High Mean, High Variation 0.55 0.17 54.2
High Mean, Low Variation 0.55 0.07 33.2
Table 3.5: Predictions for Informality
evidence of property rights discrimination, as well as its effects on economic activity.
How would we know whether this argument holds up to empirical scrutiny? The
logic of non-random selection states that countries with more severe property rights
discrimination will erect higher barriers to entry to entrepreneurs in the “out” group
and harass those “out” group firms that do exist into extinction. One empirically
verifiable implication of that argument is that countries with high barriers to entry
will exhibit higher property rights confidence among firm managers, because the
sample of firms allowed to exist by the State will tend to be better-protected members
of the “in” group. If the selection logic is mistaken or weak, it would stand to reason
that countries with lower barriers to entry will also exhibit higher property rights
confidence among firm managers. To investigate this relationship, I graph the mean
combined de-meaned property rights confidence measure for each country listed in
Table 3.1 against the Doing Business measure of the cost of starting a business in
that country, including the bivariate regression line, in Figure 3.9
Figure 3.9 shows some tentative evidence in favor of the idea that property rights
discrimination — in the form of high barriers to entry for new entrepreneurs —
affects the distribution of property rights confidence in existing firms. In countries
with higher barriers to entry, firm managers actually report higher confidence in their
private property rights.37 A closer examination of specific countries’ relative location
37The same graph using the simple combined measure of property rights confidence produces a negative correlation.
However, the positions of individual countries relative to the bivariate regression line do not change significantly.
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Figure 3.9: Property rights discrimination: barriers to entry versus existing firms
shines further light on the nature of the selection problem. In countries located above
the regression line, firms report more confidence in the protection of their private
property rights than the Doing Business indicator would predict. Conversely, firms
in countries located below the regression line tend to evince less confidence than
Doing Business would predict. The closer the country is to the regression line, the
more closely the mean of its distribution of property rights confidence reflects the
Doing Business indicator. Interpreted in this way, the ES greatly over-state property
rights confidence in Eritrea (2002), located in the upper-right quadrant of the figure.
In contrast, the ES may under-state property rights confidence in Bulgaria (2002),
located in the bottom-left quadrant.
Figure 3.9 thus presents tentative evidence that the general relationship between
barriers to entry for entrepreneurs and firms’ property rights confidence correlate as
the selection story would predict. We also found that the direction and degree of
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the distortion of the ES sample varies. In some countries, property rights confidence
seems generally over-stated, whereas in others it is generally under-stated. However,
I also claimed that this distortion affects our estimates of the relationship between
firm performance and property rights discrimination. I test this intuition as follows.
First, I estimate the simple regression depicted in Figure 3.9 for each dimension of
property rights confidence:
(3.6) Pj = α0 + α1 ∗ (SBj) + ϕj,
where ϕj is the residual for country j (i.e., the vertical distance between a coun-
try’s location and the bivariate regression line). The estimate of the residual ϕj is
positive for countries, like Eritrea (2002), where property rights confidence is higher
than the Doing Business project would indicate and vice versa. If my intuition re-
garding selection is correct, then the effect of firm-level property rights confidence on
informality will depend on the value of ϕj. More specifically, the effect of firm-level
property rights confidence on firm performance should dissipate in the size of ϕj. I
thus estimate the following equations, which adapt Equation 3.4 and substitute ϕj
or zj:
yij = β0j + β1j ∗ pij + α ∗ Zij + εij
β0j = γ00 + γ01 ∗ ϕj + δ0j(3.7)
β1j = γ10 + γ11 ∗ ϕj + δ1j
Substitution yields the following equation for estimation:
(3.8) yij = γ00 + γ01 ∗ ϕj + γ10 ∗ pij + γ11 ∗ pij ∗ ϕj + α ∗ Zij + (εij + δ0j + δ1j ∗ pij)
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I therefore expect that γ11 < 0 and that for sufficiently high values of ϕj the effect of
pij (γ10 + γ11 ∗ ϕj) will be negative and insignificant. I estimate Equation 3.8 using
firm-level informality as the measure of yij and the second-dimension de-meaned
measure of property rights confidence as pij. I report the key regressions results in




rights confidence (pij) -6.11 2.41.011
Selection distortion (ϕj) -90.58 46.01.049
Interaction (pij ∗ ϕj) 101.12 57.82.080
Constant 23.30 1.94.000
Table 3.6: The effect of selection on estimates of pij
As expected, the coefficient on firm-level property rights confidence is negative
and statistically significant, inferring that when the selection distortion is effectively
nil, increased property rights confidence reduces informality. Meanwhile, the nega-
tive coefficient on selection distortion indicates that, countries with greater selection
distortion, firms tend to have report lower informal revenues, all else equal. Finally,
the positively signed interaction term indicates that as the degree of the selection
distortion increases, the beneficial effect of firm-level property rights confidence at-
tenuates, as expected.
Figure 3.10 depicts the effect of firm-level property rights confidence and its 95%
confidence interval for different values of selection distortion. As the coefficient on pij
attests, the effect of firm-level property rights confidence is negative and significant
when there is no selection distortion. When ϕj < 0, the effect is substantively larger.
As selection distortion increases, the effect of firm-level property rights confidence
38Recall that, because higher values of informality are normatively undesirable, a negatively signed coefficient is
beneficial.
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Figure 3.10: Impact of selection on the effect of property rights discrimination
dissipates. Interestingly, the effect of informality becomes statistically insignificant
for virtually any positive value of selection distortion (i.e., in countries whose sample
of firms report higher property rights confidence than expected by the Doing Business
indicator). This evidence supports the notion that the effect of firm-level property
rights confidence in some country depends on the representativeness of its sample.
3.5 Conclusions
This chapter set out to test three key claims from Chapter 2 — that property
rights discrimination exists, varies meaningfully across countries, and has important
effects on microeconomic and macroeconomic performance. I began by reviewing
various attempts to measure the security of private property rights. Each of these ef-
forts depended on implicit assumptions regarding the distribution of property rights
protection, generally assuming a uniform level of protection that could be accurately
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proxied by the study of a particular class of actors. In contrast, the World Bank’s
Enterprise Surveys provide an exciting new opportunity to allow actual economic
agents to describe their property rights confidence. Thus, with little need for strin-
gent assumptions, we can describe the distribution of property rights confidence in
an economy. Using those measures, I demonstrate that, even in advanced economies,
firm managers’ confidence in their private property rights does vary. Furthermore,
the distribution of their responses itself varies across countries. Even in countries
with similar mean levels of confidence in private property, the size and distress of
the “out” group of firm managers could vary meaningfully.
Using these data, I tackle the question of whether property rights discrimination
affects microeconomic and macroeconomic performance. The estimates reported in
in Section 3.4 generally support the notion that firm managers shift their behavior
in response to their confidence in their property rights. In any given country, firms
receiving more vigorous protection by the State report more of their income for
tax purposes and invest more. Furthermore, I presented evidence that, in terms
of informality, firm managers respond more strongly to their own property rights
confidence than national-level property rights security. These findings also translated
to the macroeconomic level. Informality in the economy does respond to the mean
property rights confidence, but that effect depends on the degree of property rights
discrimination.
In many of these statistical tests, the effect of property rights discrimination is
less dramatic than Chapter 2 proposes. In response, I suggest that the Enterprise
Surveys under-state the severity and consequences of property rights discrimination,
since they by their nature do not report the effect of property rights discrimination on
firm creation and destruction. Furthermore, the ES’ reliance on property registries
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and only urban firms likely dampen the appearance of property rights discrimina-
tion further. In Section 3.4, I test the validity of this logic, finding evidence that
the reported distribution of property rights confidence is overly sanguine in many
countries. Moreover, the estimated effect of firm-level property rights confidence on
firm behavior strongly depends on the degree of that distortion.
With this empirical portrait of property rights discrimination in place, I now turn
to the testing of Chapter 2’s discussion of the causes of property rights discrimination
In Chapter 4, I use many of these measures to test whether and how political insti-
tutions affect individual firm managers’ confidence in their private property rights.
CHAPTER IV
Statistical Models of Property Rights Discrimination
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, I proposed that politicians discriminate the protection of private
property across citizens as part of their efforts to retain political power. In turn,
property rights discrimination will depress economic activity in the “out” group and
slow general macroeconomic performance. Chapter 3 offered statistical support for
an important segment of this theory of property rights. It tentatively showed that
property rights discrimination does exist, varies across countries, and affects firm
behavior.
This chapter tests Chapter 2’s predictions regarding the political institutional
origins of property rights discrimination. That chapter made three sets of predictions.
The first follows from the logic of collective action. Specifically, groups of citizens that
are smaller, homogenous, and richer will enjoy greater confidence in the protection of
their private property rights. The second set of hypotheses concerns the relationship
of democracy to property rights confidence. Democracies will tend to discriminate the
protection of private property against richer citizens while non-democracies will tend
to discriminate in favor of richer citizens. Overall, however, democracies will engage
in less property rights discrimination than non-democracies. Finally, the third set
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of predictions regards the selectorate theory. My adaptation of that theory predicts
that winning coalition members will tend to enjoy greater property rights confidence,
but that their political advantage declines in large-W regimes. Furthermore, regimes
with smaller winning coalitions will differ in how they discriminate the protection of
private property rights, depending on the size of the selectorate.
Thinking in terms of the firm-level data described in Chapter 3, this thinking
suggests that a firm manager’s property rights confidence depends on the interac-
tion of the design of political institutions and her firm’s position in that constellation.
When political institutions galvanize politicians to protect all citizens’ rights equally,
then the firm’s political position (however defined) will have little effect on its confi-
dence in its property rights. Conversely, when political institutions motivate political
leaders to engage in property rights discrimination, the firm’s political position will
make the difference in whether it finds itself in the “in” group of protected rights or
the “out” group of unprotected rights, with the attendant economic consequences.
This inherently interactive set of hypotheses lend themselves well to the multi-level
statistical models described in Chapter 3.
As I observe in Chapter 3, marshaling empirical support for these propositions
is no easy task. Testing Chapter 2’s political institutional theory of property rights
discrimination demands firm-level indicators that describe a particular firm’s political
grouping. Furthermore, these measures must be comparable across countries, so that
we can compare the property rights confidence of two firms with the same political
characteristics in different political regimes. In practice, the process of identifying
exactly who populates different political groupings is quite difficult. For example, in
one country, the selectorate and winning coalition may be defined ethnically, with an
ethnic minority prohibited from political participation, whereas another may deny
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membership in the selectorate to women. In practice, the shape of property rights
discrimination will differ in these regimes. Thus, it is difficult to identify a single set
of rules that define membership in these political groupings that remains constant
across regimes, even within the ideal types of regimes described in Chapter 2 (i.e.,
democracies versus non-democracies, large winning coalition versus small winning
coalition regimes).
The nature of the data used here — cross-country firm-level surveys — compounds
this issue further because we must define rules that describe a firm’s position in its
political universe in a manner that as precisely as possible reflects the underlying con-
structs suggested in Chapter 2. For instance, if non-democratic regimes more likely
engage in property rights discrimination, which firms will it discriminate against?
Which firms are members of the selectorate and/or winning coalition? In general,
the measurement strategy requires the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to tell us
something meaningful about a firm’s politics, deciphering the degree to which it
possesses a voice in politics and how it wields its political influence. Firms do not
vote in elections and in most cases, they do not formally occupy a constitutionally-
mandated place in government. At the extreme, one might argue that firms are not
constitutionally members of the polity in the sense that citizens are. However, firms
are political as well economic actors, theoretically free to lobby for policy, contest
private property rights in courts, and lobby politicians for changes to economic rules
that govern their use of private property.
Furthermore, Chapter 3’s analysis unveiled the existence of selection bias in the
Enterprise Surveys. The very nature of the surveys, in combination with their ten-
dency to over-sample certain types of firms, likely weakens their ability to demon-
strate the existence of property rights discrimination and its effect on firm behavior.
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This potential bias may also exacerbate the testing of Chapter 2’s political institu-
tional theory of property rights discrimination. Let us imagine two countries, one
that discriminates the protection of private property and one that does not. Imagine
also that a particular theory of political institutions predicts this difference well; the
first country’s political institutions create an incentive to protect all firms, whereas
the second country’s lead to a bias against certain firms. In this example, it is likely
that the latter country’s “out” group will be under-sampled, under-stating the extent
of property rights discrimination. Even if the “in” and “out” groups can be iden-
tified with some confidence, the relationship between the firm-level characteristics
and property rights will be attenuated in the country where it is strongest. This
logic suggests that the upcoming analysis will represent a difficult test for Chapter
2’s political institutional theory of property rights discrimination.
Nevertheless, these empirical tests still unveil a number of intriguing relationships.
First, there is strong support for the proposition that collective action dynamics
characterize firms’ struggle to force the State to protect their private property rights.
Larger, state-owned, and exporting firms all tend to enjoy stronger property rights
protection, all else equal. Second, tentative evidence suggests that democracies do
engage in less property rights discrimination, but that, in general, firms in democratic
countries report less property rights confidence. However, it does not appear that
richer (i.e., larger) firms suffer more in democracies than in non-democracies and
vice versa. Instead, analysis suggests that the autocratic advantage derives from
their discrimination in favor of politically connected firms. Finally, this chapter
finds tentative evidence that countries with large winning coalitions tend towards
an equilibrium of lower mean property rights confidence with less variation about
that mean. This chapter fails, however, to test the core interactive predictions of
132
Chapter 2, which predicts that a firm manager’s property rights confidence depends
on whether or not she inhabits the selectorate and winning coalition and the size of
those groupings.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 carefully describes
the empirical design of the statistical analysis, in particular issues of measurement
and specification. Section 4.3 describes models of property rights discrimination in
democracy and non-democracy. Section 4.4 summarizes results of statistical testing
of the selectorate theory.
4.2 Empirical Design
Before proceeding to the empirical testing of the political institutional explana-
tions, I return to the general approach of the statistical models contained herein, first
discussed in Chapter 3. I begin by describing the measurement of property rights
confidence and the various control variables used in the models. I then discuss the
methods used to estimate the effect of firm and national-level variables on firm-level
property rights confidence.
4.2.1 Measurement
As discussed previously, the empirical tests contained in this chapter require care-
fully constructed measures at both the firm and country levels. In particular, the
statistical tests resurrect our discussion — first broached in Chapter 3 — of strategies
for measuring firm-level property rights confidence. Then the independent variable
in models of firm performance, these measures now take pride of place in these mod-
els. Next, this analysis necessitates a set of independent variables that adequately
describe a firm’s pertinent political characteristics, depending on the contours of the
theory in question. Finally, the analysis requires a set of control variables that pos-
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sess a plausible effect on the dependent variable. I discuss each of these questions in
turn.
Chapter 3 described carefully a strategy to measure property rights discrimination,
notably by creating firm-level measures of property rights confidence. Notably, I
compared simple and de-meaned measures of firm managers’ confidence. Whereas
simple measures of property rights relied on a simple average of available assessments
of property rights-relevant issues, de-meaned measures compared that average to
each respondent’s general level of satisfaction with the investment climate, yielding
a measure of each respondent’s relative concern for her property rights. Here, I rely
on the de-meaned measures, for two reasons. First, as discussed in Chapter 3, the
de-meaned measures account a firm manager’s general tendency towards optimism or
pessimism. Furthermore, de-meaning property rights assessments helps to account
for cultural differences in responses to subjective differences, which endanger cross-
country comparisons of property rights confidence. Second, the de-meaned measures
generally more strongly correlate with measures of firm behavior, as discussed in
Chapter 3. I use the combined de-meaned measure, taken by subtracting the inverse
of the second dimension of property rights confidence (safety from expropriation)
from the first dimension (protection from violations by other citizens). The measure
ranges from -1 to 1, with higher values representing higher property rights confidence.
Chapter 2 emphasizes that, though all citizens wish to win State protection of
their private property rights, they will find it difficult to do so due to the logic of the
collective action problem, even when a group of citizens’ interests coalesce. However,
certain groups will find it easier to overcome the collective action problem. First,
smaller groups in which each member possesses a larger individual vested interest
will more likely organize around their interests. This implies that larger firms will
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more likely report confidence in their private property rights. Regardless of political
system, larger firms have a greater stake in the design of property rights institutions
and may afford better representation of their interests. I code the size of a firm by its
number of employees, according to the “employment” variable in the ES ; given the
presence of particularly larger outliers, I take the natural log of the firm’s reported
number of employees. I also rely on the ES’ coding of firm size into three categories
— small (20 employees and below), medium (between 20 and 100 employees), and
large (over 100) — in place of the continuous logged measure. In most cases, I rely
on the continuous measure based on the natural log of total employment.
Furthermore, the nature of a firm’s ownership may buttress its ability to organize
around its property rights institutional. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) will likely
possess more encompassing interests and find their costs to organizing lowered by
their access to the center of political power. For example, SOEs may prove exempt
from restrictions on property rights imposed on private firms. We might also expect
them to be relatively safe from expropriation by other actors (i.e., the first dimension
of private property rights). I create an indicator variable set to 1 when the firm is
state-owned, using the ES’ measures of ownership shares of various entities — foreign
citizens, the State, the domestic private sector, and other forms of ownership (i.e.,
co-operatives).1 Roughly 7% of firms in the dataset are state-owned.
The nature of collective action may also confer special advantages on older firms.
Olson (1982) argues that within a stable country, special interests will accumulate
over time. This logic implies that older firms may better organize for beneficial
changes to property rights institutions. Additionally, if property rights discrimina-
tion forces “out” group firms to fail, then older firms became so due to benefiting
1These variables (c203a-d in the dataset) suggest a more continuous depiction of ownership. However, nearly
95% of respondents report that their firm is either wholly publicly or wholly privately owned. Creating indicator
variables, therefore, doesn’t appear to over-simplify an underlying ownership pattern.
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from property rights discrimination. I create a measure of the age of a firm equal to
the natural log of the year of the survey minus the year the firm reported beginning
operations in that country.
I also insert several control variables, starting with an indicator variable for foreign
ownership. My theoretical framework relies on a depiction of the relationship between
politicians and citizens and hence does not provide much guidance as to how and why
politicians protect foreign firms’ rights. However, an energetic literature in political
economy concentrates on the question of when politicians expropriate foreign direct
investment (FDI), whether through outright expropriation or policy changes that
restrict their economic rights (Aizenman and Marion 1999; Jensen 2003; Stasavage
2002). I therefore code an indicator variable for foreign ownership as a control
variable; roughly 12.5% of firms in the ES are foreign-owned.2
I also control for whether or not a firm exports its goods and/or services. We
might expect politicians to discriminate the protection of private property rights
in favor of firms that generate foreign exchange, loosening the kinds of restrictions
that comprise the second dimension of property rights — safety from expropriation.
Furthermore, we might expect this relationship to vary across different regime types.
The ES record whether or not a particular firm exports on the basis of a series of
questions on the destination of its sales. Of the firms in the sample, roughly 21.2%
report the export of goods abroad.3
Finally, I create a control variable for each firm’s sector. Firms in the ES are
divided into three sectors: manufacturing (65% of the sample), services (27%), and a
residual category comprised of agro-industry, construction, and other activities (8%
2The same logic regarding SOEs holds for foreign firms — firms tend to be either wholly domestically or wholly
foreign owned. Thus, an indicator variable does not throw out information unnecessarily.
3As with state ownership, this variable could be measured continuously, but the distribution of data — dominated
by responses of 0% and 100% — suggests that a dichotomous indicator does not mis-specify the relationship.
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of the sample). I create a dummy variable equal to 1 for manufacturing firms and
0 for all others, testing whether manufacturing firms enjoy fuller protection of their
private property rights than other firms.
4.2.2 Specification and Sample
With these measures in hand, I turn now to the specification of models of firm-
level property rights confidence. As discussed in Chapter 3, the data are hierarchical;
firms are nested in countries, which are sometimes surveyed repeatedly. Furthermore,
Chapter 2 suggests that a firm manager’s property rights confidence is a product of
national political institutions and the firm’s place within those institutions. Our
specification must account for the structure of the data and the premise that the
effect of national-level political institutions on a particular firm’s property rights
confidence depends on that firm’s political characteristics.
For each of the theories tested here, I specify and estimate a series of models that
help us understand the role of political institutions in perpetuating property rights
discrimination. First, I define, at the country-level, a measure of the standard devi-
ation of firm managers’ confidence in their private property rights, as defined by the
combined de-meaned measure described in Chapter 3 and above. Greater variation
in the protection of private property rights should be reflected in a larger standard
deviation in property rights confidence. I then regress that measure of property
rights discrimination on measures of national-level political institutions discussed in
Chapter 2, as follows:
(4.1) SDj(pij) = β0 + β1 ∗ Zj + α ∗Rj + εj,
where SDj(pij) is a measure of the standard deviation of the combined de-meaned
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measure of property rights confidence for country j; Zj is a measure of the pertinent
political institutions; and Rj is a matrix of control variables measured at the country-
level. As discussed previously, this estimate allows an initial check of the explanatory
power of the theory. For example, if democratic politicians, all else equal, engage
in less property rights discrimination then we should expect that β1 < 0, since we
should expect a smaller standard deviation of property rights discrimination. These
empirical tests allow an initial test of each theory without requiring that we identify
the exact firms that populate the “out” group.
However, each of the political institutional theories discussed in Chapter 2 makes
more specific predictions regarding property rights discrimination; namely, that spe-
cific types of firms will find themselves in the “out” group, depending on their place
in the political institutional constellation. As discussed briefly in Chapter 3, the in-
creasing prevalence of cross-national survey data and hierarchically structured data
more generally has driven the development of methods to test such hypotheses.4
Imagine that we think some characteristic of firm i in country j affects its property
rights confidence. We might model that relationship as follows:
(4.2) pij = β0j + β1j ∗ xij + εij
In Equation 4.2, a firm’s property rights confidence is a function of some firm-level
characteristic xij. Now let us assume that we have theoretical reason to believe that
the effect of xij depends on some country-level political variable zj, which also may
affect the confidence of firm manager’s directly. This implies that:
4For useful introductions to analysis of these data, see Steenbergen and Jones (2002) and the special issue of
Political Analysis (2005). The remainder of this discussion follows the latter, particularly Bowers and Drake (2005)
and Franzese (2005).
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(4.3) β0j = γ00 + γ01 ∗ zj + δ0j
(4.4) β1j = γ10 + γ11 ∗ zj + δ1j
According to Equations 4.3 and 4.4, β0j, the country-level conditional mean prop-
erty rights confidence, is characterized by a multivariate normal probability distribu-
tion with mean γ00. A country’s conditional mean depends on its value of zj, while
δ0j is a mean-zero country-level disturbance. Similarly, the effect of xij on pij varies
across countries depending on zj, with mean of γ11 and a mean-zero country-level
disturbance of δ1j. Substituting Equations 4.3 and 4.4 into Equation 4.2 yields the
following:
(4.5) pij = γ00 + γ01 ∗ Zj + γ10 ∗ xij + γ11 ∗ Zj ∗ xij + (εij + δ0j + δ1j ∗ xij)
Equation 4.5 models firm-level property rights confidence as a function of both firm-
level and national-level attributes — and their interaction. The effect of national-
level political institutions depends on firm-level attributes, just as the effect of firm-
level attributes depends on national-level political institutions. As discussed in Chap-
ter 3, simple OLS and fixed effects estimates fail to capture the hierarchical structure
of the data. I estimate Equation 4.5 using a pooled-sample, one-step strategy that
uses MLE to specify the probability distribution for the coefficients, estimating the
mean and variance of the distributions (Franzese 2005).
In terms of the spatial and temporal sample, I rely on the ES for its list of countries
surveyed and the firms surveyed within each country.5 As discussed in Chapter 3,
5The ES’s sampling frame for each country and its choice of countries to survey are both discussed in Chapter 3.
Also see Chapter 3 for the list of countries included in the analysis.
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several of the countries in the ES are surveyed more than twice or even three times.
Given the paucity of level-three (i.e., across time) units, making such comparisons
would prove quite difficult. Therefore, I use all surveys for countries only surveyed
one time and the first surveys for countries surveyed more than once.
4.3 Democracy and Property Rights
According to Chapter 2’s discussion of the effect of democracy on property rights
confidence, richer citizens suffer from property rights discrimination in democracies,
whereas they benefit from property rights discrimination in non-democracies. How-
ever, property rights discrimination should be less severe in democracies, all else
equal. Here, I test those intuitions.
4.3.1 Measurement
In this set of models, the country-level variable Zj in Equations 4.3 to 4.5 is
democracy. It risks understatement to argue that measuring the presence and extent
of democratic political institutions has been a major focus of comparative politics.
That effort has yielded two primary approaches to the measurement of democratic
political institutions. The first, most often identified with the Freedom House’s
Freedom in the World dataset, focuses on the extent to which citizens securely hold
political and civil freedoms. The second, most often identified with the Polity IV
Project and the World Bank’s Database on Political Institutions, focuses on measur-
ing the nature of political institutions, such as the openness and competitiveness of
executive recruitment. In Chapter 2’s discussion of the role of democracy, I concen-
trate on the role of democratic political institutions in shaping leaders’ incentives to
protect private property rights and, most importantly, discriminate that protection.
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I therefore rely on the Polity IV Project’s coding of political characteristics.6
Polity IV generates three summary measures of the degree of democracy in a
particular country, with sample extending to all sovereign countries from 1816 un-
til 2006. The first two variables, each measured on a ten-point scale, measure the
institutionalization of democracy and authoritarianism, respectively. Each of these
scores is based on six component measures that describe the nature of executive
recruitment, constraints on the executive’s authority, and political competition. Fi-
nally, a summary measure is calculated by subtracting the autocracy score from the
democracy score, yielding a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (a hereditary monarchy)
to 10 (fully consolidated democracy), with higher scores denoting more democratic
regimes.7 The Polity IV Project also recommends a trichotomous categorization of
regime type, based on this scale. Regimes with a summary score of -6 or lower
(inclusive) are categorized as autocratic and regimes with scores higher than +6
(inclusive) are categorized as democratic. Countries with intermediate regimes are
termed “mixed” or “anocratic,” as they contain aspects of both democratic and
autocratic governance.
Testing the interaction of regime type and a firm’s wealth requires a measure of
the latter. I use the measure of firm size described in Section 4.2.
However, I also code a measure of a firms’ political influence as an alternative
test of the effect of democracy on property rights discrimination. I rely on a series of
questions asked of firm managers regarding their political behavior. The ES ask firm
managers whether their firms have sought to “lobby government or otherwise influ-
ence the content of laws or regulations affecting it.” Additionally, firm managers are
asked to assess their degree of influence on “national laws and regulations.” Finally,
6For important critical evaluations of the Polity Indexs utility, see Treier and Jackman (2008) and Vreeland
(forthcoming).
7For ease of interpretation, I convert this scale to range from 0 to 21 by adding 10 to the each point on the scale.
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the ES also ask firm managers whether or not they belong to a business association
or chamber of commerce, as well as the value such business associations bestow, from
the effect on lobbying government to information on government regulations. I use
factor analysis to create a new measure of political importance, basing the measure
on these nine variables.8 After re-scaling for ease of interpretation, this measure
of political importance varies from 0 to 1. This measure of political connectedness
possesses a distinct advantage for the purposes of this chapter. As discussed earlier,
a major obstacle to building a cross-national statistical model of property rights dis-
crimination is identifying which groups of citizens will populate the “in” and “out”
groups. Though non-democratic regimes more likely may protect politically con-
nected firms, it remains difficult to define ex ante politically well-connected citizens.
This challenge is compounded by the use of firm-level data, since the nature of firms’
political behavior is less readily defined. However, the index of political connected-
ness more directly identifies firms with political influence by their own assessment of
their lobbying activities and their involvement in business associations.
4.3.2 Preliminary Evidence
Before estimating statistical models of property rights discrimination, I estimate
a set of models that test whether democratic governance, all else equal, generally
affects firm managers’ property rights confidence. I begin with models of variation in
the protection of private property and then proceed to firm-level models of property
rights confidence in which democratic governance informs a country’s mean property
rights confidence. I then pause to report on a preliminary test of whether the selection
bias discussed above and in Chapter 3 is more pronounced in non-democracies.
8The scale reliability coefficient of 0.8758 suggests that the measures do capture the same underlying construct.
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Table 4.1: Regressions of Variation in Property Rights Confidence
Variable Simple De-Meaned
Polity -0.00070.53 -0.00170.07 -0.00110.09 -0.00080.25
Mean -0.14930.00 0.0585 0.18
Constant 0.30270.00 0.37520.00 0.16750.00 0.1648 0.00
N 69 69 69 69
R2 0.0059 0.2957 0.0436 0.0689
Cell entries are coeffcients with p-valuessuper−scripted.
Models of Variation in Property Rights Confidence
Table 4.1 records the estimates of regressions of the standard deviation of prop-
erty rights confidence for both the simple and de-meaned measures. We can observe
two patterns in the data. For the simple measures, the bivariate regression sug-
gests a statistically insignificant relationship between democracy and variation in
firm managers’ confidence. However, when the mean of the distribution is inserted
as a control, the effect of democracy increases absolutely and becomes marginally
significant (p = 0.07). For the de-meaned results, the bivariate results indicate a
negative relationship between the Polity indicator of democracy and property rights
discrimination. However, when controlling for the mean of the distribution reduces
the absolute size and the statistical significance of this finding. Neither does the
mean of a country’s distribution of property rights confidence correlate strongly with
variation in the distribution.
The differences between the sets of models derives from the pairwise correlations
among the three variables. For the simple measures, the three variables are nega-
tively correlated with each other. In contrast, for the de-meaned variables, political
democracy exhibits a negative correlation with both the standard deviation of the
distribution and the mean, whereas the latter two variables are positively correlated.
This difference in the direction and size of the correlation between the mean and
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standard deviation of a survey country’s distribution of property rights confidence
differentiates the two sets of results. When de-meaning the property rights confidence
measure, the relationship between the mean and standard deviation of a country’s
distribution is altered, becoming weaker absolutely and positive in sign.9 Including
the mean of the distribution in a regression of the standard deviation on political
democracy thus has different effects on our estimate of the effect of democracy on
the standard deviation.
Democracy and Firm-Level Property Rights Confidence
The foregoing analysis suggests tentatively that democratic countries generally
exhibit less severe property rights discrimination. I turn now to a multi-level model of
property rights confidence that allows measures of democracy to inform the country-
level conditional mean of property rights confidence, but does not yet test whether
the effect of firm-level characteristics on property rights confidence depends on the
political regime. That model takes the following form:
pij = β0j + α ∗ Zij + εij
β0j = γ00 + γ01 ∗ AUTOj + γ02 ∗DEMOj + δ0j(4.6)
pij = γ00 + γ01 ∗ AUTOij + γ02 ∗DEMOj + α ∗ Zij + (εij + δ0j)
Table 4.2 displays two models of firm-level property rights confidence. The first
column displays the results of a model in which the country-level mean (β0j) is
allowed to vary randomly across countries, whereas the second allows β0j to vary
according to the country’s political regime (autocratic, democratic, or mixed), as
9This change likely emanates from the fact that de-meaning the measures reduces mean and the total variance of
property rights confidence, both across firms and across countries.
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Table 4.2: Democracy and Property Rights
Country-level
Variable Microlevel intercept effects
Intercept (γ00) -0.06 0.00 -0.04 0.08
Firm-Level
Size 0.0040.00 0.0040.00









Intercept (δ0j) 0.090.00 0.080.00
N 28,788 28,660
Countries 72 70
Cell entries are coeffcients with p-valuessuper−scripted.
shown below, where pij is the de-meaned firm-level measure of private property
rights confidence and Zij is a matrix of firm-level independent variables:
I attend first to firm-level variables pertaining to ability of firms to lobby effectively
for beneficial property rights institutions. Larger firms benefit from stronger property
rights protections, as evidenced by the positive and statistically significant coefficient
on the size variable. An increase in employment of one standard deviation (the
natural log of 1.7, or about 5.5 employees) yields an increase in property rights
confidence of only 0.007 in our dependent variable, less than half of one standard
deviation.10 The coefficient on the state-owned enterprises (SOE) indicator is also
signed positively, as expected, though its effect is also quite small.11 Surprisingly,
10Substituting size categories for the continuous measure of firm size yields an interesting pattern. Using the
World Bank’s trichotomous coding of firm size and leaving medium-sized firms as the base category, small firms do
not suffer worse property rights protections (the sign on the small firm dummy variable is negative, but statistically
insignificant). However, large firms do benefit from stronger property rights confidence. Using a five-category coding
of size, small firms do not suffer relative to medium-sized firms, but micro-enterprises clearly do (negative and
statistically significant). Large firms are, statistically speaking, more confident, but very large firms do the best of
all. This suggests that the effects of size are felt most strongly at the very small and very large end of the scale, with
firms in the middle tending to not vary in terms of confidence as much.
11Further analysis indicates that SOEs’ greater confidence depends on their property versus contractual rights.
While their confidence in their contractual rights is not statistically different from private firms, their confidence in
freedom from expropriation is far higher.
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older firms report lower confidence in their private property.12
In terms of other firm-levle controls, manufacturing firms tend to enjoy greater
property rights confidence, as do exporting firms. Foreign ownership has no statisti-
cally significant effect on property rights confidence.
What of political regimes? Column 2 reports estimates of Equation 4.6, with
mixed regimes set as the base category. This model provides tentative evidence that
national political institutions, all else equal, do affect firm managers’ property rights
confidence. The two indicator variables are jointly significant at p = 0.003. Fur-
thermore, we can compare the estimate of δ0j, the country-level disturbance, in the
two equations; if national-level political institutions play an important role in firm
managers’ property rights confidence, then we should observe a serious decline in the
size of δ0j from Column 1 to 2. Indeed, the figure declines by 5.5% in the second
equation.13 Though the individual coefficients are only weakly significant, Column
2 supports our discussion of the covariance of national-level mean property rights
confidence and political institutions. All else equal, firms in democratic regimes de-
clare less confidence in their private property rights than firms in mixed regimes.
Similarly, firms in autocratic regimes declare higher confidence. Furthermore, the
difference in firm confidence in private property rights is substantively large and sta-
tistically significant. All else equal, the difference between the indicator variables for
autocratic and democratic countries (γ01−γ02) is 0.10, a difference that is statistically
significant at p = 0.001.
12One quite speculative explanation for this result, based on Chapter 2’s bargaining approach to economic insti-
tutions, states that sudden shifts in technology or relative prices that yield challenges to current property rights
institutions more strongly challenge the property rights confidence of older firms. One comparison that supports this
conjecture is that the effect of firm age is smaller and less statistically significant in the expropriation equation than
the contractual rights equation; this suggests that they respond more strongly to the fear of infringement by other
companies than the State.






In Chapter 3, I contend that the Enterprise Surveys likely under-state the degree
and effect of property rights discrimination. Earlier in this chapter, I have argued
that the ES might also distort our estimates of the effect of political institutions
on property rights discrimination. If a certain set of political institutions increase
the severity of property rights discrimination, we might expect higher barriers to
entry in countries with those institutions, which might reasonably be expected to
depress property rights discrimination. In a preliminary test of that intuition, I
again regress the mean property rights confidence (de-meaned) for each country an-
alyzed in Chapter 3 on the natural log of the Doing Business measure of the cost
of starting a business. I do so for both the combined, first-dimensional (i.e., con-
tractual rights), and second-dimensional (i.e., property rights) measures of property
rights security. For each regression, I save the residuals. I then regress the residuals
on a country’s regime type, using indicator varibles for democratic and autocratic
governance, leaving mixed regimes as the base category.
I report those results in Table 4.3 In each regression, the effect of autocratic gover-
nance is to increase the size of selection bias in the firm-level sample. Democratic gov-
ernance, on the other hand, is signed negatively but is statistically insignificant. In
each equation the effect of autocracy is statistically distinguishable from democracy
at at least p = 0.004. Altogether, the effect or regime type on the selection problem
is strongest in the model of contractual rights. These results suggest strongly that
the Enterprise Surveys’ sampling issues are more serious in autocratic regimes.14
14Given these results, we might be tempted to doubt Table 4.2’s finding that that firms in autocratic regimes
generally report greater property rights confidence, particularly given that the effect of autocratic regimes is strongest
in a model of contractual rights, as in Table 4.3. However, accounting for these effects by entering the residuals to
the models reported in Tabe 4.2 only intensify the negative coefficient on the democracy indicator variable.
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Table 4.3: Selection bias in democracies and non-democracies
Variable Combined D1: contractual D2: property
Autocracy 0.0657.06 0.0386.05 0.0306.10
Democracy −0.0301.22 −0.0187.17 −0.0162.25
Constant 0.0115.59 0.00750.52 0.00582.631
N 73 70 73
R2 0.12 0.16 0.12
Cell entries are coeffcients with p-valuessuper−scripted.
4.3.3 Property Rights Discrimination in Democracies and Non-Democracies
The foregoing evidence tentatively shows that firms in democratic countries, all
else equal, suffer from lower property rights confidence. However, some evidence also
suggests that democratic governance lowers the overall variation in property rights
confidence, discussed earlier. Here, I test the hypothesis that that democracy’s effect
on property rights confidence depends on firm size.
Large Firms, Small Firms, and Democracy
Table 4.2 provides evidence that larger firms generally solve the collective action
problem more successfully; all else equal, they report greater confidence in the pro-
tection of their private property rights. But does this effect depend on the presence
of political democracy? I answer this question by estimating a model of firm-level
property rights confidence that allows the effect of size — as coded into three cat-
egories of small, medium, and large by the ES — to vary across types of political
regime. Equations 4.7 and 4.8 specify that relationship. In the model, a firm’s size
affects the protection of its private property rights, but that effect depends on the
kind of political regime governing the firm.
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pij = β0j + β1j ∗ SMALLij + β2j ∗ LARGEij + α ∗ Zijεij
β0j = γ00 + γ01 ∗DEMOj + γ02 ∗ AUTOj + δ0j
β1j = γ10 + γ11 ∗DEMOj + γ12 ∗ AUTOj + δ1j(4.7)
β2j = γ20 + γ21 ∗DEMOj + γ22 ∗ AUTOj + δ2j
Substituting yields the following:
pij = γ00 + γ01 ∗DEMOj + γ02 ∗ AUTOj + γ10 ∗ SMALLij + γ20 ∗ LARGEij + α ∗ Zij +
γ11 ∗DEMOj ∗ SMALLij + γ12 ∗ AUTOj ∗ SMALLij +(4.8)
γ21 ∗DEMOj ∗ LARGEij + γ22 ∗ AUTOj ∗ LARGEij +
(εij + δ0j + δ1j ∗ SMALLij + δ2j ∗ LARGEij)
Since mixed regimes and medium-sized firms are left as the base categories, the
effect of being a small firm is
∂pij
∂SMALLij
= β1j = γ10+γ11∗DEMOj+γ12∗AUTOj+δ0j.
If democracies discriminate in favor of larger firms, then we should expect not only
that γ11 > 0 (i.e., that democracies discriminate against small firms less than mixed
regimes), but that γ11 > γ12 (i.e., that democracies discriminate against small firms
less than autocracies). We should expect the converse to be true for the effect of
being a large firm, equal to
∂pij
∂LARGEij
= β2j = γ20 +γ21∗DEMOj+γ22∗AUTOj+δ2j.
If democracies discriminate in favor of larger firms less often, then we should expect
that γ21 < 0 and that γ21 < γ22.
Table 4.4 presents two sets of estimates. Column 1 presents the estimates of an
equation that allows the effect of firm size to vary randomly across countries, but not
according to political institutions Column 2 presents the estimates of Equation 4.9.
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Table 4.4: Firm Size and Property Rights Discrimination
Country-level
Intercept Effects Fully Interactive
Intercept 0.0490.02 −0.04550.03
Firm-Level
Size:small (γ10) −0.00420.22 −0.01610.04
Size:large (γ20) 0.00760.03 0.00480.56






Democracy (γ01) −0.04200.19 −0.04610.06







Size: small (δ1j) 0.01860.00 0.01770.00
Size: large (δ2j) 0.01640.00 0.01710.00
Intercept (δ0j) 0.08070.00 0.08070.00
N 28,660 28,660
Countries 70 70
Cell entries are coeffcients with p-valuessuper−scripted.
Column 1 provides continued support for two trends observed in earlier analysis.
First, larger firms tend to enjoy more confidence in the protection of their private
property rights an effect that is statistically significant. Smaller firms, in contrast,
do not differ statistically from medium-sized firms. However, the difference between
small and large firms is substantial and statistically significant at p = 0.007. Second,
firms in democracies tend to declare less confidence in the protection of their private
property rights than firms in mixed regimes, all else equal. The opposite is true of
firms in autocratic regimes, though with less statistical confidence. However, firms
in democratic and autocratic regimes are statistically different at p = .001).
Does regime type influence property rights discrimination by firm size? Column





Regime Type Mixed −0.0161.04 +0.0048.56
Democratic −0.0031.45 +0.0080.07
Table 4.5: Effect of Firm Size on Property Rights Security
small firm is negative and statistically significant in mixed regimes, but the positive
coefficients on the interactions with autocratic and democratic regime type suggest
that this effect dissipates in those regimes. In particular, the interaction with au-
tocratic regimes is positive and significant at p = 0.06. The effect of being a large
firm, in contrast, is positive and statistically significant in mixed regimes, an effect
that doesn’t appear to increase or decrease in autocratic and democratic regimes;
though the interactions of the large firm dummy variable with those regime types
are positively signed, they are statistically insignificant.
In order to investigate these differences more carefully, I calculate the effect of
being a small or large firm for each regime type, including the variance of the effect
and its statistical confidence. Table 4.5 displays the effects, as well as the statistical
significance of the effect, for each regime type. As suggested by the regression re-
sults, mixed regimes tend to discriminate against small firms, with the effect negative
and statistically significant. However, that effect dissipates in both autocratic and
democratic regimes; for each of those regime types, the effect of being a small firm
is statistically significant and in autocratic regimes, the sign changes. The pattern
diverges for large firms. In mixed and autocratic regimes, being a large firm does not
translate into greater property rights confidence. However, in democratic regimes,
the effect of being a large firm is positive and statistically significant at p = 0.07.
Contrary to theoretical expectations, the effect of being a large firm is positive and
marginally significant in democratic regimes. In short, democracies tend to sup-
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plement the advantage large firms naturally possess in organizing around beneficial
changes to property rights institutions.15
Figure 4.1: Comparing Predicted Property Rights Confidence Across Size and Regime
I conclude this analysis by examining Figure 4.1, which compares a five-year old
domestic, privately owned, non-exporting, manufacturing firm’s predicted property
rights security across types of political regime and size. Three results discussed previ-
ously are once again visible here. Regardless of firm size, democratic governments fail
to protect private property rights as vigorously as other regime types. For each size
category, autocratic regimes tend to protect private property rights more vigorously.
Second, neither autocracies nor democracies appear to discriminate against smaller
firms; for these regime types smaller firms do not suffer relative to medium-sized
firms. However mixed regimes more regularly discriminate against smaller firms, as
evidenced by the gap between small and medium-sized firms. Finally, democracies
15One reason for this finding may be the relative abundance of observations in democratic countries; democracies
account for roughly two-thirds of countries surveyed and total observations. The larger number of observations allows
a more precise estimate of the democratic-large firm interaction. Though the coefficient for the interaction term of
the large firm and democratic indicator variables is statistically insignificant, the effect of being a large firm in a
democratic firm (γ20 + γ21) is measured with a smaller standard error, which drives the statistical significance of the
effect of being a large firm in a democracy.
152
seem to discriminate in favor of large firms rather than against smaller ones, per se;
larger firms do better, but small firms do not necessarily do worse.
Political Influence in Democracies and Non-Democracies
There is little support for the hypothesized relationship between size and property
rights confidence, as mediated by political democracy. However, I pause to consider
whether political influence generally affects property rights confidence. As suggested
earlier, the drivers of property rights discrimination may shift from country to coun-
try; in one country, a regime may discriminate based on race, in another based on
gender, and in still another based on religion. If the focus on firm size does not hold
water empirically, it may be because democracies and non-democracies discriminate
on different axes. A focus on political influence is therefore helpful because it is
agnostic as to the origins of political influence. The measure of political influence
described above may in one country depend on firm size and in another on some cur-
rently unobservable trait. As such, I expect that property rights confidence increases
in a firm’s political power.
Therefore, I test whether a firm’s political influence increases its property rights
confidence and whether that relationship shifts across regimes. To test this hypothe-
sis, I estimate the following models, where PIij is a firm’s degree of political influence
and and Zj is a matrix of firm-level control variables:
pij = β0j + β1j ∗ PIij + α ∗ Zij + εij
β0j = γ00 + γ01 ∗DEMOj + γ02 ∗ AUTOj + δ0j(4.9)
β1j = γ10 + γ11 ∗DEMOj + γ12 ∗ AUTOj + δ1j
Substituting yields the following:
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pij = γ00 + γ01 ∗DEMOj + γ02 ∗ AUTOj + γ10 ∗ PIij +
γ11 ∗DEMOj ∗ PIij + γ12 ∗ AUTOj ∗ PIij + α ∗ Zij +(4.10)
(εij + δ0j + δ1j ∗ PIij)
Column 1 displays the estimates of an equation lacking the interaction of political
influence of regime type, allowing the effect of political influence vary randomly
across countries. In this specification, a firm’s political influence has a positive and
marginally significant effect on property rights confidence. More political influential
firms generally enjoy stronger property rights protection. Furthermore, including
the measure of firm-level political influence lessens the distinction of regime types we
have seen previously. In particular, the effect of autocratic regimes on firms’ property
rights confidence loses both substantive and statistical significance in comparison
with previous estimates. The difference between autocratic and democratic regimes
is statistically insignificant (p = 0.24).
Column 2 displays the estimates of Equation 4.11, the fully interactive model
of property rights confidence. Our interpretation of the effect of political influence
shifts substantially, and in line with Chapter 2’s expectations. The effect of political
influence in mixed regimes (γ10) is statistically indistinguishable from 0, inferring
that it has little role in firms’ property rights protections in those countries. In
democratic countries, the effect of political influence is positive, but the insignifi-
cance of the interaction term indicates that that the effect of influence is statistically
indistinguishable between democracies and mixed regimes. In contrast, the effect of
political influence is substantively larger in autocracies and the difference from mixed
regimes is statistically significant. The fully interactive model also clarifies the dif-
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Table 4.6: Political Influence and Property Rights Discrimination
Country-level
Intercept Effects Fully Interactive
Intercept (γ00) 0.0490.02 −0.04550.03
Firm-Level
Influence (γ10) 0.01800.08 −0.00030.99
Size 0.00450.00 0.00450.00






Democracy (γ01) −0.03170.19 −0.03490.15





Influence (δ1j) 0.05690.00 0.05450.00
Intercept (δ0j) 0.07620.00 0.07590.00
N 26,331 26,331
Countries 66 66
Cell entries are coefficients with p-valuessuper−scripted.
ferences among political regimes. When PIij = 0, the differences among regimes
are insignificant. Both the democratic (γ01) and autocratic (γ02) indicator variables
are negatively signed, but statistically indistinguishable from 0, particularly the au-
tocratic indicator. Together with Column 1, these results suggest strongly that the
generally positive record of autocratic regimes in protecting private property rights
owes to their ability to discriminate protection in favor of politically connected firms.
Table 4.7: Effect of Political Influence on Property Rights Security
Effectp−value
Autocratic +0.0985.009
Regime Type Mixed −0.0003.99
Democratic +0.0003.22
Table 4.7 reinforces these points by comparing the effect of political influence and
its statistical significance across political regimes. The effect of political connect-
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edness is clearly strongest and highly significant statistically in autocratic regimes.
In mixed and democratic regimes, its effect is statistically insignificant. Figure 4.2
compares Column 2’s model predictions of property rights confidence for a domestic,
privately owned, manufacturing firm that is five years old and employs 20 people.
The predictions are compared across political influence for the three regime types,
with the slope of each line corresponding to the effect displayed in Table 4.7. As that
table showed, the effect of political influence is far greater in autocracies. Whereas
the predicted probability actually declines very slightly in mixed regimes in response
to political influence and increases only moderately for democratic regimes, the effect
is quite large in autocratic regimes. Figure 4.2 also illustrates the effect of different
regime types on property rights confidence. For firms lacking any political power
(i.e., PIij = 0), the differences among different regime types is very small and, as
shown in Table 4.6, statistically insignificant. Previous estimates that suggested gen-
eral advantage of firms in autocratic regimes clearly depends on those firms’ political
influence; until a value of about 0.1, mixed regimes actually better protect firms
than autocratic regimes. It is only for much larger values of political influence that
autocratic regimes clearly provide a protective advantage over other regime types.
Together, these results indicate that the differences among political regimes are
dependent not on a general ability of autocratic regimes to better protect private
property, but their ability to discriminate in favor of politically well-connected firms.
4.4 Selectorates, Winning Coalitions, and Property Rights
A more rigorous theoretical approach to political institutions — the selectorate
theory — suggests a different causal mechanism for property rights discrimination.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the main intuition of the selectorate theory in regards to
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Figure 4.2: Comparing Predicted Property Rights Confidence Across Political Influence and Regime
property rights discrimination is that the security of an individual’s private property
rights will depend on the interaction of her political station and the kind of regime
she inhabits. Put in terms of the selectorate theory, the security of a citizen’s private
property rights depends the interaction of whether or not she is in the selectorate
or winning coalition and whether the regime is democratic, non-democratic with a
small selectorate, or non-democratic with a large selectorate, as discussed above:
Table 4.8: Selectorate Theory Predictions
Membership . . .
Type of regime In W & S In S (not W) In neither
Large W, Large S Good Good Not quite as good
Small W, Small S Good Good Fair
Medium W, Large S Good Fair Poor
Firms in the winning coalition in any regime could be expected to enjoy secure
private property rights However, the key comparative static is for firms that are in
the selectorate, but outside the winning coalition. For countries with a large winning
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coalition, those outside the winning coalition can still expect protection of their rights
by the State. In contrast, such firms in small-W systems will be less confident in their
property rights. Among smaller-W regimes, we will expect different distributions.
For small-W , small-S regimes, we expect a large population with only fair confidence
in their private property rights. In medium-W , large-S regimes, we expect a larger
group with high confidence.
4.4.1 Measuring the Selectorate and Winning Coalition
Bueno de Mesquita and his co-authors (2003) confess that:
The measurement of the selectorate size and winning-coalition size, espe-
cially in nondemocratic states, is in its infancy. This means the approxi-
mations we propose are crude and primitive . . . It is possible . . . that
others may have too little confidence in our approximations of the size of
a winning coalition or the selectorate to accept the empirical results that
rely on those variables. We hope that such disagreement will motivate
the search for better ways to estimate the institutions with which we are
concerned. (133)
Only four years since the publication of The Logic of Political Survival, their as-
sessment of the empirical challenge of the selectorate theory regrettably remains
true. The theoretical and empirical development of the theory will hopefully im-
prove the measurement of the key variables in time. However, Clark, Kaufman, and
Flores (2005) propose a new method for testing the selectorate theory’s propositions
that relies on Barbara Geddes’ (1999, 2003) classification of non-democratic regimes.
Here, I describe both the original approach from Bueno de Mesquita, et al (2003)
and the latter, newer approach.
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Original Approach
Bueno de Mesquita and his co-authors (2003) code the size of the selectorate as a
function of the LEGSELEC variable from Arthur Banks’ cross-national time-series
data (2001).16 That variable is coded 0 for countries where no legislative body is
present; 1 for countries with an unelected legislature (e.g., chosen by hereditary title
or by the ruler); and 2 for an elected legislature. Assuming that countries with a
broader method of choosing the selectorate more likely have a larger S, they divide
the measure by 2, creating a measure of S that takes the value of 0, .5, or 1.0.
Coding W is slightly more complicated. The authors rely on three variables from
the Polity IV dataset (Polity IV Project, 2007) — XRCOMP, XROPEN, and PAR-
COMP — and the REGTYPE variable from Banks’ data (2001). The authors create
a four-point index, adding another point to the index for each of the following that
is true: the regime is not a military or military/civilian regime (i.e., REGTY PE 6=
2, 3); executive recruitment is relatively competitive (i.e., XRCOMP ≥ 2); recruit-
ment of the executive is relatively open (i.e., XROPEN > 2); and political par-
ticipation is open (i.e., PARCOMP = 5). As with S, they divide the scale by its
maximum value, 4, to create a measure of W that varies between 0 and 1.
I follow Bueno de Mesquita and his co-authors’ (2003) method for every year
between 1991 and 2000, inclusive. I then take the mean value of S and W , for that
time period discussed I then generate the multiplicative interaction of S̄1991−2000 and
W̄1991−2000 in order to test Bueno de Mesquita, et al’s (2003) predictions regarding
the effects of S and W .
16For the remainder of this discussion, I refer to the selectorate and winning coalition by their initials, S and W .
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Regime Type Approach
Bueno de Mesquita, et al (2003) emphasize that S and W “can be readily related
to conventional labels for describing different political systems” (69). A selectorate
equal to the size of the adult population and a winning coalition roughly half the size
of the selectorate should characterize democracies. Military juntas and monarchies,
in contrast, should have both smaller winning coalitions and selectorates, since we
expect that only a small group of citizens choose leaders and roughly half those
citizens are necessary for the leaders to remain in power. Single-party regimes likely
extend the franchise to as wide a group of citizens as democracies, but the winning
coalition should be somewhat smaller. Though the authors stress the usefulness of
moving away from categorical distinctions of different regime types, Clark, Kaufman,
and Flores (2005) follow their mapping in order to obtain empirical leverage to further
test the selectorate theory, a method I duplicate here.
Geddes (1999, 2003) classifies authoritarian regimes in a manner that correlates
closely with Bueno de Mesquita and his co-authors’ conjectures regarding different
non-democratic regimes. For every country year between 1946 and 2000, Geddes
classifies regimes as being single-party, military, and/or personalist. A regime can
be any combination of these three ideal types in a given year. She also sub-classifies
single-party regimes according to whether they have fair elections, Based on her
scheme, I create dummy variables for each regime type equal to 1 if a regime had
that authoritarian characteristic in that year. Geddes (1999, 2003) does not code
monarchies, however. I rely on the Polity IV dataset to code these regimes, classifying
regimes as monarchies according to the Polity IV dataset. According to Polity IV,
a monarchy is characterized as a regime with regulated recruitment of the chief
executive (i.e., XRREG = 3; the executive is chosen by either hereditary succession
160
or regular elections), non-competitive executive recruitment (i.e., XRCOMP = 1;
the executive is recruited through heredity or designation by a previous monarch),
and closed executive recruitment (i.e., XROPEN = 1 or XROPEN = 2; potential
adherents to the executive must be from a particular family).17
Figure 4.3: Comparing S and W in different regime types
In order to describe a regime during any given year, I implement a two-step
strategy. First, I characterize a country as being a monarchy, military junta, single-
party with free elections, single-party with un-free elections personalist, or hybrid
non-democracy on the basis of Geddes’ codings. Any combination of regimes is
coded as hybrid in that year, whereas each pure non-democratic type is coded 1 only
if that type was the sole authoritarian characteristic. In order to explore further
the relationship between size of selectorate, winning coalition, and regime type, I
17The sole overlap between Geddes’ classifications and the Polity IV codings is Haiti under the Duvalier regime,
which Polity IV codes as a monarchy and Geddes (1999, 2003) codes as a personalist regime. I characterize Haiti
during this period as personalist.
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first calculate the average values of S and W for each regime type described by
Geddes (1999, 2003) for all years between 1946 and 2000. I then graph each regime
type according to its mean values of S and W in Figure 4.3. In that figure, we
can see that democracies and freer single-party regimes evince similar values of S
and W and thus have very weak loyalty norms (0.82 for democracies and 0.77 for
single-party regimes with free elections). Single-party regimes with unfree elections
have similarly large selectorates, but smaller winning coalitions and thus stronger
loyalty norms (0.55). Personalist and hybrid regimes cluster together, with smaller
selectorates and winning coalitions than single-party regimes, implying still stronger
loyalty norms (0.44 and 0.45, respectively). Meanwhile, both military regimes and
monarchy have very small winning coalitions and the smallest values of S. However,
they differ in terms of their loyalty norms, which are stronger for monarchies (0.37)
than in military regimes (0.51).
4.4.2 Preliminary Evidence
As in Section 4.3, I begin by estimating two simple models of the effect of the
size of selectorate and winning coalition on property rights discrimination. First, I
estimate a model of the country-level standard deviation of firm managers’ confidence
in their private property rights. For the original coding of the size of the selectorate
and winning coalition, the model is specified as follows, where Sj and Wj represent
the average size of the selectorate and winning coalition for the ten year period from
1991 to 2000.
(4.11) SDj(pij) = β0 + β1 ∗ Sj + β2 ∗Wj + β3 ∗ Sj ∗Wj + εj
As discussed in Chapter 2, the selectorate theory predicts patterns of property
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rights discrimination on the basis of the sizes of the selectorate and winning coalition,
as well as the loyalty norm, or the ratio of W/S. That discussion suggested that
large-W regimes would engage in less property rights discrimination than regimes
with smaller-W (i.e., non-democracies). However, the distinction between various
forms of non-democracies is less apparent in terms of the standard deviation of
property rights confidence, since the form of property rights discrimination changes
across smaller-W regimes, but perhaps not the degree. Therefore, the expectations
for the coefficients in Equation 4.11 are as follows. We should expect that β2 < 0,
since increases in the size of the winning coalition, regardless of the size of the size
of the selectorate, will decrease variation in property rights confidence. The effect of
the selectorate size, however, is less clear. The effect of selectorate size, however, is
contingent on the size of the winning coalition. In a non-democratic regime (i.e., one
with a small W ), increasing S strengthens the loyalty norm, motivating the leader
to shift how property rights are protected, as discussed in Chapter 2. Some citizens
will find their property rights protected less rigorously, particularly those outside
the winning coalition. However, it is unclear whether the overall level of variation
in property rights confidence will increase or decrease. Therefore, we are unsure of
the of the sign of β1 in Equation 4.11 because that coefficient represents the effect
of S when W = 0. In large W regimes, increasing the size of the selectorate likely
has little effect on the extent of property rights discrimination. At sufficiently high
values of W , the effect of increasing S may even be positive. Therefore, we expect
that β3 < 0 in Equation 4.11, demonstrating that as W rises, the effect of S ceases
being positive. Similarly, in parallel to the logic for S, the effect of an increase in
W decreases (i.e., intensifies) in the size of S because of the additional effect on the
loyalty norm.
163
Table 4.9: The Selectorate Theory and Property Rights Discrimination
Original Measures Regime Types
Selectorate (S) −0.160.00










Cell entries are coeffcients with p-valuessuper−scripted.
For the Geddes-based measures of regime type, I estimate Equation 4.11, but sub-
stitute Geddes’ measures of S and W with measures of how long during the ten from
1991 to 2000 were spent as each of the regime types identified above — democracy,
military, personalist, one-party democracy, and hybrid —for the measures of S and
W .18 According to the logic of the selectorate theory, regimes with larger winning
coalitions and weaker loyalty norms should engage in less property rights discrim-
ination. Democracies will therefore engage in less property rights discrimination.
The differences among non-democracies will depend on the specific combination of
winning coalition and selectorate. In single-party regimes, which are often character-
ized with larger winning coalitions and selectorates than other non-democracies, we
may expect a lower level of property rights discrimination. Conversely, personalist
and hybrid will likely engage in extensive property rights discrimination, whereas
military and monarchical regimes will engage in less, due to a weaker loyalty norm.
Estimates are displayed in Table 4.9.
Table 4.9 displays the estimates of Equations 4.11, using the de-meaned com-
18Years spent as a monarchy are left reference category. Without a reference category, the regime type measures
would be perfectly collinear.
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bined measure as the dependent variable.19 I begin with the first set of estimates of
Equation 4.11, which use the Bueno de Mesquita, et al (2003) measure of the size
of winning coalition and selectorate. The coefficient on W is negatively correlated
with variation in firm managers’ property rights confidence, as the selectorate model
might expect; when S is very small, we expect that expanding the size of the winning
coalition will decrease property rights discrimination. The size of the selectorate is
also negatively correlated with property rights discrimination, inferring that in a
very small-W regime (which only rarely exists), moving from a small-S to a large-
S regime decreases property rights discrimination. The interaction of W and S is
positively signed, in contrast to theoretical expectations, since we expected that the
effect of an increase in S would be more beneficial the larger the winning coalition.
Table 4.10: Predicted Level of Property Rights Discrimination
Regime Type W and S Prediction
Large W , Large S W = .45; S = .9; W/S = .5 0.161
Small W , Small S W = .1; S = .2; W/S = .5 0.275
Medium W , Large S W = .35; S = .9; W/S = .39 0.167
The estimates predict that small-W , small-S regimes will have lower variation in
their property rights confidence than both large-W and small-W , large-S regimes,
as shown in Table 4.10. There, we see that democratic countries and authoritarian
regimes characterized by a medium-sized winning coalition and larger selectorate ex-
hibit nearly the same predicted level of property rights discrimination. Meanwhile,
non-democatic regimes with a small selectorate tend to engage in substantially more
property rights discrimination. Table 4.10 does not accord closely with Chapter 2’s
interpretation of the selectorate theory, which expected a lower level of property
rights discrimination in large-W , large-S regimes and perhaps little difference be-
19In this specification, I do not include the measure of the mean.
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tween the two latter forms of regimes. Instead, it appears that small-W , small-S
regimes engage in the most pernicious forms of property rights discrimination.
The second column of Table 4.9 reveals an intriguing set of differences among
regime types. A country that spent ten years as a monarchy would have a standard
deviation in firm managers’ property rights confidence of 0.16 (i.e., the constant).
Experience as a democracy, single-party regime, or personalist regime has no sta-
tistically significant effect on the variation in property rights confidence. However,
military rule increases variation in property rights confidence; ten years as a mili-
tary junta would raise the standard deviation to 0.23. Hybrid regimes are also more
discriminatory; ten years as a hybrid regime would raise the standard deviation of
property rights confidence to 023. We may further compare these results to our the-
oretical expectations by comparing the individual coefficients on regime types with
simple Wald tests. Compared in this way, democracy is more beneficial than military,
single-party, and hybrid regimes, but statistically indistinguishable from personalist
regimes at p = 0.1. Military regimes are more discriminatory than single-party, per-
sonalist, and democratic regimes at p = 0.1. Similarly, hybrid regimes are more dis-
criminatory than both democratic and single-party regimes at p = 0.01. Democratic
regimes are less discriminatory than single-party regimes at p = .06. Altogether,
military and hybrid regimes evince the highest level of overall property rights rights
discrimination.
Table 4.11 compares the predicted results from the second column, assuming a
country of that regime type for the entire period. These predictions corroborate
those in Table 4.10 and clarifies the poor performance of small-W , small-S regimes.
A country that remained democratic for the entire ten-year period possesses the
lowest degree of property rights discrimination, with a predicted standard deviation
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of 0.143.20 Military regimes, which in Figure 4.3 have small winning coalitions and
selectorates exhibit the highest predicted standard deviation. However, monarchies,
which have similar selectorate institutions in Figure 4.3, exhibit less severe property
rights discrimination. The results suggest, then, that the tendency of small-W ,
small-S regimes to engage in more severe property rights discrimination, as found
in Table 4.9, derives primarily from the record of military juntas. Hybrid regimes,
which tend to exhibit a different set of selectorate institutions in Figure 4.3 also
engage in deeper property rights discrimination. Furthermore, personalist regimes,
with selectorates and winning coalitions on average nearly identical to hybrid regimes,
exhibit far less property rights discrimination. Finally, single-party regimes exhibit a
similar level of property rights discrimination as personalist regimes, despite different
selectorate institutions.








Together, these results only partially support the selectorate theory’s predictions.
In general, regimes with similar selectorate institutions often exhibit different degrees
of property rights discrimination. Democracy doesn’t appear to improve substan-
tially on the performance of particular forms of authoritarianism. However, we ob-
serve that small-W , small-S regimes, particularly military juntas, engage in far more
property rights discrimination than other regimes. Hybrid regimes also appear prone
to property rights discrimination.21 To further this analysis, I estimate two models
20Recall, however, the statistical significance of the coefficient on democratic regimes in Table 4.9.
21Interestingly, this result may depend on the role of military coercion in hybrid regimes. Of the 753 country-years
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of firm-level confidence that allow selectorate institutions to inform the country-level
conditional mean of property rights confidence, though not the effect of firm-level
characteristics. The first model is based on the measures of the size of the selectorate
and winning coalition, as discussed above.
pij = β0j + α ∗ Zij + εij
β0j = γ00 + γ01 ∗ Sj + γ02 ∗Wj + γ03 ∗ Sj ∗Wj + δ0j(4.12)
pij = γ00 + γ01 ∗ Sj + γ02 ∗Wj + γ03 ∗ Sj ∗Wj + α ∗ Zij + (εij + δ0j)
The second model substitutes the number of years a country spent under Geddes’
six non-democratic regime types. In this case, the base category is ten years as a
democracy, to allow a more instructive set of comparisons between democracies and
non-democracies. Table 4.12 contains the results of these two models. The firm-level
effects, displayed in the first panel of the table, are consistent with those in previous
estimates; larger, state-owned, manufacturing, younger, and exporting firms tend to
enjoy stronger protection of their private property rights. Conversely, foreign firms,
all else equal, do not evince grater confidence in their private property rights.
Our estimates of Equation 4.12, contained in Column 1, echo previous results using
Bueno de Mesquita et al’s (2003) measures of S and W . The negative sign of the
coefficient on S indicates that for countries with a small winning coalition, increasing
the size of the selectorate generally decreases confidence in private property rights, as
the selectorate theory might expect; however that effect is highly insignificant. The
positive sign and statistical significance on the size of the winning coalition might
instill some confidence that more democratic regimes tend to better protect private
property rights generally. However, recall that this coefficient indicates the effect of
coded as hybrid authoritarian, 503 of those years (66.8%) had a military component.
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increasing W when S = 0, which is to some degree non-sensical, since W cannot
exceed S as a proportion of the population. The sign of the interaction term is
negative, inferring that as S increases the effect of W decreases, which runs opposite
to the predictions of the selectorate theory. Comparing the sizes of coefficients,
we can see that at S = 1, the effect of increasing W is slightly negative, inferring
that moving from a large-S, medium-W regime to a mass democracy will decrease
firm managers’ confidence, all else equal. Similarly, the statistical insignificance of
S infers that changing the loyalty norm in smaller-W regimes has little effect on a
firm’s property rights confidence.
Table 4.12: The Selectorate Theory and Property Rights
Variable
Intercept -0.025 0.81 −0.0750.00
Firm-Level
Size 0.0040.00 0.0040.00





Country-Level Intercept Effects: S and W
Selectorate (S) −0.0840.44
Winning Coalition (W ) 0.670.05
S ∗W −0.690.05










Cell entries are coeffcients with p-valuessuper−scripted.
The second column of Table 4.12 displays the effect of selectorate institutions as
coded with Geddes’ taxonomy of non-demcoratic regime (1999, 2003). As in Ta-
ble 4.9, each coefficient represents the effect on a firm manager’s property rights
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confidence of a year as that regime type; since the base category is ten years spent as
a democracy, each of these coefficients represents the effect of an extra year spent as
a particular kind of non-democracy. The positive coefficients on all non-demoratic
regime types indicates that no non-democratic regime type, all else equal, reduces
property rights confidence relative to democracy. The converse, however is often
true. Monarchies improve property rights confidence at p = 0.08. Single-party
regimes improve property rights confidence at = p = .01 and personalist regimes
improve property rights confidence at p = .03. Only military and hybrid regimes
are statistically indistinguishable from democracies. Using Wald tests based on Ta-
ble 4.12, there is no statistically significant difference in firm managers’ reported
property rights confidence among non-democracies.
Table 4.13 completes this analysis by comparing the predicted level of property
rights confidence for a domestic, privately owned, non-exporting, five-year old man-
ufacturing firm with 20 employees in different political institutional settings. Ta-
ble 4.13 returns to our ideal regime types using the continuous measures of W and
S. Firm managers in democratic and medium-W , large-S regimes tend to pro-
fess lower property rights confidence, whereas firm managers in small-W , large-S
regimes report higher confidence. However, the difference between regimes, all else
equal, is somewhat small. The predictions do little to support the selectorate the-
ory’s prediction of higher overall property rights confidence in large-W regimes. The
emergence of small-W , small-S regimes as those with the most property rights con-
fidence contrasts with its position as the regime type with the highest variation in
firms’ assessment. Similarly, large-W and medium-W regimes, previously found to
exhibit lower variation in property rights confidence, here are reported as lower con-
fidence. Together, the results suggest that small-W , small-S regimes gravitate to a
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high-mean, high-variation equilibrium, whereas other regime types tend towards a
low-mean, low-variation outcome.
Table 4.13: Predicted Level of Property Rights Confidence
Type of regime Prediction
Large W (W = .45; S = .9; W/S = .5) -0.039
Small W , Small S (W = .1; S = .2; W/S = .5) 0.050
Medium W , Large S (W = .35; S = .9; W/S = .39) -0.044
4.4.3 Property Rights Discrimination and the Selectorate Theory
Initial statistical testing has found weak evidence that firm managers in regimes
report lower property rights confidence, accompanied by less variation in their re-
sponses. This evidence suggests a low-mean, low-variation tendency in such regimes.
Nevertheless, such testing fails to test fully the implications of Chapter 2’s adaptation
of the selectorate theory, as encapsulated in in Figures 2.2 through 2.4 and Table 4.4.
According to Chapter 2, a firm manager’s confidence in her private property rights
depends on her political grouping — in the winning coalition, in the selectorate, but
not in the winning coalition, or out of the selectorate completely — and the size of
those groupings. Assuming we could measure firm-level membership in the winning
coalition and selectorate, we might estimate the following model.
pij = β0j + β1j ∗ sij + β2j ∗ wij + εij
β0j = γ00 + γ01 ∗ Sj + γ02 ∗Wj + γ03 ∗ Sj ∗Wj + δ0j(4.13)
β1j = γ10 + γ11 ∗ Sj + γ12 ∗Wj + γ13 ∗ Sj ∗Wj + δ1j
β2j = γ20 + γ21 ∗ Sj + γ22 ∗Wj + γ23 ∗ Sj ∗Wj + δ2j
In the preceding set of equations, pij is a measure of firm-level confidence in
property rights for firm i in country j; sij is a measure of whether firm i in country
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j is in the selectorate; wij is a measure of whether firm i in country j is in the
selectorate and the winning coalition; and Sj and Wj are measures of the size of the
selectorate and winning coalition for country j, respectively.22
Equation 4.13 shows the firm-level relationship of particular interest theoretically
— the effect of a firm’s political grouping (i.e., membership in the selectorate and/or
winning coalition) on firm confidence in property rights protection. The intercept
term is a function of the national-level political institutions, as is the effect of sij and
wij. Substituting yields in the following interactive model:
pij = γ00 + γ01 ∗ Sj + γ02 ∗Wj + γ03 ∗ Sj ∗Wj + δ0j
+ sij ∗ (γ10 + γ11 ∗ Sj + γ12 ∗Wj + γ13 ∗ Sj ∗Wj + δ1j)(4.14)
+ wij ∗ (γ20 + γ21 ∗ Sj + γ22 ∗Wj + γ23 ∗ Sj ∗Wj + δ2j)
Multiplying the interaction terms and rearranging yields:
pij = γ00 + (γ01 ∗ Sj + γ02 ∗Wj + γ03 ∗ Sj ∗Wj)
+ γ10 ∗ sij + γ11 ∗ sij ∗ Sj + γ12 ∗ sij ∗Wj + γ13 ∗ sij ∗ Sj ∗Wj
+ γ20 ∗ wij + γ21 ∗ wij ∗ Sj + γ22 ∗ wij ∗Wj + γ23 ∗ wij ∗ Sj ∗Wj(4.15)
+ εij + δ0j + sij ∗ δ1j + wij ∗ δ2j + sij ∗ wij ∗ δ3j
As specified in above, the model results in the following predictions for the three
political groupings by regime type. Equation 4.15 echoes Table 4.4 in displaying the
22One may be tempted to characterize the firm-level political groupings differently, inserting a separate proxy for
membership in the winning coalition and an multiplicative interaction term of the selectorate and winning coalition
proxies (i.e., β2j ∗wij ∗ sij). Doing so would have the advantage of including all constituent terms. However, in this
case one of the constituent terms (wij) does not logically exist (i.e., a firm cannot be in the winning coalition without
being in the selectorate). If a firm is in the selectorate, pij = β0j + β1j . If the firm is in the winning coalition, then
pij = β0j +β2j . If the firm is neither, then pij = β0j Therefore, the effect of moving from the selectorate but outside
of the winning coalition into the winning coalition is equal to β2j − β1j .
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predicted value of pij for each of the three types of political groupings in each of the
three types of firms.23
Table 4.14: Multi-Level Model’s Predictions for Property Rights Discrimination
Membership in . . .
Type of regime W & S S (not W) Neither
Large W, Large S (γ00 + γ01 + γ02 + γ03)+ (γ00 + γ01 + γ02 + γ03)+ γ00 + γ01 + γ02 + γ03
(γ20 + γ21 + γ22 + γ23) (γ10 + γ11 + γ12 + γ13)
Small W, Small S γ00 + γ20 γ00 + γ10 γ00
Small W, Large S (γ00 + γ01) + (γ20 + γ21) (γ00 + γ01) + (γ10 + γ11) γ00 + γ01
The main impediment to estimating such a model is the measurement of sij and
wij. How would we know that a firm inhabits the winning coalition? The selectorate?
Neither? Unfortunately, as hinted in the introduction to this chapter, these questions
remain difficult to answer. In all likelihood, membership in the selectorate and win-
ning coalition is defined by a set of rules that vary across countries. In one country,
membership may be defined by gender and in another by ethnic group. Furthermore,
defining how firms fit into the selectorate theory’s trichotomous depiction of political
groupings also engenders a number of questions. The challenge, as with the creation
of the political influence variable discussed in Section 4.3 remains creating firm-level
measures on the basis not of firm native characteristics, but the reporting of politi-
cal activity that could proxy for membership in one of the political groupings. One
strategy might make use of data from the ES on membership in business associa-
tions, which could be thought of as groups legally allowed to lobby on the behalf
their members. We could then define winning coalition membership as the value of
the business association, size, or the firm’s reporting of political influence. However,
none of these strategies, nor others attempted as part of this process, capture the
interaction of selectorate and winning coalition satisfactorily. Most importantly, in
23This depiction over-simplifies the selectorate theory by assuming that “small” infers a size of 0 and “large” infers
a size of 1.0. For the ease of presentation, I use this formulation.
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many countries the proportion of firms coded as in the selectorate and/or winning
coalition did not correspond to national-level measures (e.g., in a democracy, only
a small fraction of firms were coded as being in the selectorate). Despited repeated
attempts, these data likely render the estimation of Equation 4.15 impossible.
As in Section 4.3, we might test whether the size of the selectorate and winning
coalition condition the firm-level effect of political influence, firm size, etc., postu-
lating that selectorate institutions shift the nature of the collective action problem.
Though not as theoretically satisfying, such models would offer an initial investi-
gation in property rights discrimination across different sizes of the selectorate and
winning coalition, lending further credence to Table 4.9’s preliminary finding that,
depending on measurement, large-W regimes have lower variation in the distribution
of property rights confidence among firm managers. Analysis along these lines has
revealed little evidence of diverging patterns of property rights discrimination among
different sizes of the selectorate and winning coalition. For example, the effect of a
firm’s political influence — which I found to be larger in autocratic regimes in Sec-
tion 4.3 and specifically Table 4.7 — does not vary meaningfully across selectorate
institutions.
4.5 Conclusions: Studying Property Rights Discrimination with Firm-
level Surveys
The last two chapters have been dedicated to a statistical study of the shape,
economic consequences, and political institutional origins of property rights discrim-
ination, all using firm-level data from the World Bank. Whereas Chapter 3 sought
to quantify the macroeconomic repercussions of property rights discrimination, this
chapter has focused on its political origins.
We may summarize this chapter’s results as follows. There is strong empirical sup-
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port for the collective action conceptualization of bargaining over property rights.
Larger, state-owned, and exporting firms tend to enjoy higher property rights con-
fidence, as this approach might expect. In contrast, the results on democracy are
mixed. In general, firms in democratic countries generally exhibit lower property
rights confidence. However, it does not seem that that lower property rights confi-
dence emanates from an effort on the part of democratic politicians to expropriate
the property of richer citizens and redistribute it to the poor. In fact, democracy is
the only regime type in which firm size has a positive and statistically significant ef-
fect on property rights confidence. Altogether, Chapter 2’s implications for firm size
and democracy are not supported here. However, tentative evidence suggests that
overall variation in property rights confidence is lower in more democratic countries
and that autocratic regimes more likely have a distorted sample of firms. Finally,
there is some evidence that the autocratic advantage disappears when we control
for firm-level political influence. In autocratic countries, political influence plays a
major role in a firm’s ability to gain protection of its private property rights, whereas
in mixed regimes and democracies, that effect is statistically indistinguishable from
0.
This chapter’s testing of Chapter 2’s adaptation of the selectorate theory reveals
a similar pattern. There, I argue that the selectorate theory of Bueno de Mesquita
and his co-authors (2003) makes a series of precise predictions regarding property
rights discrimination. Unfortunately, those predictions prove nearly impossible to
test using these data. The statistical analysis of the theory necessitates firm-level
measures of membership in the selectorate and winning coalition. Despite careful
attempts, these measures prove impossible to create with any confidence in their
utility. Consequently, the selectorate theory is tested only superficially. I find that
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large-W regimes are characterized by lower variation in firm managers’ property
rights confidence, but also lower mean confidence. In contrast, small-W , small-S
regimes are characterized by higher mean confidence with more variation. A more
definitive set of tests of the selectorate theory’s effect on property rights confidence
must await better firm-level measures of political characteristics.
CHAPTER V
Property Rights Discrimination in Colombia: Land, Coffee,
and Reform, 1870-1936
5.1 Introduction
Chapters 3 and 4’s statistical analysis accomplishes several goals, depicting em-
pirically the existence of property rights discrimination among firms and providing
tentative evidence of its origins and consequences. However, there is good reason
to supplement this analysis with a more qualitative exploration of property rights
discrimination, utilizing small-n research methods. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2,
political economists have focused little attention even on the possibility of property
rights discrimination, either implicitly or explicitly assuming that the public goods
aspects of property rights protections are paramount. Thus, a major focus of this
dissertation is to posit that the phenomenon exists at all. In this sense, small-n
research can be enormously useful. Geertz (1973) argues that “thick description”
may be used in case study research to more clearly understand the meaning of a
construct and how that meaning depends on context (Geertz, 1973). In this disser-
tation, case analysis can hone our definition of property rights discrimination and
how it is executed. Similarly, Collier (1991) contends that thick description provides
a “parallel demonstration of theory,” highlighting whether a proposed causal pro-
cess is reflected. Lieberman’s (2005) defense of “nested analysis” recommends that
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scholars combine statistical analysis with the close analysis of one or more carefully
chosen cases from the statistical analysis.
Therefore, the state of research into property rights institutions, need for greater
validation of the concept of property rights discrimination, and relatively weak sta-
tistical results all suggest the utility of small-N analysis. Therefore, in this chapter, I
shift focus and method, carefully elaborating a detailed case study of property rights
discrimination. The focus of this research is not theory testing, but an elaboration
of the concept of property rights discrimination and the identification of potential
factors that drive it.1 In it, I study a series of conflicts over land rights in Colombia,
beginning in 1870 and ending with the passage of a comprehensive land reform law,
Law 200 of 1936. The series of conflicts over property rights to land and contracts
sharing land rights closely resemble Chapter 2’s theory of the origins of property
rights institutions. Fifty years after its independence, nearly 75% of Colombia re-
mained vacant, the result of the country’s arduous geography and poor transporta-
tion networks. A jumble of legal rules and titles theoretically governed land rights,
including decrees to encourage colonization, land titles dating back to the colonial
era, and land concessions of unclear size and shape granted by a frequently insolvent
Colombian government. Little conflict emerged out of this confusion over private
property rights, however, until a major shift in the Colombian economy beginning
in the 1850s, but finding its fullest expression in the 1870s and into the twentieth
century — the insertion of Colombia into the world economy and the rapid expansion
of coffee production (Kalmanovitz 2003; Palacios 1980; Safford and Palacios 2002).
These changes raised the relative value of unexploited Colombian land and revealed
1Lieberman (2005) envisions “model-building small-N analysis” in response to a lack of robust results that sup-
port the theory under analysis. Such analysis should suggest a new model with empirically verifiable implications.
However, I do diverge from Lieberman’s nested analysis approach by analyzing case not included in the statistical
analysis.
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the inadequacy of extant institutions governing access to those lands.
As Chapter 2 predicts, deficiencies in property rights institutions combined with
greater demand for land caused two stages of conflict. Section 5.2 discusses how
Colombians flocked to uncultivated areas in search for land suitable for planting cof-
fee. This race to enclose land created conflicts between and among peasant farmers,
urban merchants, and holders of ambiguous titles to uncultivated land. Intent on
capturing the gains from coffee production, these actors competed over land rights,
using both legal and extra-legal methods to cement their claims. Despite several
attempts at the national level to promote small settlers’ goals, the weakness of the
national government left political bargaining to land rights to local and regional gov-
ernments, usually friendly to larger landowners’ interests. The result of these initial
conflicts was a more concentrated ownership of land and a particular set of contracts
between large estate owners and tenant farmers that furthered the formers’ interests.
Section 5.3 then reviews how the economic dislocations of the coffee industry, com-
bined with new forms of collective action among peasants, intensified these conflicts
and led to violence in the countryside. This led to a new round of political bargain-
ing, this at the national level. I show how the rigidly bipartisan nature of Colombia’s
political system limited peasants’ ability to advocate for recognition of their rights,
leading to land reform legislation that in the long-run favored large estate owners.
The experience of Colombian land reforms help us understand how property rights
discrimination can develop and hint at its fundamental origins.
5.2 First Stage: Allocating Land Rights
Between Colombia’s independence in 1819 and the 1870s, land rights did not
cause a great deal of social or political conflict, aside from the issue of lands owned
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by the Catholic Church. Colombia’s obstinate geography and post-independence
economic stagnation created little need to exploit the 75% of territory estimated
to be bald́ıos, or public lands. A jumble of institutions governed land access and,
although land rights remained unclear, they did not materialize as a major area of
conflict. In short, Colombians felt little need to claim a resource that seemingly held
little economic promise. However, a series of changes to the Colombian economy
awakened hunger for land, most prominently increases in demand for coffee and
concomitant emergence an export economy based on agricultural products, rather
than gold. Waves of Colombians of diverse social origins sought to appropriate land
rights to begin growing bananas and coffee for export. That race to cultivate land
previously thought worthless created conflicts that prevailing institutions could not
contain.
5.2.1 Land Rights Before the 1850s
Colombia’s combination of mountains, coastline, jungles, and extensive plans
makes it one of the most diverse countries in the world in terms of biodiversity. How-
ever, its rugged terrain remains, even today, one of its foremost challenges — and
a starting point for accounts of the country’s political and economic challenges. As
shown in Figure 5.1, the Andes stretch northwards from the border with Ecuador,
dividing into three cordilleras or ranges. The Andes divide Colombia into three
main regions, which mostly have developed separate economies (Safford and Pala-
cios 2002). The easternmost cordillera demarcates an eastern zone, anchored by the
capital city of Bogotá consists of the valley of the Magdalena River and the flanks
of the cordillera itself, stretching north as far as Pamplona. The western zone en-
compasses the area between the central and eastern cordilleras, with the valley of
the Cauca River in between the two ranges, centered on Medelĺın, a city that fig-
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ures prominently in the remainder of this case study. Finally, the Atlantic coast
dominated by the port cities of Cartagena, Barranquilla, and Santa Marta. The
difficulty of traversing the Andes figures prominently in explanations of the difficulty
of asserting truly national rule from Bogotá.
Figure 5.1: Map of Colombia
Colombia’s unyielding geography also partially explains the concentration of Colom-
bia’s population, beginning during the colonial period and continuing through to-
day. The Italian geographer Agust́ın Codazzi estimates during the 1850s that ap-
proximately 75% of Colombia’s area consisted of terrenos bald́ıos, or public lands
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(LeGrand 1986)2 The lack of colonization brings into question the legal status of un-
claimed lands. Theoretically speaking, the whole of the territory in Spanish America
was the property of the King of Spain, although tracts of land were granted to sub-
jects for development. Three waves of Spanish explorers claimed the territory that
would become Colombia. Leading an expedition from Santa Marta along the At-
lantic Coast,Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada founded Bogotá in 1558 after defeating
the Muiscas, who had settled densely in the surrounded areas (Bushnell 1993). Soon
afterwards, another wave of conquistadores led by Sebastián de Belalcázar, a lieu-
tenant of Pizarro, arrived from Peru. Soon afterwards, a Germany company arrived
as part of an effort to recover debts incurred by the spanish. Eventually, the three
groups submitted their claims to the Spanish Crown who, ironically, allocated the
new area to the son of the governor of Santa Marta (Bushnell 1993: 11). Each of the
three explorers earned certain sets of rights to explore other areas.
With permanent Colombian independence in 1819, ownership of bald́ıos passed
to the democratically elected government of Gran Colombia, a confederation of
Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and Colombia. According to LeGrand (1986), colonial
land grants interspersed with bald́ıos in much of the country, virtually untouched
by any native population or subsequent Spanish exploration. The loss of records
from the colonial period, unclear demarcation of colonial land grants, a shortage of
trained surveyors, and the weakness of the Colombian government created a context
in which, according to LeGrand (1986) “property rights in land were not clearly
defined” (6). The early republican period did little to alleviate the confusing legal
status of land in Colombia. Frequent civil war bankrupted the government which
turned to the bald́ıos as a source of revenue and a means to paying its debts (Colom-
2Strictly speaking the word bald́ıo translates as “wasteland.” However, it is more commonly used to denote
unclaimed public lands and I therefore rely on that definition here.
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bia 1931; LeGrand 1986). Beginning in 1838, the Colombian Congress issued waves
of public debt payable in land, with no limit on the size of the land grants or the
number of land grants one citizen could acquire (LeGrand 1986: 11-12). Such land
certificates first served as rewards to soldiers in the wars of independence and later
as remuneration to victors in Colombia’s periodic civil wars (Safford and Palacios
2002: 157).
Given the lack of a comprehensive land census during this period, it is difficult to
re-construct land redistribution for this period. However, records do exist for land
concessions between 1823 and 1931, thanks to a report of the Colombian Ministry of
Industries (Colombia 1931) that recorded land concessions for the entire republican
period. Table 5.1 records the number of concessions by their size and calculates
the percentage of public lands granted for each category.3 To understand Table 5.1
better, we can rely on Machado’s (1988: 93) classification of farm sizes. He classifies
farms with fewer than 3 hectares of land as minifundios, or small farms, whereas
those between 3 and 12 hectares as family farms. Palacios (1980: 176) sets these
limits slightly differently, defining a small farm as having fewer than 10 hectares of
land and a medium-sized family farm as fewer than 50 hectares. With this basis in
mind, Table 5.1 signals that the Colombian government generally distributed land
in large estates. Small holders obtaining fewer than 10 hectares received only .12%
of land allocated during the period. Put differently, only about 42 hectares of land
per year were allocated to small land holders during this period. Nearly half of
allocations went to medium-sized holdings, but these still comprise only 2.8% of the
total land allocated. In contrast, over 79% of land was dedicated to large estates, or
3A hectare equals 10,000 square meters; a square that is 100 meters on each side covers one hectare. To calculate
the total area for each category, I assume that all allocations in each category were for the maximal size (i.e., 9.9
hectares each for the first category, 49.9 for the second, etc.) Assuming instead that each allocation is for the average
size in each category does not alter Table 5.1’s conclusions regarding the relative extent of land allocations by more
than half a percentage point.
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Size (in Area in 000s
hectares) Allocations (%) hectares (%)
0 — 10 627 (10.6%) 4.7 (0.12%)
10 — 50 2,690 (45.6%) 111.8 (2.8%)
50 — 100 689 (11.7%) 68.8 (1.7%)
100 — 1,000 1,253 (21.2%) 645.5 (16.2%)
1,000 + 645 (10.9%) 3,146.9 (79.1%)
Total 5,904 (100%) 3,977.6 (100%)
Table 5.1: Land Adjudications, 1823-1931
latifundios, that contained 1,000 hectares or more.
Table 5.1 provides evidence supporting the proposition that frequent insolvency
forced successive Colombian governments to allocate lands in large tracts to pay
debts to bond holders. In contrast, Colombian law problematized the allocation
of land to squatters. Peasants often opted for what one Colombian historian has
called a “precarious independence” by squatting on public lands and engaging in
subsistence farming (Kalmanovitz 2003: 106). Until reforms in the 1870s and 1880s,
however, their occupation could not form the basis of legal title under Colombian
law (LeGrand 1986: 12; Colombia 1931). Kalmanovitz (2003: 124) estimates that at
most 0.05% of adjudicated public lands went to small cultivators until 1881. Instead,
politicians hoped to use land policy to attract foreign immigrants and pay debts, goals
it satisfied only superficially (Safford and Palacios 2002: 158).
By the middle of the nineteenth century, then, a hodgepodge of different rules and
titles regulated the appropriation of public lands, or bald́ıos. Neither citizens nor gov-
ernment could distinguish clearly between publicly and privately owned lands. The
insufficiency of property rights institutions, however, failed to spur serious economic
or legal conflict over land ownership.4 This lack of conflict reflected the relatively
4Politicians did, however, frequently sparred over two land rights issues. The first concerned lands owned by
the Roman Catholic Church, which more conservative politicians generally wished to preserve. The second involved
resguardos, or reservations, collectively held by the relatively small population of indigenous peoples, which, again,
the Liberal Party generally wished to convert to private property and the Conservative Property wished to preserve
(Safford and Palacios 2002: 136-7).
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somnolent post-independence economy. The wars of independence had depressed
the economy and the malaise persisted, particularly on the Atlantic Coast (Safford
and Palacios 2002). Gold mining, Colombia’s primary colonial enterprise, recovered
only slowly from the instability of independence, apart from the region of Antioquia,
centered on Medelĺın in the west of the country. The population of the country grew
only slowly — about 1.5% per year between 1825 and 1905, according to one esti-
mate — and the population of particular regions, such as Cali in the southwest of
the country, decreased (Kalmanovitz 2003: 106). Agricultural technology remained
somewhat backwards, as did transportation (Kalmanovitz 2003: 107). Furthermore,
recession in Europe between 1820 and 1850 squashed hopes for exports during this
period (Kalmanovitz 2003: 111-112). Roughly 85% of the population worked in rural
areas, mostly in the highlands areas in the east (Kalmanovitz 2003). In combination
with the difficulty of creating a truly national market due to geography, these fac-
tors created an economy dominated by intra-regional economic activity and sparse
prospects for international trade (Ocampo 1984: 100).
5.2.2 Coffee and Conflict
By the middle of the century, however, political and economic factors slowly began
to transform this stagnation into dynamism. First, Colombia’s two dominant politi-
cal parties managed to forge a consensus in favor of free trade about the mid-1840s,
fusing the Liberal Party’s more radically liberal faction, known as the gólgotas, with
a strain within the Conservative Party that saw free trade as a means to republi-
can order.5 Second, demand for Latin American goods generally increased with the
conclusion of civil war in the United States and the recovery of Europe’s economy
5Palacios (1980: 2-3) qualifies this description of Colombian politics by emphasizing continuing differences among
the parties and the power of regional governments during this period to legislate policy that differed from the national
government’s.
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(Legrand 1986: xiii). Slowly, an export economy based on agricultural products be-
gan to develop, beginning with a series of generally short-lived commodities booms
in tobacco, cinchona bark, and cotton. Despite the eventual collapse of each of these
booms, Colombian exports began to rise after a steady deterioration since indepen-
dence, recovering pre-independence levels by the early 1870s (Ocampo 1984: 89).
However, it was coffee that thrust Colombia onto the international economic stage,
particularly after about 1870, helped along by increasing demand for the product in
Europe and especially the United States (Palacios 1980: 14).6 Two particular char-
acteristics of coffee quickly had an immediate effect on its production in Colombia.
First, coffee trees require a particular climate to thrive. Coffee generally favors
middle altitudes, favoring altitudes of about 1,000 to 1,800 meters (about 3,300 to
5,900 feet), as opposed to the highlands of highly populated areas, which can exceed
Bogotá’s elevation of 8,600 feet (LeGrand 1986: 14). This climactic requirement
increased the relative value of land along the middle altitudes of Colombia’s unex-
plored mountains, precisely where a hodgepodge of large land concessions, unclaimed
colonial titles, squatters, collective settlements, and public lands. Second, the cycle
of coffee production favors small and medium-sized family farms. Coffee is easily
grown alongside more traditional foodstuffs and its labor-intensive growing cycle
favors family production.
These factors created a groundswell of migration to Colombia’s frontiers, as set-
tlers cleared previously unexplored land in the hopes of growing coffee. In the west,
they moved south from Medelĺın, building new towns such as Manizales, Armenia,
and Pereira, in an episode generally considered to be transformative for Colombian
history. In the east, a second wave drove from Bogotá into previous unexplored por-
6Bananas also played a major part in exports in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly
along the more tropical Atlantic coast. However, I focus on coffee here.
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tions of Cundinamarca and Boyacá, particularly the region known as Sumapaz south
and east, stretching across the borders of Cundinamarca and Tolima (Marulanda
1991). The initial stages of exploration usually brought peasant farmers, known in
Colombia as colonos. LeGrand (1986) explores the origins of colonos, concluding
that they constituted a diverse range of multi-generational squatting families, blacks
who had withdrawn from white society after the abolition, and indigenous and mixed
indigenous-Spanish peasants who descended from the highlands. Pushed by chronic
political instability that often resulted in forced drafts of peasants, advertisements
by land entrepreneurs, and low wages, colonos pushed into the multiple Colombian
frontiers, clearing multiple parcels of land in order to diversify production and sell
lands to families arriving in the area later (LeGrand 1986: 24). Confined to sub-
sistence farming in the first few years of settlement, colonos turned afterwards to
profitable commercial crops, particularly coffee (LeGrand 1986: 24). In this effort,
they could build profit-making parcels within several years of settlement.
Historians studying Colombia have tended to emphasize the importance of the
colonos to the colonization of previously untouched portions of Colombia. However,
the upper and middle classes also readily sought access to public lands and, for many
historians, were primarily responsible for the shape of colonization (Palacios 1980:
25). In many cases, these land entrepreneurs represented the very upper stratum
of Colombian society, families that had attained influence since the colonial era.
However, many were drawn from more recently prominent families, usually from
urban areas, who had attained wealth as merchants, lawyers, or bankers (LeGrand
1986: 33). Regardless, they tended towards great wealth and political influence.
For many of these aspiring landowners, land represented a means to diversify their
holdings (Palacios 1980). They hoped to produce coffee for export on a large scale
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and profit from the sale of land.7
Land entrepreneurs’ desire to create latifundios, or large estates, brought them di-
rectly into conflict with colonos, however. As we have already seen, property rights
institutions largely could not distinguish between publicly owned bald́ıos and pri-
vately held lands, creating large areas of undefined borders, absentee owners, and
unexploited titles. Colonos could expropriate private property purely out of igno-
rance, since public and private lands intermingled without clear markers. Moreover,
prospective hacendados, or large estate owners, frequently targeted colonos ’ lands
for expropriation (LeGrand 1986: 37). Land entrepreneurs recognized that colonos
had often chosen the most fertile land with access to markets in urban areas. Their
improvements to the land, or mejoras, augmented the market value of the land and
decreased the time and effort to ready the land for production and put coffee on the
market, of great value to upper and middle class entrepreneurs with little use for a
period of subsistence agriculture. Palacios (1980: 36) estimates that for prospective
hacendados, five years were necessary to clear the land and ready it for production,
requiring capital spending on the purchase of the land, machinery and tools, and
contracting a labor force. Half the expenditure was concentrated in the first year,
particularly purchasing the land, pushing landowners into debt (ibid). By the turn
of the century, the price of land had risen dramatically (ibid). By appropriating land
that had already been cleared, hacendados could slash their fixed costs.
Intensifying entrepreneurs’ desire for already settled tracts of land was the pres-
ence of the colonos themselves. As peasant farmers sought their independence, the
available labor force dwindled, presenting challenges to hacendados hoping to cre-
ate large estates with cheap labor. In 1907, a municipal council put the matter as
7Colonos also speculated on land values, though on a smaller scale (LeGrand 1986: 27).
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follows:
Here the majority of the hacendados have taken over vast zones of public
lands and even parts of the Indian resguardos that they neither work them-
selves nor allow others to work. By monopolizing the land they aim only to
undermine the position of the independent cultivators so as to form from
their ranks groups of dependent laborers. (Public Land Archives, Volume
42. Quoted in LeGrand 1986: 39)
Large investors generally appeared after colonos already had improved the lands
and increased their value, usually somewhere between ten and thirty years after the
original arrival of settlers (LeGrand 1986: 39-40).
Hacendados ’ and colonos ’ claims to land clearly conflicted. At the heart of the
conflict lay the allocation of rights to valuable resources, which would affect the
distribution of gains to economic activity. In a deeper sense, the conflicts pitted
two visions of economic development. Whereas colonos envisioned small-scale in-
dependent production of coffee, which eventually would necessitate the legalization
of their claims. Meanwhile, hacendados foresaw large commercial estates utilizing
cheap labor (i.e., colonos). Certainly, the efficiency of coffee production and the
larger Colombian economy also hung in the balance. However, the main competition
revolved around individual gains and competing claims to land rights. This clash
often took place within the legal and bureaucratic institutions of the Colombian
government. As we have seen, Colombian regulations of land tenure, while weak,
generally did not take up the issue of squatters’ rights, leaving questions regarding
squatters’ rights largely unanswered. However, in 1874 and again in 1882, the na-
tional government passed legislation that favored colonos’ land rights, reflecting a
newfound dedication to stimulate rural production. Law 61 of 1874 enshrined for
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the first time the legal principle that public property could be acquired through
cultivation, with the construction of a dwelling and planting of crops proof of posses-
sion (LeGrand 14-15; Palacios 1980: 172). Furthermore, land adjudicated to colonos
could include twice the area than that under cultivation (ibid). The legislation also
encouraged colonos to apply for legal title to their lands in order to solidify their
claims and allow the legal sale or mortgage of their plots (LeGrand 15, 84). In short,
national policies seemed, at least generally, to favor colonos’ claims to land rights
and, with those claims, colonos’ vision of a small-holding rural production.
Despite the repeated endorsement of occupation as the legal basis of ownership,
the legal framework remained tilted towards hacendados, for two main reasons. Dur-
ing the same period, the national government passed Law 57 of 1905 that regulated
eviction procedures for squatters on privately held lands. Article 15 read as follows:
When a landed estate has been occupied de facto without the intervention
of a rental or tenancy contract and without the consent of the owner, the
chief of police before whom the complaint is made will go to said estate
within forty-eight hours after the written presentation of the complaint;
and if the occupants cannot show tenancy contracts or if they conceal
themselves, he will proceed to evict them, admitting no appeals or for-
malities which might delay their removal from the property. (Colombia,
Congreso Nacional 1906: 302-303)
Taken together, these laws assumed that local officials could ascertain the veracity of
claims by hacendados that a colono had squatted on private, not public, land. If that
claim proved false, then colonos, under laws passed in 1874 and 1882, became “good
faith” occupants of the land with legal standing. Otherwise, hacendados possessed
the legal right to eject colonos.
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The resolution of land conflicts therefore devolved to local governments, a reality
reinforced by the congenital weakness of the central government and, until 1888, the
heavily federalist bent of the Colombian constitution. In particular, mayors were to
play an integral role in adjudicating disputes over land. As has been noted, most
hacendados were from urban areas. Furthermore, they often preferred to reside in
large cities, rather than on their holdings. As a result, most declined to personally
hold local offices (LeGrand 1986: 203). However, they retained a great deal of
political power through their connections to municipal officials, particularly mayors
and municipal councils (Palacios 1980: 186). Prior to 1885, departmental governors,
themselves elected by rules decided at the departmental level, appointed mayors,
who in turn depended on municipal councils for their salaries. After 1885 and the
elimination of federalism in a new constitution, governors also became appointees,
in this case of the President of the Republic. In both events, rich hacendados appear
to have successfully influenced the appointment of mayors through their connections
in departmental capitals and Bogotá itself, as well as their influence on municipal
councils (LeGrand 1986: 74). A National Labor Office report in 1930 stated that:
Municipal authorities are in the habit of constantly abusing Law 57 of
1905 . . . . Colonos and their families very often are despoiled by the
misapplication of this statute which, in turth, has become a legal betrayal
of our poor citizens. (Quoted in LeGrand 1986: 82)
Judges, too, proved generally sympathetic to hacendado claims and, when more
inclined to the colonos, found their rulings ignored by municipal councils and mayors.
The weakness of the national government, continuing confusion concerning land
ownership, and hacendados’ power at the local level combined to create an ideal envi-
ronment for hacendados to gain legal recognition of their rights and the concomitant
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economic benefits. They possessed a variety of legal and administrative instruments
to force the allocation of land rights. Regardless, the end remained gaining rights
to colonos’ lands and bring the latter to farm their newly created haciendas. As al-
ready mentioned, land certificates were often used to obtain legal title and surveyors
often could be relied on to expand hacendados’ holdings for legal hearings (LeGrand
1986: 81-82). Hacendados’ also filed legal suits that forced the drawing of generous
boundaries and could later serve as proof of ownership (LeGrand 1986: 53-54). A
number of other tactics, some decidedly illegal, also sufficed. Landholders often col-
luded with surveyors to enlarge their holdings past that dictated by land grants and,
in many, cases simply occupied land and claimed prior ownership (LeGrand 1986:
50-51). Another common tactic consisted of obtaining a public land grant legally and
then writing deeds that claim ownership of a far larger tract than granted legally.
When colonos, thinking these adjacent lands to be bald́ıos, settled them, hacenda-
dos would allow them to do so and then re-appropriate the lands forcibly using the
forged deeds as proof and engaging the local police in the effort. Colonos, displaying
a keen recognition of their legal rights and economic self-interest, wielded the power
accorded them by national law, applying for legal title and filing lawsuits. However,
the costs of applying for legal title remained prohibitively high for peasant farmers.
Most importantly, applications required colonos to hire surveyors and lawyers to as-
certain the size of the parcel of land and manage the legal process. Although colonos
often pooled the resources to hire surveyors and lawyers, previous conflicts amongst
settler families over land could inhibit collective action to do so (LeGrand 1986).
Moreover, the length of time needed to complete the applications frustrated their
claims and opened opportunities for hacendados to use local political power to claim
the disputed land. In one case, two colonos won a superior court decision enforcing
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their legal rights to land they had cultivated for years. However, the lower district
court simply ignored the superior court’s decision in response to the hacendado’s
complaint, partially by removing all mention of the case from official bulletins, caus-
ing the colonos in question to abandon their lands to the haendados (LeGrand 1986:
85).
Often, these conflicts shifted from the legal arena to the disputed lands themselves,
as both colonos and hacendados turned to violence to defend their claims. LeGrand
(1986) documents several cases in which landowners arrived with the mayor and
police in order to evict colonos from disputed lands, which usually produced the de-
sired effect. In one case, for example, Liberal Party stalwart and coffee grower Sixto
Durán used the presence of the police to pressure over 100 settler families to sign
labor contracts and abandon their legal claims to land they had cultivated for some
time (LeGrand 1986: 78). Hacendados also turned to force, employing cuadrillas,
or gangs, to intimidate settlers into rescinding their rights. Tactics included burn-
ing down dwellings, destroying fences, confiscating work tools, and turning cattle
into their fields (LeGrand 1986: 81). Kalmanovitz (2003: 123) recounts one case
in which the Aranzazu family, which had been granted 200,000 hectares of land in
the coffee-growing western region during colonial times, sought to enforce this claim
against settlers by employing an armed band against them, which sparked a settler
uprising against the family, which caught the attention even the central government’s
attention. In fact, colonos used a number of tactics to defend their rights forcibly.
Such resistance often consisted of refusing to abandon disputed lands. Upon evic-
tion by police, many colonos would re-occupy lands, harvesting their crops until
re-discovered (LeGrand 1986: 67). In one case, a dispute over thousands of hectares
of land ended with colonos ransacking the office of the company that claimed their
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land (ibid). However, in most cases they found themselves forced, often forcibly, to
recognize legal titles presented by hacendados.
5.2.3 Economic and Institutional Consequences
With the rise in the relative value of previously unexplored land, hacendados and
colonos clashed over rights to resources whose ownership remained opaque, due to
the jumble of often conflicting colonial titles, post-independence concessions, and
national laws regarding the basis of property ownership. An intriguing regularity in
this narrative, consistent with the idea of property rights discrimination, is how both
sides of these disputes claimed legal rights, though they differed in their ability to
have those claims recognized and enforced. Put differently, a simple injunction to
“protect private property rights” would not suffice to resolve conflicting claims to land
whose ownership remained blurred. Instead, the resolution of these disputes required
a mechanism to adjudicate claims according to transparent guidelines, as well as
choose between competing visions of the social functions of private property and
hacendados’ vision of an efficient coffee industry based on large estates. National laws
fitfully sought to create rules to guide that adjudication by establishing occupancy
and cultivation as the legal bases of property ownership, in line with a consensus
in favor of encouraging colonization. However, hacendados’ local political power
and the weakness of the central government subverted any attempt to implement
a transparent process of adjudication. The delineation of private property rights
to disputed lands took place primarily in an administrative no man’s land, which
allowed hacendados’ to utilize a series of legal and extra-legal measures to tilt the
allocation of bald́ıos in their favor.
We can describe a series of institutional and economic repercussion of this first
wave of land conflicts. Though the nature of the conflicts itself complicates a pre-
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cise description of the distribution that resulted from these ongoing conflicts in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it appears that hacendados success-
fully shaped the process of colonization. In doing so, they implemented particular
property rights institutions in which they shared rights to cultivation with colonos
in a way that advanced their economic interests. These arrangements deserve closer
analysis, particularly due to their role in the second wave of conflicts in the 1920s
and 1930s described in Section 5.3. Recall that large-scale coffee production required
large start-up costs and a long lead-time until profitability, as well as a labor force
often absent from the latifundios. By winning disputes over land rights, hacenda-
dos created a landless peasant labor force and freed themselves to institute systems
of tenant farming. Though these agreements often remained verbal and varied sig-
nificantly over time and across regions of the country, we can briefly survey their
form here. Arrendatarios were service tenants allowed to rent a parcel of land on
an hacienda for subsistence farming, which they paid for through the obligación,
working on the hacendado’s coffee fields, particularly during harvest (Palacios 1980;
LeGrand 1986; Machado 1988).8 Additionally, the arrendatario often owed the ha-
cendado some percentage of his food crops and faced restrictions on their sale at
market. Most importantly, hacendados mostly prohibited arrendatarios from from
planting coffee and other cash crops on their parcels, preventing any competition
with small producers on their own lands. The severity of the tenant farming agree-
ments, particularly the size of the obligación, varied over time and across regions.
Machado (1988: 135) emphasizes that in many instances, the weak labor supply still
forced hacendados to offer wages to arrendatarios. In other areas, a less rigid form of
8The nomenclature of these different forms of tenant farming tends to be confusing and difficult to translate into
English. The system of tenant farming are often referred to as arrendatario, although it also referred to as agregado,
terrazguero, and concertado. The word arrendatario can refer both to the specific arrangement described here or the
more general system of tenant farming.
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share-cropping existed that consisted only in the rental of parcels of the hacienda’s
land in exchange for a percentage of the foodstuffs grown (LeGrand 1986: 88).
The institutions implemented by hacendados served their economic interests and,
as a result, Palacios (1980: 196) concludes that the coffee industry of this period
had not substantively improved peasants’ living standards, failing to create a rural
middle class or integrate peasants into a monetized economy. Instead, by the early
twentieth century, coffee income was concentrated in very few hands. Though difficult
to quantify, the various forms of share-cropping in coffee-growing regions mostly
prevented arrendatarios from gaining substantially from coffee production, since they
could not grow coffee themselves. Palacios (1980) hypothesizes that arrendatarios
were generally better off than landless day laborers. Meanwhile, hundreds of colonos
managed to retain rights to their lands, where they collectively became an important
stratum of the coffee industry, though their rights to their lands remained precarious
in the years ahead. LeGrand (1986: 89) summarizes the matter, “ . . . such patterns
of land use . . . constituted the logical outcome of an on-going historical process by
which pre-existing inequalities were projected into newly developing areas.”
What of the coffee industry as a whole? Chapter 2 hypothesizes that property
rights discrimination not only funnels economic activity into “in” group hands, but
also impairs aggregate performance. This period of disputed property rights gener-
ally produced a large expansion of the Colombian coffee exports, though subject to
continued political instability and the vagaries of the international market for coffee.
By 1910, exports of coffee were forty times levels in the 1850s, driving total exports to
heights previously unknown in Colombia. (Kalmanovitz 2002). Furthermore, many
authors credit the growth of the coffee industry with Colombia’s industrialization be-
ginning in the late 1880s (Kalmanovitz 2002; LeGrand 1986). This evidence supports
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the proposition that a discriminatory land allocation supported unequal growth, but
growth nonetheless. However, analysis of the coffee industry has also identified the
under-utilization of land. By claiming far more land than they intended to dedicate
to coffee production, most hacendados left fallow a large percentage of their holdings;
Palacios (1980: 94) estimates nearly a quarter of land was left uncultivated on aver-
age. Certainly, these conflicts introduced a measure of social instability into newly
colonized areas, which might have inhibited growth in the coffee industry, in line
with the conventional account of property rights institutions. The deeper question
of whether the coffee industry might have growth more quickly if colonos had more
frequently won land rights disputes is unclear, though Section 5.3 will analyze the
efficiency of different sizes of coffee estates.
What remains beyond doubt is that hacendados directed the production of coffee
according to their economic interests. However, by the 1920s, it was clear that
haciendas faced severe pressures from small producers and their own tenants. I turn
now to this more explosive second wave of land rights conflicts and their resolution
in Colombia’s Land Reform of 1936.
5.3 Second Stage: Social Instability and the Land Reform
During this first stage of conflicts over land rights, both colonos and hacendados
both resorted to violence to further their interests. However, the resulting disorder
only rarely exceeded a low level of intensity. Each side limited its demands to the
allocation of land rights and conflicts tended to pit individual hacendados against
small groups of colonos. Seen in the aggregate, the social instability these conflicts
introduced might seem consistent with any frontier region. In contrast, Colombia’s
economic crisis in the late 1920s and early 1930s provoked clashes over land rights
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that pitted large organizations of campesinos and hacendados against each other in
increasingly violent confrontations, arousing fears in Bogotá of a peasant revolution
that would rupture the countryside.
After World War I and Colombia’s Thousand Days War, a disastrous civil war
that witnessed the secession of Panama and the loss of thousands of lives, coffee
propelled the Colombian economy into a period of unprecedented economic growth.
Coffee exports during the 1920-1924 period had increased elven times since the turn
of the century (Kalmanovitz 2003: 220). Healthy international prices for coffee fur-
ther boosted the industry, roughly doubling between 1900 and 1925 (Kalmanovitz
2003: 345). The health of the coffee industry permitted a period of economic mod-
ernization. Export earnings allowed growth in imports, which permitted not only
new consumer luxuries, but imports of the machinery necessary for industrializa-
tion. The national government, whose revenues quadrupled between 1919 and 1929,
more actively involved itself in sponsoring industrialization, promoting small textiles
and food processing as part of a partisan consensus in favor of industrialization.
(LeGrand 1986: 95-96). Foreign investment, mostly in the form of bank lending,
fueled this boom in the government’s finances at all levels (LeGrand 1986: 92). The
government used the funds to create a massive public works drive that at its height
employed 36,000 (more than 8% of the active rural labor force at the time) in projects
in construction of roads and railroads, stimulating migration towards cities and away
from latifundios. (LeGrand 1986: 103). Given the new demands for labor from in-
dustry and public works projects, wages grew dramatically during this period and
rural workers celebrated their newfound market power by creating unions (LeGrand
1986: 103-105). The urban migration also forced hacendados to offer higher wages to
daily laborers and improve the terms of agreements with tenant farmers (Machado
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1988: 73).
However, two events brought Colombia’s boom to an end in 1928 and 1929. First,
the price of coffee collapsed, due in part to larger than expected coffee harvests in
Brazil from 1928 until 1930 (Palacios 1980: 214-215).9 As stocks rose, the price of
coffee began to fall in mid-1928 and by 1936, the price of coffee was half what it was
in 1929 (Kalmanovitz 2003: 330). Second, the international depression led to the
suspension of credit and the abrupt closure of public construction (Palacios 1980:
214-215). Thousands of workers suddenly found themselves without work and those
who retained their jobs saw their salaries crumble (Kalmanovitz 2003). Industrial
production and exports also fell, though both began to recover by 1934 (ibid).
Most economic historians tend to conclude that signs of a recovery were evident
by the mid-1930s at the latest, as wages, exports, and industrial production resumed
their rise. However, for workers, the dislocations of the period — in particular
unemployment and their reinsertion into the rural economy — created the impetus
for new strife.
5.3.1 Land Disputes: Continuity and Intensification
Both the resurgence of the Colombian economy and its subsequent collapse in
the late 1920s strained the already tense hacendado-campesino relationship and in
particular shifted the balance of power towards the latter. During the boom years,
the relative value of land continued its sharp increase, leading both arrendatarios, in-
dependent colonos, and hacendados to seek to appropriate more land for production
and/or speculation, as hacendados continued to use the methods described above.
Public works projects, incipient industrialization, and expanding coffee production
bid up rural workers’ wages, leading to labor shortages that led one departmental-
9Similar collapses of the price of coffee due to the vicissitudes of Brazilian production have led to the sardonic
joke amongst Colombians that, “When Brazil sneezes, Colombia gets the flu.”
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level assembly to prohibit the emigration of the department’s rural workers to other
departments (Legrand 1986: 103-104). Higher wages encouraged arrendatarios and
other tenant farmers to demand improvements in their tenants’ contracts, deepening
friction with hacendados. New labor unions formed during the early 1920s, focusing
on improving both rural and urban workers’ lots (LeGrand 1986: 103-105). Eco-
nomic depression reversed many of these trends and created new tensions in rural
areas. Government policy encouraged newly unemployed workers to return to the
countryside, partly out of fear of urban worker unrest. It offered free railroad to
campesinos returning to rural life and encouraged the further colonization of frontier
areas (LeGrand 106-107). The enlargement of the rural labor force created a kind
of hacendado retrenchment, as they reestablished lower wages and more severe work
obligations on tenant farmers (LeGrand 1986: 106-107).10
The transition from boom to bust created conflicts along two axes — tenant con-
tracts and land rights — that showed both continuity and change from the first
stage of conflicts. While the core economic issues should be familiar in the light
of the first wave of land disputes in the nineteenth century, the tactic intensified.
Collective action, the breadth of each side’s claims, and the level of violence inten-
sified until the national government felt the need to step in. The reinforcement of
stringent terms for tenant farming contracts shocked campesinos returning to the
countryside. Furthermore, many hacendados responded to economic collapse by ex-
erting tighter controls on arrendatarios ’ movement throughout the haciendas and
their ability to sell surplus crops at market (Palacios 1980: 114). Hacendados’ urban
origins raised a different set of difficulties, as most lived in urban areas far from their
holdings, appointing administrators and foremen to manage tenant farmers. Arren-
10Recall again that tenant farming contracts varied substantially across regions, a fact largely ignored here in favor
of a consideration of their change across time.
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datarios frequently complained of cruel treatment at the hands of these surrogates,
as in one strike by campesinos in the town of Quipile, who complained of brutality,
near-starvation, and an obligación that exceeded agreed-upon limits (Machado 1980:
182; Palacios 1980: 114-115). In another case, this on the estate La Viña (“The
Vineyard”) in the township of Viotá in the eastern state of Cuninamarca, a group
of arrendatarios complained of “shameless” and “anti-Catholic” treatment, alleging
the severe beating of one of their rank with no provocation (Machado 1988: 114).
The right to plant coffee quickly became the dominant issue during this period. As
discussed above, hacendados prohibited arrendatarios from planting coffee for fear
of competition from smaller producers. The issue increased in importance during
the depression areas, when workers returning from rural areas, now accustomed to
a degree of economic mobility, felt the restriction on their economic independence
more deeply (LeGrand 1986: 107). Growing coffee opened a path to self-sufficiency
that work as an arrendatario clearly restricted. By 1931, arrendatarios had filed
formal complaints in twenty haciendas (Machado 1988: 189). In a formal letter
of reponse to a government minister, large landowners justified the prohibition by
citing the flood of Brazilian coffee and the resulting plunging world price for their
product, arguing that further coffee production would damage the Colombian coffee
industry and economy as a whole (Machado 1988: 194-196). They also argued that
allowing arrendatarios to plant coffee would destroy the production of foodstuffs
necessary for the survival of the haciendas and for regional economies (ibid). In
reality, allowing arrendatarios to plant coffee likely would have caused irreparable
harm to the hacienda as a form of production and thus decrease the hacendados’
economic power. The prohibition on coffee planting prevented campesinos from
attaining the kind of economic independence that would have removed them from
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large coffee estates. Forced to work fields solely through wage labor, hacendados
likely would have been driven to bankruptcy, unable to compete with small-scale,
family-driven production that, as we have noted, lent itself well to family production
(ibid). For both colonos and hacendados, the right to plant coffee as part of the
arrendatario contract would determine the division of gains from the coffee industry.
Disputes over the nature of tenant contracts reinvigorated land rights disputes. In
response to the restrictions of the arrendatario system, campesinos again began to
move from haciendas to bald́ıos, clearing land for family farms (LeGrand 1986: 107).
In doing so, they forcefully questioned the legality of hacendados’ claims to private
property appropriated in the first wave of land conflicts in the nineteenth century.
Their tactics showed a particular ingenuity. Colonos often worked at night in order to
escape the watchful eye of absentee hacendados’ hired administrators, clearing land
over the course of a few weeks. Once they had successfully cleared land, built a small
dwelling, and planted crops, they would withdraw from working on the hacienda
and file for formal legal title, claiming that the lands in questioned were bald́ıos
illegally stolen from the national patrimony by hacendados (LeGrand 1986: 107-110).
Sumapaz, in the east of the country, saw aggressive actions on the part of former
arrendatarios. A decree by the departmental government of Cudinamarca asked all
landowners to re-verify their claims in the department’s civil courts (Marulanda 1991:
79-94). In the municipality of Pandi, peasant farmers celebrated by refusing to work
the obligación and claiming private ownership of their parcels. No fewer than 800
families on the hacienda Sumapaz publicly claimed that the hacendado’s title was
fabricated and called for the division of the estate into small holdings (ibid). These
disputes spread into at least seven areas of the country, including banana plantations
along the Atlantic coast and coffee-growing regions in the west and east (LeGrand
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1986: 110-111).
The issues at stake in these disputes — the content of contracts and the legal-
ity of hacendados’ property rights — show some continuity from the first stage of
conflicts reviewed in Section 5.2. Nevertheless, the expression of conflicts evolved
and intensified, most notably in the assertiveness of the campesinos’ claims and tac-
tics.11 This period witnessed an unprecedented degree of collective action among
campesinos, which became institutionalized in unions, peasants’ interest groups, and
quasi-socialist collectives. In contrast to previous disputes, campesinos displayed a
willingness to initiate disputes. As already discussed, the boom period witnessed the
creation of the first Colombian labor unions. The National Workers’ Congress, cre-
ated in 1924 eventually gave way to the more ambitiously named Partido Socialista
Revolucionaria (PSR), or the Revolutionary Socialist Party. Though its base re-
mained largely urban, the PSR often supported campesino interests in disputes with
landlords and sent organizers into rural areas (LeGrand 1986: 105). The Partido
Agrario Nacional (National Agrarian Party, or PAN), on the other hand, dedicated
itself solely to agrarian interests. Founded by Erasmo Valencia, a journalist, the PAN
published a magazine, Claridad (Clarity), that widely published alleged accounts of
hacendado illegality and abuse (Marulanda 1991: 126-129) PAN also fielded candi-
dates in municipal and departmental elections in 1935 and Valencia found himself
an assemblyman in Cundinamarca (Marulanda 1991: 129).
The Unión Nacional Izquierdista Revolucionaria (National Leftist Revolutionary
Union, or UNIR, the Spanish word for “to unite”) also deserves special attention.
UNIR was founded in 1933 by Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, a fiery politician who had bro-
ken from the Liberal Party earlier that year. Gaitán represented a more radical,
11For the remainder of this discussion, I use the words campesino and colono interchangeably, whereas I use the
word arrendatario to indicate a campesino in the particular tenant farming contract already discussed fully.
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leftist wing of the traditional Liberal Party and created UNIR as a vehicle for a left-
ist, populist movement in Colombia. UNIR promoted agricultural causes by calling
meetings of campesinos, creating local federations, and offering legal advice on titling
and land rights issues. Gaitán, a lawyer by training, himself defended campesinos in
several court cases (Marulanda 1991: 130-131). UNIR called for a democratic and
socialist revolution in Colombia, beginning with the creation of a more democratic
economy. In agricultural terms, UNIR proposed a program in line with campesino
interests, emphasizing a first stage of dividing haciendas into smaller properties and a
second stage of heavy state involvement in agricultural production (ibid). Although
UNIR proposed a kind of corporatist or state-directed capitalism in Colombia, there
is little evidence that it advocated a communism, per se, as evidenced by its cham-
pioning of private property rights to land for campesinos and its relationship with
the Communist Party of Colombia, which consisted of “permanent confrontation”
(Marulanda 1991: 132). In addition to these national organizations, peasants also
organized themselves at the local and regional levels. Federations of arrendatarios
and squatters on one hacienda often formed, while many squatter organizations took
the form of colonies (LeGrand 1986: 128-129). The most famous of these, the Colo-
nia Agŕıcola de Sumapaz, formed by Erasmo Valencia of PAN, included more than
6,000 squatters and encompassed all of the Sumapaz region in the east (ibid).
New forms of collective action through campesino organizations provoked an ha-
cendado response. In 1928, they created the Liga de Defense, or Defense League, as
a mouthpiece for their interests and mediator for negotiations with rural workers and
the government (Marulanda 1991: 133). In 1933, hacendados created the Asociación
de Propietarios y Empresarios Agŕıcolas (Association of Agricultural Landowners
and Businessmen, or APEN), which had as its goal the defense of private property
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against what it termed subversive and communist influences (Marulanda 1991: 133).
Importantly, APEN united rich landowners from both of Colombia’s traditional po-
litical parties, Liberal and Conservative, as a defense of hacendado interests and
to counter campesino organization such as PAN and UNIR. The largest of the ha-
cendado organizations was the Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia, (Society of the
Farmers of Colombia, or SAC), which also portrayed civil strife as a result of socialist
ideas and the rejection of private property itself (Marulanda 1991: 135).
Competing campesino and hacendado organizations expanded the economic strife.
As mentioned briefly in Section 5.2, neither of these groups were monoliths; large
landowners competed against each other for rights to fertile land, as did colonos.
Intra-class discord impeded collective action, particularly since many of the conflicts
described here consisted of local actions between an hacendado and campesinos. By
the late 1920s, however, a more heterogeneous set of disputes yielded to a more
purely class-based antagonism. Although the core issues at stake — rooted in the
distribution of gains from coffee production — reflected previous clashes over land
rights, new forms of collective action imbued those disputes with a previously unseen
socio-political breadth. As has already been seen, APEN portrayed the hacendado-
colono struggles as a defense of private property itself, a question of patriotic loyalty
to capitalist development. Such movements dismissed new campesino organizations
as the product of urban or even international agitation (LeGrand 1986: 121). In turn,
campesino organizations portrayed latifundistas as opponents of Progress, stuck in
colonial, feudal practices that obstructed Colombia and impoverished the majority
of its citizens.
In a deeper sense, colono organizations such as PAN and UNIR disturbed Colom-
bia’s traditional politics, both at the local and national level. Hacendados were
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drawn from both traditional political parties, Conservative and Liberal and were
accustomed to some measure of political control over the rural poor, particularly
tenant farmers (LeGrand 1986: 122). The weakening of urban labor unions in the
wake of economic depression meant that political organizers moved to the country-
side, applying their lessons to rural constituencies in the hopes of awakening the
rural poor as an electoral constituency. Self-organized groups of squatters and/or
arrendatarios also threatened local control by removing peasants from the immedi-
ate control of their landlords. Hacendados’ reactions reflect this dynamic, as APEN
contained both Liberal and Conservative elites. The Liberal Party also responded
to these challenges by channeling rural interests into Liberal-led unions. It does not
appear that these had much success, especially given Gaitán’s exit from the party
and intra-party divisions (LeGrand 1986: 126). Altogether, the leftist campesino
movement added a political dimension to the economic struggles over land.
5.3.2 Political Bargaining: Judicial and Bureaucratic Failure
As campesino organizations sought to build a new rural political base, Liberals
returned to power after a Conservative hegemony that had begun in 1898. In 1930,
Enrique Olaya Herrera was elected president as a representative of the moderate wing
of the Liberals, to be succeeded by Alfonso López Pumarejo in 1934 as the chief of
the more leftist wing of the party. As we shall see, the results of land reforms would
not follow expectations based on the ideology of the two presidents.
Even in advance of the economic depression of the late-1920s and early-1930s,
successive Colombian governments had expressed concern for agricultural production,
fearing that a labor shortage in the countryside might short-circuit industrialization
by under-supplying foodstuffs and raising their prices, causing inflation. As the
depression developed, high unemployment triggered a fear of urban labor unrest
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and policies that encouraged a migration from the cities and colonization of bald́ıos.
Among national policymakers, a sense developed that the large estates’ monopoly
of land, backwards production methods, and under-utilization of resources were the
root cause of lethargic agricultural production, prompting one minister to state the
importance “to have done with the noxious and antiquated latifundia system, the
cause of the ruin of our agriculture” (quoted in LeGrand 1986: 97). The national
government saw the small colono as the key to building a rural middle class, quelling
unrest, and sparking agriculture (LeGrand 1986: 98). Colombian legislators, for
example, passed no less than ten laws between 1917 and 1930 designed to ease
restrictions on colonos gaining legal title to their lands and close loopholes through
which hacendados had evicted settlers (LeGrand 1986: 99). In 1926, the Supreme
Court also responded to these new goals when it announced a major decision that
re-defined the nature or private property ownership. Specifically, the judges ruled
that the entirety of Colombia would henceforth be considered public land unless the
prospective landowner could procure the original title by which he had received the
land from the colonial or national domain (LeGrand 1986: 99-100). Unlike previous
land titling provisions, the judgment rendered inadmissible documents such as wills
and previous court decisions.
The Supreme Court’s decision and the Colombian government’s enforcement ef-
fort immediately encountered a number of obstacles and contributed to confusion
regarding legal titles. Most landowners lacked original title to their lands because
such documentation had been destroyed during Colombia’s frequent nineteenth cen-
tury civil wars. Furthermore, the chaotic colonization and accompanying conflicts
of the late nineteenth century meant that hacendados often lacked title. In effect,
the Supreme Court had undermined most land ownership in the country (LeGrand
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1986: 100). Furthermore, hacendados immediately delayed execution of the law by
filing civil suits against the government (LeGrand 1986: 100-101). The Colombian
Congress failed to confirm the law, as was then legally necessary, and the Supreme
Court itself compounded the confusion by rescinding its decision in 1927, the con-
firming it in years later (LeGrand 1986: 100-102, 143-144).
Nonetheless, campesinos seized on the 1926 decision as a rejection of hacendados’
rights and vindication of campesino claims that the lands on which they squatted
were, in fact, public lands. In general, campesinos began to clear untouched lands
and plant crops, confident that the new legal framework would support their claims
that the lands were bald́ıos and hence open to colonization (Marulanda 1991: 84-
85). Arrendatarios ceased payment of their labor requirement on their haciendas
and asked for the adjudication of lands they occupied (ibid). They also leveraged
their allies in PAN and UNIR to obtain legal advice and assist in pleas for help to
municipal, departmental and national authorities. National review of one hacienda
revealed that one hacendado had converted an original legal title of 9,300 hectares into
holdings of 290,000 hectares, the majority of which remained fallow (LeGrand 1986:
113). Land invasions also became more common, as organized groups of campesinos
would occupy lands and refuse to leave, claiming it as public lands (LeGrand 1986:
115). In Sumapaz according to one estimate in 1931, 2,500 colonos had established
themselves on 500,000 hectares. In the department of Huila, tenants on one hacienda
refused to pay their obligación and squatters soon invaded the estate (LeGrand
1986: 118). In Quind́ıo in late 1931, an organized group hundreds of colonos invaded
eleven estates, with the squatters doggedly resisting arrest until 1936 (LeGrand 1986:
116). In the town of Fusagasugá, in Sumapaz, arrendatarios reacted to hacendado
opposition to their petition for fairer treatment by occupying lands, refusing to pay
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their obligations, and proclaiming the entire hacienda public land that had been
illegally appropriated (Marulanda 1991: 106-109). Colonos, it would seem, had
taken the offensive.
Alongside these judicial efforts, the Ministry of Industries, which governed agrar-
ian matters, launched a series of efforts to aid campesinos, concentrating on plans
to sub-divide large estates to create farms for campesinos. It proposed a program
by which it would buy land from hacendados and in turn sell it to colonos, creating
a national agricultural mortgage bank to financially assist campesinos in the pur-
chases (Marulanda 1991: 99). The proposal tended to create a division within the
campesino movement between those who supported the measure and those who did
not. Many opposed the policy on the grounds that it enriched hacendados while
asking peasants to pay dearly for the land that, in many cases, they already had oc-
cupied and improved (Marulanda 1991: 109-112). They argued that the government
had backtracked from its previous commitments to expropriate lands previously ap-
propriated illegally by hacendados (LeGrand 1986: 138). Furthermore, hacendados
often sold less fertile land, leaving colonos with land that could not support families
and mortgage debts. In other cases, peasants envisioned an opportunity to officially
and legally own land and participated in the program. However, the program had
only moderate success in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
These judicial and bureaucratic interventions on the part of the national govern-
ment proved pro-colono in their design and consistent with repeatedly stated goals of
increasing agricultural production and fostering social stability. However, they often
obscured further the already inconsistent jumble of legal and bureaucratic institu-
tions distinguishing between private and public property, allocating public lands,
and adjudicating disputes among citizens. Judicial actions could last as many as ten
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years (LeGrand 1986: 137). The Ministry of Industries was overwhelmed by claims
of false title and found it difficult to judge the legality of most cases (LeGrand 1986:
138). These institutional failures intensified a spiral of extra-legal, violent conflict
over land rights. In Viotá, just north of Bogotá, one thousand campesinos attacked
the town, targeting the police station and mayor’s office, wounding 25 and killing 4
(Machado 1988: 199). In the early months of 1936, twenty-five strikes had gripped
the town of Quilpe (Machado 1988: 205). Hacendados often responded with similar
acts of violence, co-opting the police as patrols to quell riots. The departmental civil
guard and local officials often could be counted on for armed support (LeGrand 1986:
119-120). In one case, a departmental government attempt to divide an hacienda
floundered when hacendados and local police forcibly ejected the peasants selected
to buy the land and defied the order (Machado 1988: 202). They also organized
gangs to eject squatters and confiscated arrendatarios ’ produce (Marulanda 1991:
87-88). In 1934, the governor of Cundinamarca declared that the region had fallen
into anarchy (Machado 1988: 204). Economic disputes over land rights threatened
the social fabric of Colombia.
5.3.3 Political Bargaining: Legislating Land Reform
By the mid-1930s campesino organizations had managed to place agrarian reform
onto the center of the political stage. Through publications, legal challenges, and
the violent instability discussed above, politicians moved towards a political solution
to the question of land rights. Judicial and bureaucratic efforts had largely failed
to quell the violence and the successive presidents turned to a more fundamental
legislative reform. President Enrique Olaya Herrera stated the issue simply in his
annual message to Congress in 1933:
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The public now must turn to an issue of singular importance to society,
so disquieting to the very spirit of our farmers that it has provoked in
certain parts of the country a precarious unrest and numerous conflicts on
the ground. That issue is property claimed by some as colonizers of public
lands and by others as private property (Mártinez 1939: 9).12
Olaya, elected under the Liberal banner in 1930, represented the more centrist wing
of the Liberal Party. His administration, however, proposed an agrarian reform that
favored colonos’. In 1933, his government created a commission to study the land is-
sue and make recommendations for reform (Mart́ınez 1939: 6, 23-24; LeGrand 1986:
144). The commission, which included members of the president’s cabinet, recom-
mended legislation in August 1933, which Olaya submitted to Congress (LeGrand
1986: 144). In proposing the law, Olaya synthesized the basis of agrarian conflicts
as follows:
In much of the country . . . the perversion of the process of legal ti-
tling has created large estates where rural laborers’ lives are subject to
the despotism of a backwards economy dedicated solely to the minimal
production of immediately consumable goods and lacking real investment,
and that without rights to the land that nourishes them, cannot support
their families, so that instead of being factors in the creation of a richer
society, are instead the cause of social unrest. If, for a long period of time,
they have remained tranquil, subdued by ignominious work regimens and
condemned to poverty, their own interests and the awakening of a collective
consciousness has uprooted this submissiveness and inspired within them
12References to the text of laws, presidential messages to Congress, reports, and Congressional debates are taken
from a compilation of all archival resources leading to the the land reforms of 1936 undertaken by Marco A. Mart́ınez
in 1939. I have translated quoted passages into English.
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an urgent reclaiming of their rights to the land. (Mart́ınez 1939: 53)
As this passage suggests, Olaya had proposed a law that largely favored the
colonos’ interests. The proposal first concluded that, owing to the inability of most
title holders to trace their titles back to the original concession from either the Colom-
bian government or Spain, the system of legal titling was irrevocably broken. Private
property, in this sense, could not exist within the realm of the law. The fourth article
of the law enshrined the exploitation of land as the only means of converting public
lands to private possession. In line with the 1926 Supreme Court decision discussed
above, then, the legislation declared that all uncultivated land would revert to the
Colombian government, regardless of legal title, unless the titular owners had put the
land to use within ten years of the bill’s passage (Mart́ınez 1939: 25). Land disputes
would be judged by the Ministry of Industry and a new set of land courts, in order
to dispense of the disputes efficiently (Mart́ınez 1939:33-41). The law also sought to
prevent any attempts to circumvent its goals through future re-concentration by re-
ducing the maximum allowable land grant (Mart́ınez 1939: 30-31). In short, Olaya’s
administration had proposed a law that challenged hacendados’ claims, limited their
ability to reclaim large expanses in the future, and decided a key legal issue —
whether land rights derived from title or from cultivation — in favor of the colonos.
LeGrand (1986: 146) cites a contemporary estimate that if the law had gone into
effect, it would have converted 75% of private property into public lands.
However, the proposal did not become law. According to the record, after its
proposal on August 30, 1933, the lower chamber of the legislature empowered a com-
mission to review the law and in October, the commission submitted its report in
advance of a second debate (Mart́ınez 1939). As part of that review, it recommended
several modifications to the bill. By Christmas 1933, the Congress had debated those
212
modifications, but new elections on February 12, 1934 ended the consideration of
the bill (New York Times 1934a).13 With the Liberal Party firmly in power, the
more radically leftist wing of the party put its champion forward and Alfonso López
Pumarejo won an election that Conservatives refused to contest (New York Times
1934a). López referred to his term in office as “la revolución en marcha,” or the “rev-
olution on the march.” However, in terms of campesinos’ political lobby in favor of
the recognition of their land rights, his election brought a political closure. Most im-
portantly, the bipartisan system had re-asserted itself. Jorge Gaitán returned to the
Liberals, winning election to Congress in the spring of 1935 and disbanding UNIR,
his independent populist movement. His motives remain unclear, but in retrospect
it seems likely that his road to the presidency would have to run through the Lib-
eral Party.14 Furthermore, López’s more left-leaning platform generally agreed with
UNIR’s orientation. Even the more combative Communist Party also supported the
revolución en marcha (LeGrand 1986: 146). National organizations that had sup-
ported colonos ’ agenda therefore became subsumed under the ascendant Liberals’
broader agenda, a trend exacerbated by López’s concentration on the urban labor
movement (LeGrand 1986: 147).
Just as López came to power, therefore, campesinos ’ ability to project their power
on the national stage seemed to dissipate. Simultaneously, attempts at parcelización,
or dividing large estates into smaller family-sized parcels, undermined collective ac-
tion at the local level. As mentioned previously, the program had evoked strong
opposition among certain quarters of the campesino movement. However, many
13Ironically, the notice of López’s election in the New York Times was accompanied by an article on the expropri-
ation of unexploited land by the Ministry of Industry (New York Times 1934b).
14Gaitán was assassinated in Bogotá on April 9, 1948 — in all likelihood not the result of a political plot — and at
the time, it seemed likely he would win the Liberal nomination for the presidential elections of 1950, having contested
the 1946 election and placed third. His assassination sparked the Bogotazo, a riot that destroyed large sections of
Bogotá and in turn eventually gave way to Colombia’s long-running civil war.
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peasants did participate and those who did seemed to lose interest in political or-
ganization (LeGrand 1986: 147). In other words, dividing estates into parcels and
selling them introduced a new heterogeneity into the campesino alliance of share-
croppers, small parcel owners, and squatters, particularly in the Sumapaz region, a
flashpoint of the conflicts.
The decline in the campesinos ’ power of collective action at the national and local
levels was compounded by the continued rise of hacendado organizations. As we have
already seen, organizations such as the APEN and the SAC already had advanced
an interpretation of the civil strife as a socialist-inspired attack on private property.
After the Olaya administration’s legislation in 1933 and López’s election in 1934,
they accelerated these efforts. The SAC formed chapters throughout the country and
won the backing of the Catholic Church (LeGrand 1986: 147). APEN, in response
to López’s expansion of state economic interventions, launched a campaign that
branded the regime as socialist and any attempt at land reform an attack on private
property. Coupled with the loss of the organizing power of the colonos, this alliance
of hacendados managed to unite “a broad cross-section of the Colombian upper
and middle classes . . . landowners, merchants, professionals, and some financial and
industrial interests.” (LeGrand 1986: 148). Importantly, that united front included
López’s own party, since hacendados inhabited both political parties. The president
seemed to have little political capital at hand.
Consequently, the new land reform law proposed by the López administration
in 1935, though superficially dedicated to the same goals as Olaya’s proposal in
1933, represented a compromise with hacendados, a compromise that in the long-
run would favor their claims (LeGrand 1986; Marulanda 1991; Safford and Palacios
2002). The comments that accompanied the proposal clarify the compromise and
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contrast sharply with Olaya’s proposal:
Because the great majority of private landholdings in Colombia lakck per-
fect titles, in the light of abstract jurisprudence, they should return to the
public domain. Technically, then, we find ourselves faced with the juridi-
cal alternative of directing this country towards a socialist orientationn, or
of re-validating such property titles, purifying them of imperfections. My
government has chosen the second path . . . Accused of doing away with
private property, this administration instead presents to you, honorable
members of Congress, the bases that it considers adequate to defend the
extant system of private property in the rural area (Mart́ınez 1939: 13-14)15
Recall that the 1933 proposal essentially allowed that only occupancy to deter-
mine ownership, with the exception of unexploited lands that the prospective owner
exploited the land within ten years. In contrast, the López proposal, which would

























Case B Case C
Figure 5.2: Land Ownership in Law 200 of 1936
In Case A, Article 1 of the legislation proposed that if a piece of land remained
unoccupied, it would be considered public. However, Article 4 inserted a loophole; if
15In this case, I rely on LeGrand’s (1986: 150) translation of this passage, with a few minor changes.
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a claimant could show title or chain of custody extending back thirty years or more,
the land would be considered the claimant’s private property. However, the land
would revert to the government if left unused for ten years after the adjudication.
In short, the law recognized what it referred to as the “social function” of private
property; land would not be allowed to lay unused. In Case C, the occupant of the
land would be considered its owner, as in the 1933 legislation. However, Case B
diverged from the 1933 legislation. If a land was disputed and one of the disputants
was a squatter who had invaded the land before 1935, then the squatter would acquire
formal ownership if he could prove five years of occupation and that the occupation
had been in good faith (i.e., that the squatter did not know the land was private).
Any squatters from 1935 or afterwards were termed illegal and subject to eviction
and imprisonment. The hacendado claiming ownership would retain ownership only
if he possessed the original title to the land, either from the Colombian or Spanish
government. If the hacendado retained legal ownership, then he would be responsible
for paying for any improvements the squatter had made to the land; if he refused,
the squatter would assume formal ownership. In the Olaya proposal, the squatter in
this case would win legal ownership, regardless of titles (Mart́ınez 1939: 123-130).16
Several more minor aspects of Law 200 of 1936 also bear mention. Deviating
from the 1933 proposal, the law set no rules for the future appropriation of bald́ıos.
In essence, the legislation neglected to attend to the question of how to prevent
future conflicts and left open the possibility of future concessions of lands in large
estates. The law also created land judges to adjudicate disputes, review titles, and
determine claims of occupancy. In addition to this new body, the law created checks
on hacendados’ ability to evict immediate squatters, particularly their ability to use
16For an excellent discussion of the fine points of the law, see Marulanda (1991: 136-246).
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the police for this function (Mart́ınez 1939: 126-127). However, opaque wording of
these provisions and hacendados’ interpretations of them law largely frustrated this
section of the law (Marulanda 1991: 195-197). Finally, the law did little to regulate
tenant farmer contracts.
By admitting the social value of private property, allowing a path for squatters
to legitimate their land claims, and restricting the ejection of squatters, Law 200 of
1936 did bow to several campesino demands. However, the law allowed estate owners
several loopholes to evict squatters, retain lands appropriated by force, and expand
their holdings in the future — loopholes they would soon exploit. Furthermore,
the years following the passage of the land reform saw hacendados’ allies in Bogotá
weaken its provisions further. Most importantly, the SAC pushed Congress to pay
supplementary legislation in 1944 that eliminated the requirement that landown-
ers exploit lands within ten years or risk the lands reverting to public ownership
(LeGrand 1986: 151). Second, legislators began to chip away at the land judges’
authority, wages, and finally, their existence. Implementing legislation was delayed
until 1938, delaying the deployment of the land judges into the countryside and
allowing hacendados to bring cases to civil judges, thought to be more friendly to
their interests (Marulanda 1991: 204). By the end of 1937, legislators had proposed
laws that would eliminate the land judges and return to civil judges the authority
to decide land tenure cases (Marulanda 1991: 237). Though this legislation failed
to pass, a 1941 decree substantially reduced the land judges’ wages, causing many
to resign, obstructing their function (Marulanda 1991: 238-239). A 1943 law finally
disposed of the land judges and granted their responsibilities to civil judges.17 Fur-
ther legislation in 1944 sought to protect hacendado interests further by introducing
17LeGrand (1986: 156-157) judges that the land judges were partial to hacendado interests and therefore concludes
that their elimination did little to further obstruct the enforcement of Law 200 of 1936.
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measures to boost share-cropping contracts, which had been threatened by the rise
of wage labor in the late 1930s (LeGrand 1986: 161-162).
What of Law 200’s effects on disputes over land rights and agricultural productiv-
ity? The immediate aftermath of the law’s passage created confusion over its terms,
as both campesinos and hacendados hoped the law would advantage their interests.
Campesinos continued land invasions in the hopes of proving five years of occupancy
to land judges in the years to come (Marulanda 1991: 205). Hacendados responded
with evictions and also took the initiative by evicting colonos and arrendatarios from
their lands. The delay in the law’s implementation lent the hacendados extra time to
utilize civil judges and local police to execute these evictions (Marulanda 1991: 205).
Once the legislation finally took effect, both sides immediately availed themselves of
its provisions, seeking rulings on land disputes. Marulanda (1991: 208) comments
that for the colonos, the land judges represented a near religious ritual and often
their best option to vindicate their land rights claims. In certain cases, hacendados
leveraged local networks to subvert land judges’ rulings; one land judge commented
that the campesinos were “persecuted daily” and often put in jail by local police
at the behest of the local estate owner (Marulanda 1991: 212-213). In one case in
Tolima, a large estate owner simply refused to acknowledge a land judge’s award of
1,500 parcels to colonos (LeGrand 1986: 157).
Despite these difficulties, Law 200 and ongoing attempts to divide haciendas for
re-sale likely democratized access to land slightly. A shift away from tenant farming
and towards drove up large estate owners’ costs; they became more willing to sub-
divide their estates to exit coffee production (Machado 1988: 237-244). LeGrand
(1986) concludes that the 1936 land reform did little to modify the system of large
estates or improve peasants’ incomes, though it did convert them to wage laborers in-
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stead of share-croppers. Neither did the legislation galvanize agriculture production.
Landlords increasingly put their land to pasture because it required fewer workers
and more quickly showed the kind of occupation required by Law 200 (LeGrand 1986:
161). Continuing fears regarding low agricultural production and the high price of
food led the national government to pass further legislation in 1944 to revive the
arrendatario system and relieve hacendados of further pressure on land rights from
colonos (LeGrand 1986: 161-162). However, evidence suggests that land disputes did
diminish overall during the period immediately after passage of Law 200, a result of
recovery from depression and the sub-division of haciendas.
5.4 Conclusions
What have we learned form this brief survey of land issues in Colombia? And what
can Colombia tell us about property rights discrimination? First, the two stages of
land conflicts within the coffee industry furthers our understanding of Chapter 2’s
emphasis on the process of property rights discrimination. In both stages of conflict
over land rights, self-interested economic actors reacted to largely exogenous shifts in
the relative value of land. When coffee production increased that value, Colombians
migrated to uncultivated areas and pursued their economic interests by clearing
land and planting crops. As they did so, they came into conflict with one another,
since they often claimed rights to the same land. A more conventional account of
property rights institutions might interject here to complain that these economic
agents sought to improve property rights institutions, clarifying titles and modifying
procedures for appropriating land, so that they could all better capture gains from
coffee production. The inability of the Colombian state to consistently articulate
and enforce a set of institutions governing the colonization of public lands, therefore,
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represents inefficient institutions.
In contrast, the case suggests that economic actors competed amongst themselves
for the gains from the coffee industry, with little sense of the most “efficient” course
for Colombia. Policy makers did seek to foster national goals, such as improving
national agricultural production. Hacendados and colonos, however, competed over
the design of rules that would affect their relative gains. Each side wished to design
property rights institutions that would essentially result in property rights discrim-
ination. Hacendados saw in land the creation of a model of coffee production that
would favor their interests by capturing a cheap labor force and allowing them to
speculate in land. Their interest in local institutions — police, mayors, and civil
courts — concentrated on closing institutional channels to colonos. In turn, colonos
engaged in extra-legal actions designed to present hacendados with a fait accompli
of occupied land already in production. They favored occupancy and production as
the basis of ownership because it favored their interests over those of landowners.
Each side hoped to build discriminatory property rights institutions that would fa-
cilitate its access to valuable rights while closing access to rights to others. In this
competitive cauldron, the health of national coffee production was an afterthought.
We can also see that bargaining over property rights institutions occurred in the
shadow of political institutions. Local political institutions played a major role in
this story, as hacendados translated their political connections into support for their
land rights claims. As Chapter 2 predicts, collective action proved difficult and, in
this case, more difficult for the campesinos, a larger, more heterogeneous group. The
sub-division of large estates into small parcels further weakened collective action,
since land-owning peasants were content to leave the protests to others. The smaller
group of hacendados found it easier to build lasting organizations to represent their
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interests, organizations that made an important difference during the national debate
over land reforms. The bipartisan nature of democratic politics in Colombia exac-
erbated this collective action problem, as campesino organizations found themselves
folded into the Liberal Party’s general agenda, where hacendado interests found rep-
resentation in both traditional parties. Simply put, political power mattered for
pursuing property rights discrimination.
This case study also suggests factors missing from the statistical analysis in Chap-
ters 3 and 4 that may help us better understand the origins of property rights dis-
crimination. Perhaps the most important of these is the role of economic inequality
in bargaining over future property rights institutions. Hacendados’ greater wealth
facilitated their efforts at crucial points in this narrative. Access to education im-
proved their access to legal institutions, experience in urban centers allowed close
access to political power, and greater funds fostered more durable organizations rep-
resenting their interests. By examining this narrative in two stages, we can also see
how a discriminatory result in the allocation of rights in the first stage of land dis-
putes left hacendados in possession of large tracts of land, a status quo that proved
difficult to budge. Previous inequality, then, may drive inequality in bargaining over
present and future institutions of private property, regardless of political regime.
This suggests a kind of path dependence in property rights institutions, where the
concentration of private property ownership will tend to foster institutions that pre-
serve and concentrate still further the possessions of the “in” group, particularly in
cases like Colombia’s where the government finds it difficult to enforce its dicta.
With these thoughts in mind, I turn to concluding the dissertation and highlight-
ing the contributions and limitations of this research.
CHAPTER VI
Conclusions
Capitalism is built upon institutions and its performance cannot be understood
without attending carefully to the institutional context, particularly the protection of
private property. This is the great insight of what this dissertation has called a hege-
monic consensus in institutional economics. That literature — alongside its followers
in the academic and public policy realms, including studies of governance, investment
climate, economic freedom, etc. — has built a theory of “economic institutions,” the
complex of rules that govern the protection of private property, resolution of disputes
over rights, and restrictions on citizens’ (and foreigners’) enjoyment of those rights.
They convincingly have argued that such institutions, broadly construed, underlie
economic agents’ decisions to invest in technology and physical and human capital.
Economic institutions meant the difference between order and anarchy, capitalism
and socialism, growth and stagnation. Empirically, the field has used sophisticated
statistical methods to quantify the impact of economic institutions on macroeconomic
performance.
Economists’ abiding interest in long-run economic growth has motivated their
emphasis on the public benefits of protecting private property. However, it has also
obscured the distributional benefits of protecting private property. In this disser-
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tation, I break from that tendency to build a theoretical and empirical narrative
rooted in a single premise — that economic actors desire and politicians can provide
property rights discrimination, protecting only certain groups’ rights while ignoring
or violating others’ rights in order to fix the distribution of economic activity. In the
preceding chapters, this research has moved from economic and political institutional
theories, through the statistical analysis of cross-national surveys of firm managers,
and ended in the rural frontier of 1930s Colombia. Here, I pause to summarize briefly
this dissertation’s approach and revisit Chapter 1’s discussion of its contributions to
the study of political economy.
6.1 The Political Economy of Property Rights Discrimination
This dissertation began with a seemingly unassailable consensus in institutional
economics that identifies the quality of institutions that protect private property as
the primary factor affecting international divergence in economic performance. In
short, countries with robust institutions protecting private property grow and those
that lack such institutions stagnate or collapse. With the collapse of the Soviet bloc
and conversion of many Eastern European economies to capitalism, this academic
consensus also seized the imagination of public policy makers around the world,
including at some of the most powerful international financial institutions and aid
agencies. The consensus made intuitive sense and satisfied economic liberals’ faith
in free markets and private property. It helped explain the economic dislocations of
socialist economic policies from Mao’s China to Allende’s Chile and supported the
case for institutional reform around the globe.
Beginning in Chapter 1, I examined this consensus more closely. Economists’
focus on property rights institutions originated in the search for an explanation of
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differences in economic performance across countries and time. Consequently, insti-
tutional economists have largely studied the public benefits of property rights insti-
tutions, particularly on economic growth. This focus on international comparisons of
institutions and economic performance, I argued, concealed a vital assumption of the
literature — that property rights institutions are public goods, inexhaustible and un-
differentiable. The public good assumption was useful, yielding a more tractable set
of institutional comparisons — property rights institutions varied only internation-
ally and only along one dimension. Certain countries had “high-quality” institutions
that protected contract and property rights, where others had “low-quality” institu-
tions that left those rights in limbo. Like any simplifying assumption, the public good
assumption served a purpose in the construction of a body of knowledge concerning
growth and institutions.
I assert that the public goods assumption has out-lived its usefulness, obscuring
the nature, origins, and consequences of property rights institutions. In effect, the
public good assumption requires the acceptance of one or both of two presumptions
regarding private property rights, one about economic agents’ demand for property
rights institutions and the other about politicians’ supply of those institutions. First,
it presumes that a self-interested economic agent prefers property rights institutions
that protect other agents’ rights, as well. By protecting other agents, property rights
institutions facilitate an agent’s acquisition of rights and involvement in contracts
that maximize her gains. Second, it imagines that, even if that demand existed,
politicians cannot differentiate the protection of private property. Although the ac-
tual mechanisms by which institutions that protect private property are left unclear,
scholars have assumed those mechanisms cannot be closed to particular segments of
society.
224
In contrast, I claim that economic actors demand, and politicians can provide,
property rights discrimination. In contrast to the hegemonic consensus on private
property institutions, I argue that, under certain circumstances, an economic actor
profits mightily from institutions’ failure to protect other agents’ rights. At the very
least, there is no reason to believe that economic agents require the protection of
other agents’ rights. Using a simple extension of the Coase Theorem, I show how
the allocation of rights affects the distribution of economic benefits, suggesting that
economic actors, all else equal, prefer institutions that allow them to extend their
economic rights. Under certain circumstances, politicians will differentiate the pro-
tection of private property rights to create an “in” group of well-protected rights
and an “out” group of unprotected rights. Chapter 3 provides the empirical coun-
terpart to this theoretical contention. Previous measures of the quality of property
rights institutions inhered the public goods assumption, characterizing institutions
as varying across countries, but not within them. In contrast, I allow the data to
speak for themselves as to the distribution property rights institutional quality. I
analyze data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, which ask firm managers in
a wide range of countries to state their confidence in the protection of their private
property rights. The careful design and analysis of firm-level measures of property
rights confidence reveals a pattern that supports the theoretical case for property
rights discrimination. In short, property rights confidence varies within countries
and the degree of within-country variation itself varies across countries.
The decisive first step of this dissertation, then, is a kind of existence proof for
property rights discrimination, a phenomenon unexpected by previous research in
institutional economics.1 In short, property rights discrimination exists and varies
1As Chapter 1 discusses, previous authors have attended to discrimination in property rights institutions (Knight
1992; Haber, Razo and Maurer 2003; Acemoglu et al 2004).
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meaningfully across countries. In making this claim, I fundamentally re-define the
nature of institutional failure. In certain countries, institutional failure is total;
most, if not all, actors suffer from weak property rights protection from the state,
with grave repercussions for macroeconomic performance. In other countries with
the same “mean” institutional obstacles, failure is discriminatory in nature. An
“in” group enjoys relatively secure rights, whereas an “out” group must suffer the
violation of its rights, either through negligence or official policy. The next step after
defining the phenomenon is theorizing its origins and repercussions.
In Chapters 2 and 3, I attend to the question of the micro and macroeconomic
consequences of property rights discrimination. The hegemonic view from institu-
tional economics commits a form of ecological inference. The logic of property rights
protection is fundamentally microeconomic in nature; when an individual doubts
the protection of her property rights, she will forego otherwise profitable economic
activity. Yet tests of that logic tend to use macroeconomic data; countries with
better property rights institutions also perform better. Thinking of property rights
confidence as distributed allows a test both of the basic logic of property rights and
of the microeconomic effect of property rights discrimination. In short, citizens with
greater confidence in protection of their private property rights should invest more,
transact in the formal economy, and use more sophisticated financial instruments.
Chapter 2 also considers, however, how property rights discrimination influences
macroeconomic outcomes, as well. Again, I lean on the Coase Theorem. In the
presence of non-zero transaction costs, discriminatory property rights institutions
will threaten aggregate efficiency. When property rights institutions funnel rights
towards an “in” group chosen for any reason other than efficiency, rights will fail to
accrue to productive actors, with consequences for the aggregate performance of the
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economy.
Chapter 3 tests these intuitions. Using statistical methods designed for multi-
level data, I generally find empirical support for the notion that firm managers alter
their behavior in response to their confidence in their property rights. All else equal,
higher property rights confidence correlates positively with investment and negatively
with informality, even when controlling for the national-level mean of property rights
confidence. At the macroeconomic level, findings suggest that aggregate informality
declines in mean property rights confidence, but that effect depends on the degree of
property rights discrimination. Though weaker than might be expected, Chapter 3
does provide general support for Chapter 2’s portrait of the micro and macroeconomic
consequences of property rights discrimination.
Having theorized and estimated empirically the extent and impact of property
rights discrimination, I turn to the issue of its origins. Following previous accounts, I
conceptualize property rights institutions as the outcome of bargaining between self-
interested economic agents and politicians. Exogenous shifts in the relative value of
resources tend to exert pressure on property rights institutions, as when technological
change enables new forms of economic activity that raise questions unanticipated by
extant institutions. When such shifts occur, economic agents will form preferences
over changes to property rights institutions. A key insight of institutional economics
their common interest in promoting efficient institutions. In contrast, I emphasize
how their preferences often conflict, leading to competition over changes to property
rights institutions. Agents will vary in their ability to overcome the collective action
problem and successfully lobby politicians; smaller, richer, and more homogenous
groups of agents will more likely win this institutional competition. More funda-
mentally, however, I argue that this competition is inherently political, occurring
227
according to the rules set by political institutions. Therefore, a particular citizen’s
probability of securing favorable changes to property rights institutions depends on
her relationship to politicians, as structured by political institutions.
This discussion begs the question of how political institutions affect the distri-
bution of property rights confidence. In Chapter 2, I consider two sets of theories
that answer this question. First, I blend disparate claims regarding how democ-
racy shapes politicians’ incentives to protect private property. I argue that while
democratic leaders are tempted to discriminate against the property rights of the
rich, non-democratic leaders will discriminate in favor of the rich. However, more
extensive limits on executive power in democracy should temper property rights dis-
crimination more generally. Second, I consider the predictions of the selectorate
theory of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and his co-authors (2002). The theory’s logic
suggests that politicians will wish to discriminate the protection of private property
in favor of members of their winning coalition. However, their willingness to do so
depends on the size of the winning coalition, particularly in relation to the selec-
torate, or the group from which the winning coalition is drawn. The theory suggests
little property rights discrimination in large-winning coalition regimes (e.g., mass
democracies), as most citizens should enjoy full confidence in their private property
rights. In contrast, we should expect some property rights discrimination in non-
democracies, though its shape will vary. In medium-W , large-S regimes, the larger
winning coalition encourages wider property rights protections, but the strong loy-
alty norm counteracts that effect; the result will be strong property rights protection
for the winning coalition, but weaker rights for those outside the winning coalition.
In contrast, small-W , small-S regimes will protect the rights of the winning coalition
as a private good, since it is so small. However, the weak loyalty norm motivates
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leaders to protect property rights of those outside the winning coalition in order to
augment economic performance. In these latter two regime types, mean property
rights confidence will be similar, but its distribution will differ.
Each of the theories of the political institutional origins of property rights discrim-
ination predicts not only the general pattern of property rights discrimination, but
also whose rights more likely suffer. To test those hypotheses, I return to the World
Bank Enterprise Surveys. Using statistical techniques recommended for multi-level
data, Chapter 4 reports on models that test the principal hypotheses of Chapter 2.
That analysis first provides strong empirical support for the collective action con-
ceptualization of bargaining; all else equal, larger, state-owned, and exporting firms
report higher confidence in the protection of their private property rights. In con-
trast, the results on democracy are mixed. Firms in democratic countries generally
exhibit lower property rights confidence. However, it does not seem that that effect
emanates from efforts by democratic politicians to redistribute rights from rich to
poor citizens. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that politically influential firms en-
joy great property rights confidence in autocratic countries, but not in mixed regimes
and democracies. This evidence partially favors Chapter 2’s portrait of democracy.
However, Chapter 4’s attempt to test the hypotheses of the selectorate theory is
largely frustrated by the difficulty of creating firm-level measures that match the
demands of the theory. The initial tests conducted suggest that regimes with large
winning coalitions tend towards lower mean property rights confidence, but a tighter
distribution about that mean.
Altogether, the statistical analysis of Chapters 3 and 4 show strong evidence that
property rights discrimination exists; tentative evidence that it affects firm behav-
ior and national economic performance; weak evidence that democracy affects the
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pattern of property rights confidence, and no corroborating evidence for my interpre-
tation of the selectorate theory. In Chapters 3 and 4, I consider whether this generally
weak empirical portrait is the consequence of a selection bias inherent in firm-level
surveys. Since property rights discrimination likely stops “out” group members from
starting businesses, a survey of existing firms likely understates the degree of prop-
erty rights discrimination, its effect, and the effect of political institutions. However,
the early state of research into the origins of property rights institutions, the need
for greater validation of the concept of property rights discrimination, and this sta-
tistical weakness all suggest the utility of close case analysis. Therefore, Chapter 5
shifts focus and method to carefully elaborate the history of land rights conflicts in
nineteenth and twentieth century Colombia.
Chapter 5’s analysis of land conflicts within the Colombian coffee industry empha-
sizes the process of property rights discrimination. In two stages of conflict over land
rights, self-interested actors — peasant settlers and large estate owners — reacted
to largely exogenous shifts in the relative value of land to compete over land rights.
In doing so, each set of actors pursued a vision of Colombian coffee production that
would maximize its gains. They did so within the context of a weak Colombian
state. Though Colombian policy makers attempted to foster national goals (e.g.,
galvanize agricultural production), their attempts at governing this competition re-
sulted in a jumble of conflict property rights institutions. The hegemonic school of
property rights institutions would find in this case proof that “inefficient” property
rights institutions inhibited production and exacerbated economic conflict. However,
the case also reveals patterns of property rights discrimination. Large estate owners
largely succeeded in leveraging their greater wealth and control over local institu-
tions to enforce their prerogatives over land. At the national level, they built more
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enduring forms of collective action in the pursuit of land reform, given the smaller,
more homogenous group of actors. The bipartisan nature of democratic politics mag-
nified this advantage, as peasant organizations found themselves subservient to the
Liberal Party’s broader agenda, while large estate owners enjoyed support from both
traditional parties. Neither side in these conflicts enjoyed perfect property rights
confidence, yet it seems clear that large estate owners largely succeeded in fending
off challenges to their land rights.
6.2 Contributions and the Road Ahead
At its core, this dissertation proposes a new dimension by which we should rate
the performance of property rights institutions and, by extension, the governments
that create them. It thus re-states Huntington’s (1968: 1) proposition — the most
important political economic distinction among countries concerns neither their form
nor their degree of government, but their distribution of government. Its principal
contribution to the study of political economy, therefore, is the very idea of property
rights discrimination — that it exists, matters for microeconomic and macroeconomic
outcomes, and is the predictable outcome of a discoverable process. I conclude by
considering soberly this dissertation’s contribution to the study of political economy
and identifying new avenues of research it implies.
For a moment, let us consider the political economy of trade as an instructive
example. A country’s volume of international trade likely has a positive effect on a
country’s macroeconomic growth rate (Frankel and Romer 1999). However, scholars
do not assume that the design of trade policy revolves around an effort to maxi-
mize the aggregate benefits. Rather, political economists theorize trade policy as the
product of rent-seeking behavior by different interest groups whose relative power
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over policy depends on their ability to act collectively, the nature of the country’s
economy, and political institutions. Likewise, the public benefits of institutions that
fairly and vigorously protect private property should not blind us to the process
through which those institutions are created. In a fundamental sense, the protec-
tion of one citizen’s property rights necessitates restricting other citizens’ behavior;
your rights to your car inherently prohibit me from stealing it. As with trade, this
dissertation proposes that the origins of property rights institutions can only be un-
derstood as the result of a process by which actors pursue their self-interest, which
fixes their distributional implications as the starting point for theory-building. We
should therefore apply the tools of political economy (e.g., the formal study of in-
stitutions) — tools that have furthered our understanding of fiscal policy, central
bank independence, and trade policy — to the study of the design of property rights
institutions.
Ironically, a valuable first step in this effort would be to define the sadly obscure
term “property rights institutions.” The central hypothesis of this agenda — that ac-
tors’ economic behavior depends on their confidence in the protection of their private
property rights — is based on economic agents’ perceptions, rather than the design of
specific institutions, such as the judiciary or bureaucracy. Institutional economics, in
contrast, has chosen to theorize and measure the latter concept, measuring the “effi-
ciency” of specific arms of the state. We observed many such institutions in play in
Chapter 5’s analysis of Colombian land rights disputes. Economic actors disputed the
design of judicial institutions that would judge property rights disputes, bureaucratic
rules that restricted the appropriation of land rights, etc. In turn, those institutions
influenced actors’ confidence in their land rights. We do well, however, to distinguish
between the function of, say, judicial institutions on one hand and citizens’ property
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rights confidence on the other. At the very least, these are conceptually distinct.
This discussion suggests that researchers should work towards a consensus on
defining and measuring property rights institutions, an effort that could work along
two tracks. First, cross-national survey research holds great promise as a means to
measuring individuals’ property rights confidence. Here, I use firm-level surveys to
accomplish those goals, but the selection bias discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 sug-
gest that individual-level surveys might improve upon that choice. Individual-level
surveys might allow us to directly assess the distribution of property rights confi-
dence within any given country and investigate why those distributions vary across
countries. Analyzing such data would also facilitate the statistical investigation of
why certain citizens’ rights more generally suffer from property rights discrimina-
tion. Second, researchers should work towards the identification and investigation of
specific institutions that protect private property rights. For example, Haber, Razo,
and Maurer (2003) identify different methods that successive short-lived Mexican
governments used to protect particular industries’ property rights, allowing growth
in key sectors during civil war. In a far less impressive effort, Chapter 5 identifies
various institutions, including local ones, that protected land rights. Finally, re-
searchers might unite these two efforts by testing whether those institutions really
do increase property rights confidence. For example, we might assume that judicial
independence instills greater confidence in private property rights, but do not test
that assumption.
Finally, I propose that researchers begin to build more dynamic explanations of
the origins of property rights discrimination. Both the theoretical framework and
the statistical tests were static in nature. Chapter 2 envisions that modifications
to property rights institutions depend on the reigning political institutions. That
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framework did not allow the distribution of economic resources or the nature of the
extant property rights institutions to influence bargaining. Likewise, the nature of
the data used in Chapters 3 and 4 do not allow an analysis of how the distribu-
tion of property rights confidence changes over time. However, Chapter 5 strongly
suggests a particular form of path dependence. Large landowners consistently trans-
lated their wealth and standing in society into new rules that favored their economic
interests. Consequently, campesinos found it difficult to lobby for rules that would
recognize their land claims. Economic inequality began continued property rights
discrimination, which in turn reinforced economic inequality. Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson (2004) propose a “hierarchy of institutions” that accords with this
view, arguing that the openness of political institutions, fairness of economic institu-
tions, and distribution of resources modify each other across time, creating patterns
of economic inequality and institutional change. Thinking in these terms, perhaps
including the use of formal models and even complex systems, will yield new under-
standing of the origins not only of property rights institutions, but the distribution
of wealth and political institutions.
In this sense, the continued study of property rights institutions promises new
answers to foundational questions of the development of democracy and wealth. Let
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[44] José Antonio Ocampo Gavira. Colombia y la economı́a mundial, 1830-1910. Siglo XXI,
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Bogotá, Colombia, 1991.
[74] Fred S. McChesney. Government as definer of property rights: Tragedy exiting the commons?
In Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and Law, ed. by Terry L. Anderson and Fred S.
McChesney.
[75] Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard. A rational theory of the size of government. Journal
of Political Economy, 89(5):914–927, 1978.
[76] New York Times. Colombia takes back 1,000,000 idle acres. page E8, February 11, 1934.
239
[77] New York Times. Colombia to elect a president today. page 32, February 11, 1934.
[78] Douglass North. Structure and Change in Economic History. W. W. Norton and Company,
New York, NY, 1981.
[79] Douglass North. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1990.
[80] Mancur Olson. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1965.
[81] Mancur Olson. The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social
Rigidities. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1982.
[82] Mancur Olson. Dictatorship, democracy, and development. American Political Science Re-
view, 87(3):567–576, 1993.
[83] Mancur Olson, Naveen Sarna, and Anand V. Swamy. Governance and growth: A sim-
ple hypothesis explaining cross-country differences in productivity growth. Public Choice,
102(3):341–364, 2000.
[84] Elinor Ostrom. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1990.
[85] Marco Palacios. Coffee in Colombia, 1850-1970: An economic, social, and political history.
Cambridge University Press, Oxford, UK, 1980.
[86] A. Mitchell Polinsky. An Introduction to Law and Economics. Little & Brown, Boston, MA,
1989.
[87] Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi. Political regimes and economic growth. Journal of
Economoic Perspectives, 7(3):51–69, 1993.
[88] William Riker and Itai Sened. The origins of property rights. American Journal of Political
Science, 35(4):951–969, 1991.
[89] Dani Rodrik. Getting institutions right. Mass. Mimeo. Available at: http://ksghome. har-
vard. edu/drodrik/ifo-institutions% 20article% 20 April% 202004 . pdf, 2004.
[90] Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. Institutions rule: The primacy of
institutions over geography and integration in economic development. Journal of Economic
Growth, 9:131–165, 2004.
[91] Clinton Rossiter, editor. The Federalist Papers. Penguin Books, New York, NY, 1961.
[92] Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth Paul Ericson, editors. Comparative Political Dynamics.
Harper Collins, New York, NY, 1991.
[93] Jeffrey D. Sachs. Institutions don’t rule: Direct effects of geography on per capita income.
NBER Working Paper 9490, February 2003.
[94] Frank Safford and Marco Palacios. Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society. Oxford
University Press, Oxford, UK, 2002.
[95] Edella Schlager and Elinor Ostrom. Property rights regimes and natural resources. Land
Economics, 68(3):249–262, 1992.
[96] Amartya Sen. Development as Freedom. Anchor Books, New York, NY, 1999.
[97] Itai Sened. The Political Institution of Private Property. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, UK, 1997.
240
[98] David Stasavage. Private investment and political institutions. Economics and Politics,
14(1):41–63, 2002.
[99] Marco R. Steenbergen and Bradford S. Jones. Modeling multilevel data structures. American
Journal of Political Science, 46(1):218–237, 2002.
[100] Jakob Svensson. Investment, property rights and political instability: Theory and evidence.
European Economic Review, 42:1317–1341, 1998.
[101] Charles Tilly. The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Princeton University
Press, Princeton, NJ, 1975.
[102] Shawn Treier and Simon Jackman. Democracy as a latent variable. American Journal of
Political Science, 52(1):201–217, 2008.
[103] James R. Vreeland. Research note: A problem with polity — unpacking anocracy. Unpub-
lished manuscript. Yale University. Available at: http://pantheon. yale. edu/jrv9/Vreeland
anocracy. pdf, 2005.
[104] Barry R. Weingast. The political foundations of democracy and the rule of law. American
Political Science Review, 91(2):245–263, 1997.
[105] World Bank Group. World bank enterprise surveys. Dataset and documentation available at:
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.
[106] World Bank Group. Doing Business in 2004. World Bank Press, Washington, DC, 2004.
[107] World Bank Group. Doing business. Dataset available at: http://www.doingbusiness.org,
2007.
[108] World Bank Group. World bank enterprise surveys implementation notes. Available at:
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org, 2007.
[109] World Bank Group. Doing Business in 2008. World Bank Press, Washington, DC, 2008.
[110] World Bank Group Governance and Anti-Corruption (GAC) Group. Strengthening world
bank group engagement on governance and anticorruption. Unpublished paper., 2007.
[111] World Bank Independent Evaluation Group. Doing business: An independent evaluation.
Report published by the World Bank Press., 2008.
[112] Yi Feng. Democracy, Governance, and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence. The
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2003.
